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The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
Charter) on the employment relationship. The Charter has long been praised for its inclusion 
of socio-economic rights alongside traditional civil and political rights. It might have been 
thought, therefore, that the Charter would be a particularly potent tool in the employment 
context, characterised as it is, by the continuous interaction between economic and social 
rights. However, to draw an analogy from George Orwell’s Animal Farm, although ‘all rights 
are equal, some rights are more equal than others’. Not only does the Charter distinguish 
between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’, but the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) seems actively to 
prioritise the Charter’s economic freedoms over the social rights. This thesis focuses on the 
consequences of this variable geometry for the regulation of the employment relationship. In 
particular, it examines the widening gap between contractual autonomy/business freedom as a 
fundamental right found in article 16 of the Charter and the employment rights contained in 
the Solidarity Title.  
 
Of particular concern from an employee’s perspective is the decision of the CJEU in the case 
of Alemo-Herron and its progeny. In a series of highly deregulatory judgments, the CJEU has 
found that the employee-protective aim of the relevant legislation was incompatible with the 
employer’s freedom to conduct a business. At the same time, the CJEU has been reluctant to 
invoke the Charter’s employment rights to give an employee-friendly reading to legislation. 
The effect of this divergence for the employment relationship is explored in two ways. On a 
micro level, the thesis looks to the very practical or ‘day to day’ influence of fundamental 
rights at various stages in the life cycle of the employment contract. It addresses the 
relationship between individually agreed employment terms and fundamental rights sources. 
The macro level considers the broader question of the effect of fundamental rights on the EU’s 
(or the State’s) ability to regulate the employment relationship more generally. It is 
demonstrated that there may be a systemic problem with fundamental economic freedoms 
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I. Introduction and Methodology 
 
1. Background  
 
This thesis seeks to examine the impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) 
on the employment relationship. The Charter has long been praised for its inclusion of socio-
economic rights alongside traditional civil and political rights. It might have been thought, 
therefore, that the Charter would be a particularly potent tool in the employment context, 
characterised as it is, by the continuous interaction between economic and social rights. 
However, to draw an analogy from George Orwell’s Animal Farm, although ‘all rights are 
equal, some rights are more equal than others’. Not only does the Charter distinguish between 
‘rights’ and ‘principles’, but the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) seems actively to prioritise the 
Charter’s economic freedoms over the social rights. This thesis focuses on the consequences 
of this variable geometry for the regulation of the employment relationship. In particular, it 
examines the widening gap between contractual autonomy as a fundamental right found in 
article 16 of the Charter and the employment rights contained in the Solidarity Title.  
 
Of particular concern from an employee’s perspective is the decision of the CJEU in the case 
of Alemo-Herron and its progeny. In a series of highly deregulatory judgments, the CJEU has 
found that the employee-protective aim of the relevant legislation was incompatible with the 
employer’s freedom to conduct a business. At the same time, the CJEU has been reluctant to 
invoke the Charter’s employment rights to give an employee-friendly reading to legislation. 
The effect of this divergence for the employment relationship is explored in two ways. On a 
micro level, the thesis looks to the very practical or ‘day to day’ influence of fundamental 
rights at various stages in the life cycle of the employment contract. It addresses the 
relationship between individually agreed employment terms and fundamental rights sources. 
The macro level considers the broader question of the effect of fundamental rights on the EU’s 
(or the Member States’) ability to regulate the employment relationship more generally. It 
demonstrates that there may be a systemic problem with fundamental economic freedoms 
being prioritised over social rights.  
 




The reference point of this thesis will remain primarily on the relationship between EU 
fundamental rights and the English common law contract of employment. The common law 
will be used in two respects, first, in considering the effect of fundamental rights arguments 
on common law principles, notably freedom of contract, and second, by examining the ability 
of common law concepts, for example implied terms, to encapsulate or promote fundamental 
employment rights.  
 
It may be thought a particularly (in)opportune moment to be examining this question following 
the decision of the British people to leave the European Union, but there are several reasons 
for choosing to examine the Charter’s impact on common law principles. First, the thesis was 
conceived prior to Brexit and the common law is the legal system best known to the author. 
Second, the EU will continue to be composed of a few other common law jurisdictions. Third, 
even following Brexit, existing employment legislation—including the Charter’s influence on 
that legislation—will be preserved at least for the time being. Fourth, as the Commission’s 
draft guidelines make clear, the EU is likely to insist that the UK replicate and maintain an 
equivalent level of social protection in return for any free trade agreement. Fifth, it is a useful 
stock-taking exercise to examine the current impact of EU human rights on employment 
legislation and thereby the employment contract, as this will demonstrate what the UK stands 
to lose (or indeed gain) during the Brexit process.  
 
Part of this thesis will also explore the alternative ways in which the English common law 
might take up the fundamental rights baton in the absence of the Charter. Finally, there are 
broader lessons to be drawn for both the UK and the EU as to the appropriate balance to be 
achieved between the regulation of the employment relationship in order to protect employees 
and the business autonomy of employers.  
 
Although this is not intended to be a ‘Brexit thesis’, it is difficult to escape the emphasis placed 
on the Charter and indeed the role of the CJEU more generally during the referendum 
campaign. The Prime Minister, from as early as the Conservative Party Conference in October 
2016 made the uncharacteristically specific commitment to leaving the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU a ‘red line’ issue for the Brexit negotiations.1 It was, however, Boris Johnson who led 
the way in deriding the Charter’s influence over British legislation. In the Telegraph article in 
which he first declared his support for Brexit, Mr Johnson wrote:  
                                                          




[i]t was one thing when that court contented itself with the single market, and ensuring 
that there was free and fair trade across the EU. We are now way beyond that stage. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the court has taken on the ability to vindicate people’s rights 
under the 55-clause “Charter of Fundamental Human Rights”, including such peculiar 
entitlements as the right to found a school, or the right to “pursue a freely chosen 
occupation” anywhere in the EU, or the right to start a business (…) These are not 
fundamental rights as we normally understand them, and the mind boggles as to how 
they will be enforced. Tony Blair told us he had an opt-out from this charter. Alas, that 
opt-out has not proved legally durable, and there are real fears among British jurists 
about the activism of the court.2  
 
It is apparent, then, that for eurosceptics such as Johnson, the Charter was an unacceptably 
powerful weapon in the CJEU’s arsenal, capable as it was, of overriding national sovereignty. 
Any undergraduate law student could point out the inaccuracy of Johnson’s assessment. 
Indeed, anyone could point out the inconsistency between raising fears of the Charter’s 
influence while simultaneously sneering at the difficulties of enforcing its provisions. As this 
thesis will show, however, there may be more than a grain of truth to the argument that the 
Charter is both inert and yet unpredictably dynamic. The employment context provides a useful 
backdrop against which to assess these apparent contradictions.  
 
3. Human rights and the employment relationship  
 
The idea of examining the relationship between human rights and the employment relationship 
is not a particularly novel one. However, much of the existing literature tends either to focus 
on the role in the employment context of civil/political/public human rights—notably those 
found in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)3 or notes the influence of human 
                                                          
2 Boris Johnson, ‘There is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want – Vote to Leave the EU’ The Daily 
Telegraph 16 March 2016.  
3 See for eg Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’ in Mark 
Freedland (ed), The Contract of Employment (OUP 2016) 188; Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and Unfair 
Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’ (2008) 71 MLR 912; Gillian S Morris, ‘Fundamental Rights: Exclusion 
by Agreement?’ (2001) 30 ILJ 49; Hugh Collins, ‘Theories of Rights as Justifications for Labour Law’ in Guy 
Davidov and Brian Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2011) 137; K D Ewing, C A Gearty and B A 
Hepple, Human Rights and Labour Law (Mansell 1994); Robin Allen and Rachel Crasnow, Employment Law 
and Human Rights (OUP 2002); Robin Allen, Rachel Crasnow and Anna Beale, Employment Law and Human 
Rights (OUP 2007); John Bowers and Jeremy Lewis, Employment Law and Human Rights (Sweet & Maxwell 
2001); Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Law and Human Rights’ 41 (2016) New Zealand Journal of Employment 
Relations 3; Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’ 
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rights on private law more generally,4 or finally sets out the potential effects of the Charter’s 
employment rights in a rather broad-brush manner, placing a particular emphasis on the 
legislative process and on ‘Social Europe’ rather than on the contract of employment itself.5 
These trends are understandable. The ECHR has been incorporated into domestic law since 
1998 via the Human Rights Act (HRA) and so its effects on the employment relationship have 
been more fully fleshed out. The Charter, by contrast, is still a relatively new instrument, 
having achieved binding legal status only in 2009. In addition, the Charter’s drafters, as we 
shall see, appear to have gone out of their way to ensure that the social provisions would have 
a minimum impact on domestic employment law. Despite this, the potential influence of the 
Charter on specific types of contract is beginning to be recognised.6 The influence of 
contractual autonomy as a fundamental right has also gained traction in recent years, largely 
as an immediate reaction to the above-mentioned decision in Alemo-Herron.7  
 
4. Original contribution  
 
                                                          
(2013) 73 MLR 909; Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An 
Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 529; 
Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Private Life and Dismissal: Pay v UK’ (2009) 38 ILJ 133.   
4 See for eg Hugh Collins, ‘The Challenges Presented by Fundamental Rights to Private law’ in Kit Barker, Karen 
Fairweather, Ross Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart 2017); Olha O Cherednychenko and 
Norbert Reich, ‘The Constitutionalization of European Private Law: Gateways, Constraints and Challenges’ 
(2015) European Review of Private Law 797; Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal Application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (2013) 38 ELRev 479; Hugh Collins, ‘The (In)compatibility of Human Rights and Private 
Law’ in Hans W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014); Hugh Collins, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law as a Path to Social Justice?’ in Hans W Micklitz (ed), The Many 
Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (Elgar 2011); Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal Effect of 
Fundamental Rights: In Search of Social Justice or Private Autonomy in EU Law?’ in Ulf Bernitz and others 
(eds), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer 2013) 171; Arthur Hartkamp, 
‘Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Contract Law’ in Stefan Grundman (ed), Constitutional Values 
and European Contract Law (Kluwer 2008) 85; Olha O Cherednychenko, ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Law: 
A Relationship of Subordination or Complementarity?’ (2007) 3 Utrecht Law Review 1; Olha O 
Cherednychenko, ‘The Constitutionalization of Contract Law: Something New under the Sun?’ (2004) 8 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law; Hugh Collins, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on Contract Law in Europe’ 
(2011) 22 European Business Law Review 425;  
5 See for eg Mark Bell, ‘Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law’ in Hans W Micklitz (ed), 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014) 137; Catherine Barnard, ‘The Protection of 
Fundamental Social Rights in Europe After Lisbon: A Question of Conflicts of Interest’ in Sybe de Vries and 
others (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon (Hart 2013) 37; Catherine Barnard, 
‘The Silence of the Charter: Social Rights and the Court of Justice’ in Sybe de Vries and others (eds), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument: Five Years Old and Growing (Hart 2015) 173; Marianne 
Gijzen, ‘The Charter: A Milestone for Social Protection in Europe’ (2001) 8 MJ 33; Steve Peers and others (eds), 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014); Tamara Hervey and Jeff Kenner, Economic 
and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Hart 2003).  
6 Hugh Collins (ed), European Contract Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Intersentia 2017).  
7 See for eg Stephen Weatherill, ‘Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper 
Veneration of “Freedom of Contract”’ (2014) 10 ERCL 167; Jeremias Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General 
Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law’ 
(2013) 42 ILJ 434; Jeremias Prassl, ‘Business Freedom and Employment Rights in the European Union’ (2015) 
17 CYELS 189.  
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The original contribution of this thesis can be seen in a number of aspects. First, there is the 
contrasting examination of the influence of human rights at both the level of the individual 
contract and more broadly on the regulation of the employment relationship. Second, the thesis 
adopts a comprehensive analysis of the influence of the Solidarity Title, juxtaposing it with 
article 16 on the freedom to conduct a business. This has simply not been possible until now 
given the dearth of case law, with existing analysis remaining largely speculative in nature, 
although as explained below, this is a charge that may also be levelled at elements of this thesis. 
The third original aspect is the questioning of the wider systemic effects of prioritising the 
Charter’s economic freedoms over its employment rights. As such, a comparison is made 
between Alemo-Herron and previous ‘landmark’ (allegedly) deregulatory judgments such as 
Lochner and the infamous Viking/Laval line of cases. Did these cases have the impact that 
labour lawyers feared, and will Alemo-Herron go the same way? Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, is the application of these fundamental rights principles to common law concepts. 
Classic common law contractual concepts such as derogability and default terms are re-
examined through a fundamental rights lens, with the Charter acting as the focal point. Put 
simply, the question is how do fundamental rights via the medium of employment legislation 
trickle down to the individual contract of employment?  
 
5. Why the Charter?  
 
The next question that must be addressed is why does this thesis focus on the Charter at all? 
Commentators have long discussed the potential effects of human rights arguments on the 
employment relationship even prior to the adoption of the Charter in 2000 and its granting of 
legal effect in 2009. The reasons for choosing the Charter are two-fold. First, the very raison 
d’être of the Charter was to consolidate or render more visible existing sources of EU 
fundamental rights including the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Community Social Charter and the 
European Social Charter (ESC). The influence of this acquis can therefore be funnelled 
through the Charter. Second, unlike many existing human rights instruments such as the 
ECHR, the Charter does not (at least in theory) distinguish between social and economic rights 
and so it is particularly relevant in the employment context. Discussion of the interpretation of 
the ECHR and its application to the employment context has largely been excluded. This issue 
has already been extensively dealt with the literature and there is very little overlap between 
14 
 
the Charter Employment Rights and the Convention.8 Where such overlap does exist, for 
example in relation to the right to strike and collective bargaining, lessons will be drawn from 
the Convention case law. In addition, article 53 of the Charter mandates that if a provision is 
also found in the Convention then it should be given the same interpretation. Also excluded 
from the scope of thesis is the more recent European Pillar of Social Rights. This is not a 
rights-instrument as such, but is rather a ‘road map’ aimed at ‘upward convergence’ between 
the Member State social systems, including areas over which the Union has no competence, 
such as wages. As a ‘proclamation’ addressed to the institutions, the Pillar has a status similar 
to the Charter before it was granted legal effect in 2009. It also takes the form of a 
‘recommendation’ addressed to the Member States. Neither a proclamation nor a 
recommendation has direct legal effect.9 The Pillar also makes clear that the Charter is one of 
its sources of inspiration. This may mean that the Pillar can be relied on in future to govern the 
interpretation of Charter provisions covering the same field. Thus, as things stand, the likely 
immediate effects of the Pillar on existing EU employment law are too uncertain to be 
considered at this stage. It currently has more relevance for the legislature (at EU and national 
level) than for the CJEU, the institution that forms the focus of this thesis.  
 
As mentioned, particular attention is devoted to the employment rights found in the Solidarity 
Title and article 16 on the freedom to conduct a business. The equality concept has to some 
extent been excluded because equality as a general principle has enjoyed a long history in EU 
law and has infused the CJEU’s approach to the interpretation and application of employment 
legislation from the very beginning. In addition, the notion of equality is intimately linked with 
the Treaty, somewhat impeding an assessment of the Charter’s role in this context. The equality 
concept will, however, be drawn upon as a reference point throughout the thesis where it serves 
an illustrative purpose.  
 
Having said all this, it may simply be the case that it is still too early to assess the real impact 
of the Charter on the employment relationship. There is no doubt that the CJEU is by now 
well-used to dealing with the Charter in the employment context. The Charter has now been 
referred to 223 times as of April 2018 by the CJEU and the Advocates General.10 Although 
                                                          
8 See for eg Filip Dorssement and others (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and The Employment 
Relation (Hart 2013).  
9 Zane Rasnača, ‘Social summit preview: Can the European Pillar of Social Rights deliver on its promises?’ LSE 
Blogs 16 November 2017.  
10 Based on a search of ‘Charter of Fundamental’ at curia.europa.eu using the subject matters ‘social security’, 
‘social policy’ and ‘employment’.  
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this may be thought a particularly low figure given that many of the Charter’s provisions are 
of potential relevance to the employment relationship.  
 
6. Structure of the thesis  
 
Headings are outlined using the following system I, A, 1, 1.1, a. EU cases and legislation are 
cited in short hand in the footnotes, with a full citation included in the bibliography.  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter II explores the relevance of the EU Charter 
for the employment relationship. It starts by setting out the background and the purpose of the 
Charter before turning to vexed question of the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the employment 
relationship. This chapter concludes by setting out the methods by which the Charter (with a 
focus on the employment rights at this stage) may penetrate the employment relationship, 
before discussing some of the limits on this process. Chapter III traces the CJEU’s treatment 
of the freedom to conduct a business found in article 16 of the Charter, which Steven Weatherill 
has provocatively described as an ‘aberrant veneration’. 
 
If Chapter II describes the potential erosion of contractual concepts in the employment context 
in the face of social rights, Chapter III asks whether such an assessment may have been 
premature. Although it is certainly correct to say that the employment contract has been 
considerably influenced by social rights, the CJEU is broadening its fundamental rights 
horizons, opening the door to competing economic rights, notably freedom of contract. This 
chapter begins by defining and delimiting the notion of contractual autonomy as found at EU 
level. Particular attention is then paid to the case of Alemo-Herron and its progeny—cases in 
which the CJEU has adopted a particularly aggressive reading of article 16 to defeat competing 
social goals. Chapter III concludes by asking whether Alemo-Herron really was a one-off, an 
aberration to be forgotten, or whether the CJEU’s aggressive approach to article 16 has now 
hardened.  
 
Chapter IV explores the potential broader or ‘macro’ impact of this granting of fundamental 
rights status to business freedom ie the impact of business freedom as a fundamental right on 
the ability of the EU to regulate the employment relationship. Comparisons are drawn from 
the US Lochner era at the turn of the last century. Is Alemo-Herron the EU’s Lochner moment 
(or indeed, is it the start of a Lochner process)? In other words, just how systemic is the 
prioritisation of fundamental economic freedoms over fundamental social rights and are the 
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consequences really as bad as certain employment lawyers think? If article 16 is to continue 
to be prioritised, are there alternative forms of employment regulation that might escape the 
reach of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right?  
 
This sets the scene for a discussion in Chapter V of the micro level, ie an assessment of the 
potential impact of the employment rights and contractual autonomy as a fundamental right 
on the contract of employment. This is done through a consideration of the impact of 
fundamental rights on the hierarchy of sources of employment terms. The chapter starts with 
the ‘external’ hierarchy, ie the relationship between labour law sources outside of the contract. 
The relationship between the common law, statute, human rights and private agreement is 
considered before turning to the ‘internal’ dimension ie the relationship between the various 
types of terms found within the contract of employment itself.  
 
Chapter VI considers the impact of the Brexit and the Charter’s removal on the employment 
relationship. The key provisions of the Withdrawal Bill are addressed, before considering how 
the Charter’s absence might influence the employment relationship. The chapter concludes by 
looking to the future and asks whether the common law is capable of replicating the Charter 
and whether this is an endeavour worth pursuing. Is the common law, with its chequered 
history of interaction with employment legislation capable of stepping into the breach to 
guarantee the protection of fundamental social rights and what of the continued role for 
contractual autonomy?  
 
7. Methodology  
 
In terms of methodology, this thesis focuses largely on gathering, analysing and drawing 
connections between CJEU case law. Such a case-centred approach has recently been criticised 
by van Gestel and Micklitz, who argue that EU doctrinal research has become too focused on 
the CJEU as its point of reference. They argue that EU academics seem to have ‘more trust in 
supranational courts than in the EU legislature’, which ‘could be a first indication for herd 
behaviour, legal scholars following a wider trend without critical reflection’.11 As shall be 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, the CJEU continues to play a significant role in the 
governance of the employment relationship, a situation which must be contrasted with the lack 
                                                          
11 Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship’ (2014) 
20 ELJ 292, 299.  
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of legislative activity in this context. The CJEU will continue to be a major point of reference 
for some time to come.  
 
It is also hoped that by here articulating the methodology adopted, some of van Gestel and 
Micklitz’s justified criticisms of doctrinal legal research can be addressed. In particular, they 
criticise policy-driven research that strives to emphasise issues concerning ‘effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact, influence and so on, whereas usually these criteria are not 
operationalised’.12 Adopting the word ‘impact’ in the title of this thesis may therefore appear 
somewhat cavalier. It is, of course, notoriously difficult to measure the ‘impact’ of any external 
source on judicial behaviour. This is perhaps particularly so in the case law of the CJEU, with 
its terse reasoning and absence of dissenting opinions. This thesis makes no claim at having 
adopted any sort of scientific approach to defining or measuring ‘impact’. Rather, an attempt 
has been made to assess the qualitative effects of the Charter by exploring the relative weight 
of Charter arguments. This has been achieved by examining the precise point of entry of such 
arguments in the CJEU’s reasoning. Essentially, the question is whether fundamental rights 
arguments are crucial to the outcome of cases or whether they act simply as ornaments or 
rhetorical flourishes. Having measured the impact of the Charter on a particular judgment, how 
then might we make the leap to assessing the impact of that judgment on employment law 
more generally? This thesis adopts the twin approach taken by Freedland and Prassl to measure 
the impact of a judgment. First, there is the question of whether a topic covered by a judgment 
is ‘of particular significance and controversy in a specific regulatory domain of EU law, be 
that due to the development of a novel legal point or due to a change in tack in existing 
approaches’ and second ‘whether the decision has caused particular upheaval or controversy 
in at least some of the Member States’ domestic systems’.13 It will be shown that in some 
instances the Charter cases meet these criteria while in others they fall short.  
 
Although this thesis is primarily doctrinal in nature, it is by no means sealed off from policy 
or indeed political perspectives. As such, it does not conform to the traditional understanding 
of doctrinal or black letter research as being focused ‘almost entirely on law’s own language 
of statutes and case law to make sense of the legal world’ with law being ‘seen as a self-
contained system which is politically neutral and independent of other academic disciplines’.14 
It is difficult for any labour lawyer, let alone an EU labour lawyer to be entirely politically 
                                                          
12 ibid 301.  
13 Mark Freedland and Jeremias Prassl, Viking, Laval and Beyond (Hart 2015) 3.  
14 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Hart 2011) 31. 
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neutral. The choice of research topic and the choice of examples are, of necessity, coloured by 
the author’s preconceptions as to how the fundamental rights in the Charter ought to be used. 
As such, the thesis breaks once again with a ‘pure’ doctrinal approach which has been 
described as confining suggestions for reform within the premise of the doctrinal analysis: ‘[a] 
doctrinally-based thesis therefore, would not argue that the law needs reforms because it is 
inconsistent with wider social values or is unfair to a sector of society, but because it is vague, 
or is inconsistent, and thus leads to uncertainty in its application’.15  
Perhaps a better description of the approach adopted by this thesis might be found in legal 
realism. This school posited that ‘the outcome of legal disputes was not determined by 
considerations such as the consistent and logical application of the law, devoid of moral or 
policy considerations’ but rather ‘[l]egal realists worked to uncover the reality behind judicial 
decisions arguing that judges responded more to facts than to rules’.16 Ironically, it could be 
said that human rights arguments have placed a greater emphasis on the rule of law rather than 
on the consequences a particular decision might have. As this thesis will demonstrate, in the 
context of the Charter, the CJEU has shown itself willing to use human rights to overlook 
certain aspects of legislative text only to reemphasise them at a later date, depending on the 
potential consequences for the economic governance of the Union. It is to the growth of the 
role of fundamental social rights in the employment relationship that we now turn. 
                                                          
15 ibid.  
16 ibid 32.  
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II. The Charter and the Employment Relationship 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the nature of the relationship between the fundamental 
employment rights found in the Charter and the employment relationship. In Section A, the 
sources and content of the Charter’s employment rights are outlined. This is followed by a 
discussion of the very applicability of the Charter to the employment relationship by exploring 
the definition of both labour rights and human rights. Section B contains an analysis of the 
methods by which the Charter’s employment rights might influence the employment 
relationship, namely as a standard of review and as a tool of interpretation. It will be shown 
that the impact of the Charter’s social provisions on the employment relationship has, for now, 
been minimal, but that there is potential for development should the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) engage with the employment rights in a more meaningful way. It is to those 
employment rights that we now turn.  
 
A. The Employment Rights 
 
This section sets out the background and purpose of the Charter before turning to the content 
and human rights-underpinning of its employment rights. This is followed by an exploration 
of the barriers undermining their potential impact on the employment relationship.   
 
1. Background and purpose of the Charter  
 
The Charter’s history is well known and need not be retold here in any detail.1 It is also well 
known that, in the absence of a statement of EU human rights in the founding Treaties, it had 
been left to the CJEU to develop human rights as general principles of EU law.2 The 
deficiencies in this system of fundamental rights protection soon became apparent, not least 
due to the lack of transparency of those rights, and there were calls for the codification of EU 
human rights in a single written text. These calls were finally heeded with the proclamation of 
                                                          
1 See for eg Joseph Weiler, ‘Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’ (2000) 6 ELJ 
95; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 26 ELRev 
126; Aalt Willem Heringa and Luc Verhey, ‘The EU Charter: Text and Structure’ (2001) 8 MJ 11; Michael 
Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008) CMLRev 617.  
2 Case C-29/69 Stauder; Case C-4/73 Nold.  
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the Charter at the Nice Summit in December 2000. Despite codification, the status of the 
Charter rights remained unclear and it was not until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
in December 2009 that the Charter was granted full legal effect and the same legal value as the 
Treaties themselves.  
 
According to Weiler, much of the Charter is ‘drafted in the magisterial language characteristic 
of our constitutional traditions’.3 At first glance, therefore, the Charter may appear remote 
from the practical content of the employment contract. This lack of clarity is not aided by the 
manner of the Charter’s incorporation. The Charter is not to be found within the text of the 
Treaty itself, but is rather incorporated by reference in article 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) which provides that: 
 
[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter (…) 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties (…) The Union shall accede to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (…) Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention (…) 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.   
 
Article 6 TEU makes clear, then, that the Charter is but one of three sources of EU fundamental 
rights, the others being the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and human rights 
as general principles of EU law (general principles are also inspired by the international rights 
texts to which the EU Member States adhere). The relationship between the Charter and the 
other sources will be discussed at various stages of this thesis but it is now settled that the 
CJEU will first consider the Charter and will only then look to other rights sources if the 
Charter is insufficient. Whether this approach is deliberate or merely a matter of practicality 
remains unclear.4 It suffices for now to note that the Charter was not intended to replace the 
existing rights sources but was merely adopted to codify or render more visible these rights.5 
In short, the Charter’s adoption may have been no more than a presentational affair with few 
intended substantive consequences. However, this is not to deny the consequences that might 
nonetheless derive from granting the Charter constitutional value. The Charter’s limited 
intended purpose also belies the fact that far from representing an exercise in mere visibility, 
                                                          
3 Weiler (n 1) 95.  
4 Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadkis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the Treaty of 
Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights’ (2011) 17 ELJ 595.  
5 Lord Goldsmith, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 1201.  
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the Charter’s drafters were necessarily selective in the provisions that they deemed worthy of 
fundamental rights protection.6 Certain rights found in other international social rights 
instruments have been excluded, notably the right to a fair wage.7 But equally, other rights not 
typically found in human rights documents have been added. This approach can most clearly 
be seen in Title IV entitled ‘Solidarity’.  
 
It has been suggested that the inclusion of social rights in the Charter stemmed from the 
insistence of the Finnish delegation that the ECHR, which was at that point over five decades 
old, was no longer fit for purpose.8 As a result of the inclusion of social rights, it has been said 
that the Charter can be considered ‘the most comprehensive and modern instrument for the 
protection of fundamental rights, not only in Europe, but perhaps also globally in terms of the 
scope of the rights protected and the level of protection it supplies’.9 There are numerous 
Charter provisions from across its various titles that may have a bearing on the employment 
relationship. This thesis focuses on four provisions found in the Solidarity Title. Particular 
attention will be paid to the ‘individual’ social rights which have a close connection to the 
employment contract, namely article 30 on the protection from unfair dismissal and article 31 
on the right to fair and just working conditions. Also relevant are the ‘collective’ social rights 
found in article 27 which provides for worker information and consultation and article 28 on 
the right to bargain collectively. It is worth setting out the text and source of these provisions 
at this juncture as their language and content will be relied on when it comes to assessing the 
influence of the Charter on the employment relationship.  
 
2. The content of the ‘employment’ provisions in the Charter 
 
The idea here is not to reconsider the background and genesis of the employment rights in the 
Charter, but rather to highlight some of their features which are particularly salient for 
analysing their impact on the employment relationship. Emphasis is placed here on their 
personal scope, textual content and connection to employment legislation.10 As mentioned, a 
distinction can be drawn between the individual and collective Employment Rights.  
                                                          
6 Heringa and Verhey (n 1) 12. 
7 RESC 1996, art 4 right to fair remuneration.  
8 Nilo Jääskinen, ‘The Place of the EU Charter Within the Tradition of Fundamental and Human Rights’ in Sonia 
Morano-Foadi and Lucy Vickers (eds), Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts (Hart 2015) 11, 
11.  
9 ibid 12.  
10 See Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter: Text and Commentary (Hart 2014).  
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2.1. The individual Employment Rights  
 
We begin with article 31 which provides that: 
 
(1) ‘[e]very worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, 
safety and dignity’.  
 
(2) ‘[e]very worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily 
and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave’.  
 
Immediately striking is the broad personal scope of this provision which applies to ‘every 
worker’. The worker concept has an autonomous EU law definition, deriving largely from the 
case law on free movement of persons. In Lawrie-Blum, the CJEU held that the worker concept 
‘must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment 
relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned’. The essential 
feature of an employment relationship, however, is that ‘for a certain period of time a person 
performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives 
remuneration’.11 Whether subordination and a genuine and effective economic activity exist, 
is a matter for the national court to determine.12  
 
Beyond its broad personal scope, article 31 has been praised for its unequivocal language and 
its close connection to fundamental rights. Article 31(2), in particular, has been described as 
‘a pioneering Charter provision in that it had an early and bold impact on the interpretation of 
the right to paid annual leave’.13 Article 31(2) made its first appearance in the opinion of 
Advocate General (AG) Tizzano in BECTU.14 In that case, BECTU, a trade union, argued that 
the UK Government had incorrectly implemented the Working Time Directive (WTD) by 
imposing conditions on the entitlement to paid annual leave, for which there is no justification 
in the Directive.15 AG Tizzano thought it appropriate to take a step back from the WTD in 
order to place the entitlement to paid annual leave in the broader context of fundamental social 
rights.16 The right to paid leave, he noted, was not introduced with the adoption of the WTD, 
                                                          
11 Case C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum para 17.  
12 See Mark Bell, ‘Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law’ in Hans W Micklitz (ed), 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014).  
13 Alan Bogg, ‘Article 31’ in Peers and others (n 10) 833, 835.  
14 AG opinion in Case C-173/99 BECTU.  
15 Consolidated Directive 2003/88. 
16 AG opinion in Case C-173/99 BECTU para 26.  
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but rather, it has long been considered a fundamental right.17 The AG thought that the inclusion 
of a right to paid annual leave in the Charter made it easier to ‘apprehend the meaning and 
scope of the principle laid down in Article 7 of the Directive’.18 Indeed, as a fundamental social 
right, the right to paid leave is ‘an automatic and unconditional right granted to every 
worker’.19 The fact that the Charter contained a right to paid annual leave had the effect of 
‘fortifying’ the AG’s conclusion that any precondition must be an unlawful derogation from a 
fundamental right.20 The CJEU came to the same conclusion but avoided any reference to the 
Charter—which at this point did not have legal effect—preferring instead to classify the 
entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave as a ‘particularly important principle of 
[Union] social law’.21  
 
Article 31(2) is particularly useful for our purposes given its intimate link to employment 
legislation. This relationship is made clear by the Explanations which are attached to the 
Charter and which act as interpretative guidance.22 According to the explanations 
corresponding to article 31(2), its legislative source can be found in the WTD. Although to 
date, its impact has largely been confined to the context of paid annual leave. Article 31(1) is 
also linked to EU employment legislation, but the relationship is less concrete.23 Article 31 
will primarily serve as our reference point for examining the Charter’s influence on the CJEU’s 
interpretative methodology.  
 
The next relevant provision is article 30 which provides that ‘[e]very worker has the right to 
protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and 
practices’. As with article 31, this provision has a broad personal scope, applying to ‘every 
worker’. Article 30 is somewhat unusual in that the concept of dismissal has clear fundamental 
rights implications, yet this is an area in which the Union has not adopted any specific 
legislation with a direct link to the termination of the employment contract, although equality 
legislation does apply to dismissal. Article 153(1)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) also authorises the European Parliament and the Council to adopt, 
by means of Directives, minimum requirements as regards the protection of workers whose 
                                                          
17 See art 24 UNDHR 1948, art 2(3) ESC 1961, art 7(d) UN Charter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966.  
18 AG opinion in Case C-173/99 BECTU para 29.  
19 ibid.  
20 Bogg (n 13) 847.  
21 Case C-173/99 BECTU para 43.   
22 Art 52(7) of the Charter.  
23 Directive 89/391/EEC.  
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employment contract is terminated. However, article 153(1) TFEU specifies that termination 
of employment falls outside the ordinary legislative procedure. There has been little appetite 
on the part of the Member States to adopt legislation dealing specifically with the termination 
of the employment relationship. It has been suggested that this reluctance stems largely from 
the ambiguity of the right itself, with article 30 representing an ‘essentially defensive right to 
protect the worker against the abuse of managerial power’.24 Certainly, article 30 lacks the 
precision and force of language that article 31 enjoys. In addition, this right is subject to ‘Union 
law, national laws and practices’. As we shall see, this may have the effect of limiting the 
strength of this provision.  
 
In addition to this lack of legislative initiative, there is also an absence of case law on article 
30. However, for the purposes of this thesis, a consideration of a fundamental right not to be 
unfairly dismissed may give us an insight into how ‘domesticated’ employment legislation 
with a former (although as yet largely dormant) fundamental rights underpinning may be 
treated post-Brexit. In addition, article 30 does touch upon EU legislation such as the Transfer 
of Undertakings Directive (TUD) analysed in more detail in the next chapter.25 
2.2. The collective Employment Rights  
 
Turning to the ‘collective’ employment rights, article 27 provides that ‘[w]orkers or their 
representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in 
good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws 
and practices’. Again, in contrast to article 31, this provision is somewhat lacking in precision 
and is heavily dependent on national law and practice for further elucidation, a situation that 
has been confirmed by the CJEU.26 Article 27 is particularly interesting, however, in that, as 
has been noted by Filip Dorssemont, ‘[t]he right to information and consultation cannot be 
dissociated from the exercise of the managerial prerogative. It constitutes a procedural 
restriction of the latter. The exercise of the managerial prerogative is deeply rooted in the 
freedom to conduct a business’.27 Article 27, as with the individual employment rights, is 
closely related to the EU legislative acquis, in particular the Collective Redundancies Directive 
(CRD)28 and the TUD. Article 27 will primarily assist us in addressing the question of the 
                                                          
24 Jeff Kenner, ‘Article 30’ in Peers and others (n 10) 805, 806–807.  
25 Directive 2001/23.  
26 Case C-176/12 AMS.  
27 Filip Dorssemont, ‘Article 27’ in Peers and others (n 10) 749, 750.  
28 Directive 98/59/EC.  
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Charter’s role as a standard for reviewing EU legislation and Member State legislation falling 
within the scope of EU law where it has been described as having a ‘shielding’ effect.  
 
Finally, article 28 tells us that ‘[w]orkers and employers, or their respective organisations, 
have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, 
to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action’. The right to bargain 
collectively and to strike has occupied discussion in the fundamental rights field for many 
years.29 It is well known that article 28 and the internal market freedoms have long interacted 
with each other.30 These freedoms have recently been explicitly linked to article 16 on the 
freedom to conduct a business, the focus of this thesis.31 But, before embarking on further 
analysis of the Charter’s employment rights, it is worth taking a step back to consider the wider 
question of how we are to define human rights in this context. Are employment rights human 
rights and does it really matter if this label can apply to the Charter?  
 
3. Employment rights as human rights  
 
Are social rights human rights? Should they be, and more specifically, are the employment 
rights found in the Charter human rights? The question of whether such a characterisation even 
matters is explored in further depth in Chapter V when we come to consider the future of 
fundamental social rights in the UK post-Brexit. This section starts by setting out the 
traditional characteristics attributed to human rights before asking where the Charter 
provisions fit into this paradigm. 
3.1. Are labour/social/employment rights human rights?  
 
We must address two questions here: (a) whether labour rights are human rights and (b) if they 
are, where they fall in the human rights hierarchy. First, we must clear up some terminology. 
A lingering question remains whether the terms ‘social rights’, ‘labour rights’ and 
‘employment rights’ are interchangeable and if not, which should apply to the provisions 
contained in the Charter’s Solidarity Title. It is suggested that the term ‘social rights’ is a much 
broader concept covering wider human needs beyond employment, such as the right to 
                                                          
29 K D Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 ILJ 2.  
30 Case C-438/05 Viking and Case C-341/05 Laval.  
31 Case C-201/15 AGET.  
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housing, education and other resource-demanding rights. The term ‘labour rights’, although 
narrower, still covers the working relationship beyond the mere contract of employment, as it 
touches upon areas such as the prohibition of forced labour and access to placement services. 
The term used in this thesis to describe the four Charter provisions discussed above is 
‘Employment Rights’. This term is used to designate those rights that have a particularly close 
connection to the contract of employment and may therefore be distinguished from the notion 
of employment rights as typically understood by labour lawyers. But the question remains: are 
employment rights human rights?  
a. Characteristics of human rights  
 
Four characteristics of human rights have been suggested. First, human rights represent urgent 
and compelling moral claims. Second, human rights are universally applicable. Third, human 
rights represent strict standards. Finally, human rights embody timeless, fundamental needs.32 
Various attempts have been made to show that employment rights do not meet these criteria.33 
It is argued that rights such as limited working hours or paid annual leave, are simply not as 
compelling or imperative as, say, the right to life. This must of course be true. It cannot be 
doubted that certain human rights must be prioritised, but the fact that some rights may be 
more important than others does not detract from the characterisation of the less ‘important’ 
rights as human rights. Human rights instruments like the Charter also recognise the potential 
for conflict between the rights contained therein and have developed mechanisms to facilitate 
the balancing of such rights.34  
It is also true that most employment rights can in some way be connected to more ‘compelling’ 
civil or political rights, for example, the right to human dignity, the prohibition of torture and 
the right to life in both the sense of survival and the sense of a meaningful or fulfilled life. The 
second argument that employment rights are not as universal as other human rights must fall 
for similar reasons. It is certainly the case that most employment rights depend on the party’s 
characterisation as a ‘worker’ or an ‘employee’ and to that extent do not apply to the population 
as a whole by virtue of their humanity, but this is to ignore the reality that most of us must 
work at some point in our lives and also to overlook the value of work to the human experience. 
                                                          
32 Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ (2012) 3 ELLJ 151, 164.  
33 See for eg Jay Youngdahl, ‘Solidarity First Labour Rights are not the same as Human Rights’ (2009) 18 New 
Labour Forum 30; Jay Youngdahl, ‘Youngdahl Replies’ (2009) 18 New Labour Forum 46; Cass Sunstein, 
‘Against Positive Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights Don’t Belong in the New Constitutions of Post-
Communist Europe’ East European Constitutional Review Vol 2 No1 (1993) 35. 
34 For limitation of the Charter rights see article 52.  
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In addition, many civil rights are also dependent on gaining some form of status such as 
citizenship (as is usually the case with the right to vote).  
As to the argument that employment rights do not embody strict standards, ie they vary from 
country to country depending on available resources, Mantouvalou points out that many 
‘universal’ rights such as the prohibition of torture also have resource implications eg the 
obligation to maintain decent prison conditions and in any case there is a continued obligation 
to ‘strive’ to meet these rights requirements.35 Finally, the idea that employment rights evolve 
over time whereas human rights are timeless is also easily refuted. Many labour rights can be 
said to represent ‘abstract principles that are always applicable, irrespective of the historic 
circumstances. It is this abstract normative standard that is timeless, and against which the 
actual working conditions in different periods of time should be assessed’.36  
b. Relationship with traditional human rights  
 
Beyond the question of the whether employment rights are human rights lies the more vexed 
question of their relationship to traditional civil and political rights. Social rights are 
considered second generation rights and deemed worthy of weaker protection than classic 
rights such as the right to life and protection from torture, for several reasons. First, it is argued 
that human rights language has usually been invoked against the state which conforms more 
closely to the ideal of civil and political rights. Social rights on the other hand are conceived 
as positive rights, requiring state action rather than inaction. In addition, social rights are seen 
as having cost and resource allocation implications. Social rights ‘thereby impose conditional 
and indeterminate obligations that are programmatic in nature’.37 As we will examine below, 
this distinction has had an effect on the juridical status of social rights, with commentators 
continuing ‘to insist upon the benchmark of justiciability (…) as a true test of a “real” human 
right’.38   
The distinction can be criticised. As Gearty comments, ‘[n]ever satisfactory in its cold war 
heyday, the incoherence of such an approach has done great damage to the subject by 
suggesting a foundational distinction between rights where none exists’.39 We have mentioned 
that many civil and political rights have resource implications and are often dependent on the 
                                                          
35 Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ (n 32) 166.  
36 ibid 169.  
37 Judy Fudge, ‘The New Discourse of Labour Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?’ (2007) Comparative 
Labor Law and Policy Journal 29.  
38 H J Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context (3rd edn, OUP 2007) 313.  
39 Conor Gearty in Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Hart 2011) 17.  
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rights claimant achieving a particular status before the right can be invoked. As Mantouvalou 
tells us, ‘economic and social rights do not differ conceptually, contrary to what was suggested 
in the past because all rights can impose positive and resource-demanding duties’.40  
The final argument against the human rights characterisation of social rights is that it is 
undemocratic to leave such sensitive decisions in the hands of the judiciary. This narrow vision 
of democracy ‘leads us to lose sight of the fact that democracy, properly understood, requires 
satisfaction of certain basic needs’.41 In response to this particular criticism, commentators 
have suggested that the leap to justiciable social rights ‘is too bald to be achieved directly; it 
is necessary to shuffle towards them through the less disputed field of the civil and political’.42 
At certain points, the Charter itself adopts this approach of viewing social rights as a reflection 
of more compelling civil and political rights. Article 31(1), for example, explicitly ties that 
provision to the notion of human dignity. In one respect, this approach is to be welcomed for 
its recognition that employment rights, here the right to safe working conditions, are 
intrinsically linked to notions of human dignity. On the other hand, such an approach may have 
the effect of devaluing social rights, emphasising that they are only worth protecting to the 
extent that they reflect a more compelling pre-existing dignitarian notion.  
Having determined then that social rights may in some cases be considered human rights—or 
at the very least connected to human rights—it is necessary to consider whether the Charter 
Employment Rights are human rights.  
3.2. Are the Charter Employment Rights human rights? 
 
The most obvious answer to this question is that the Charter Employment Rights are included 
in a human rights document and must therefore be human rights. As Mantouvalou remarks, 
‘[t]he positivist would list all these documents, and would claim that labor rights are human 
rights sometimes, in some jurisdictions’.43 This assertion is strengthened if we look to the 
Charter’s Explanations, which make clear the human rights pedigree of the Charter’s 
Employment Rights. We see that a number of the provisions derive from the European Social 
Charter (ESC), an earlier fundamental social rights text. Article 31(1) finds its source in article 
3 ESC and article 26 of the revised ESC which relate to health and safety and dignity at work. 
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Article 31(2) derives from article 2 ESC which guarantees ‘just conditions of work’. The 
‘fundamental’ nature of the right to paid leave has also been recognised under this provision.44 
The Explanations also point to the 1989 Community Social Charter as a source for the rights 
contained in article 31. Point 19 governs health and safety while point 8 concerns the right to 
rest and paid annual leave. Article 30 derives from article 24 of the Revised European Social 
Charter (RESC) which provides for protection in cases of dismissals initiated by the employer. 
Article 27 is derived from article 21 of the RESC which is more specific in setting out the 
nature of information and consultation required as well as points 17 and 18 of the Community 
Charter which also govern information and consultation requirements in a more detailed 
manner.  
Article 28 is a somewhat unusual example in that it is both more intimately linked to a rights 
instrument, in this case article 11 of the ECHR and yet it is also more dubious whether it is a 
right at all, at least in the UK. In this country, there is no positive right to strike, but rather a 
series of legislative immunities. In addition to article 11 ECHR, article 28 is also connected to 
article 6 ESC on the right to take collective action and points 12 to 14 of the Community 
Charter also dealing with collective action and the right to bargain collectively. Clearly, the 
Employment Rights have long been considered worthy of international protection. In addition, 
most of the arguments levelled at the justiciability of social rights generally do not apply to 
the Charter’s Employment Rights specifically. First, none of the four Employment Rights 
necessarily entail any state expenditure (although many workers are, of course, employed in 
the public sector) and do not therefore involve the distribution of resources, although there are 
likely to be costs involved for employers. Second, the four rights considered have largely been 
fleshed out in legislation and so in this respect cannot be criticised as being vague, abstract 
standards. 
Looking to the national constitutions of the Member States produces a less emphatic result. 
The concept of human dignity expressed in article 31(1) can be found in several domestic 
constitutions, but the national approaches to the more specific issue of health and safety 
regulation and working conditions are far from homogenous. As a result, it is ‘unlikely that 
interpretative difficulties under Article 31 will be susceptible to resolution by invoking 
common constitutional traditions as a principal guide’.45 Like article 31, article 30 is not 
sourced directly from the Member State constitutions.46 Some national constitutions do contain 
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a commitment to collective action and freedom of association similar to article 28, although 
as we have seen, the UK protects no such right. Article 27 is perhaps the most distant from the 
rights found in national constitutions. None of this is to say, however, that other constitutional 
principles such as equality, dignity, solidarity and legitimate expectations are irrelevant to the 
employment relationship. As we shall also see, other international rights sources beyond those 
referred to in the text of the Explanations may also be relevant for the interpretation of 
employment legislation.  
So, the rights contained in the Charter may, for their very inclusion in rights texts, be human 
rights after all (at least at an international level) but is this enough? Referring to the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), Gearty comments that although it reads very 
well, ‘when it comes to the origin of these rights, why they exist in the form that they do, what 
gives them moral force, the document is oblique, indeed almost coy’, with reference to 
‘inherent dignity’, ‘peace’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and equality being ‘expected to provide the 
necessary explanations’.47 Although similar criticisms may be aimed at the Charter, we are in 
the more fortunate position of being able to rely on the Explanations. We have already seen 
that the Charter’s Employment Rights have a particularly close connection to other social 
rights instruments as well as employment legislation. Indeed, as will become apparent, ‘the 
guiding principle for or against the inclusion of a “Solidarity” right has been the recognition 
of such a right in already existing EC/EU rules’.48 This tells us that they are at least legislative 
rights, but what makes them human rights?  
A potential solution suggested by Gearty, again in the context of UN human rights sources is 
to ‘track back behind the language of rights to explore the principles and values which make 
sense of rights, which further explain their power, and in doing so provide the linkages between 
them’.49 He notes that, ‘principles’ provide us with ‘guides for action (…) in particular 
concerning the specification of rights’ while ‘values’ ‘function at a more abstract level, 
explaining what lies behind the choice of these (…) principles’.50 In other words, principles 
are derived from the values (principles here should not be conflated with the rights/principles 
distinction in the Charter which is dealt with further below).  
The Charter opens with rather vague language: ‘[t]he peoples of Europe, in creating an ever 
closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values’. 
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But this is then followed by a clearer articulation of the principles and values underpinning the 
Charter. Values include ‘human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’ while the principles 
are said to be ‘democracy and the rule of law’. It is not obvious that the terms ‘values’ and 
‘principles’ are used here in the same manner suggested by Gearty. Indeed, it seems as if the 
values and principles expressed by the Charter are as indeterminate as each other. 
Nevertheless, knowledge of the values underpinning the Charter may allow us to outline more 
clearly the ‘principles’ governing its Employment Rights, thereby demonstrating that they are 
just as capable of being classed as human rights as any of the Charter’s more traditional civil 
and political provisions. Is there a connection between the four Employment Rights and the 
Charter’s ‘values’? 
a. The Charter’s values     
 
Article 31(1) provides the clearest statement of the values underpinning that provision, but 
even this is a rather bald statement that every worker is entitled to working conditions which 
are respectful, of among other things, his human ‘dignity’. The texts of the other Employment 
Rights contain no such explicit link to the values allegedly espoused by the Charter. However, 
if we look to the explanations to article 1 entitled ‘dignity’ we see that ‘[t]he dignity of the 
human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of 
fundamental rights’. It is then emphasised that the right to human dignity has already been 
recognised as a general principle of EU law.51 As a result, ‘none of the rights laid down in this 
Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human 
person is part of the substance of the rights laid down in this Charter’.  
We can clearly see that despite its somewhat awkward positioning, human dignity is the value 
underpinning all of the Charter rights, including the Employment Rights. Any additional role 
for the solidarity value set out in the Charter’s preamble and indeed in the ‘Solidarity’ Title is 
not clearly articulated. Is it possible to move from the generality of the Charter’s values to the 
specificity of its principles? Again, if we look to the Explanations, we see that the principles 
that underpin the Employment Rights and thereby incorporate the Charter’s values are already 
set out in existing EU employment legislation.  
The connection between the Employment Rights and various legislative provisions has already 
been noted. If we again take the example of article 31, we see that reference is made to the 
WTD. If we turn to the text of that Directive, we see that it lays down ‘minimum safety and 
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health requirements for the organisation of working time, in respect of periods of daily rest, 
breaks, weekly rest, maximum weekly working time, annual leave and aspects of night work, 
shift work and patterns of work’. We can also note that ‘[t]he improvement of workers' safety, 
hygiene and health at work is an objective which should not be subordinated to purely 
economic considerations’. Finally, ‘workers must be granted minimum daily, weekly and 
annual periods of rest and adequate breaks. It is also necessary in this context to place a 
maximum limit on weekly working hours (…) The organisation of work according to a certain 
pattern must take account of the general principle of adapting work to the worker’. This 
demonstrates that, via the Explanations and the relevant legislation, we can move from the 
indeterminate notion of human dignity to the more concrete idea of limiting working hours for 
all EU workers. Of course, the statements in the recitals of the WTD are themselves given 
further substance in the subsequent provisions of the legislation and are also fleshed out by the 
CJEU. Therefore, the Charter only gets us so far. We know that there is a fundamental right to 
limited working hours but how limited must it be? We will come back to this point when 
examining the Employment Rights as a standard of review.   
 
4. Impeding the effectiveness of Employment Rights in the Charter 
 
 
Despite the Charter’s rhetoric of indivisibility, the potency of (at least some) of the 
Employment Rights has been undermined in a number of respects. The limitation which the 
drafters sought to place on the invocability of the Charter’s employment provisions ‘can be 
seen most patently in the distinction drawn between rights, freedoms and principles’.52 This 
distinction, which is contained in article 52(5), was intended to ensure that that the Charter’s 
socio-economic rights would not become directly effective fundamental rights.53 Article 52(5) 
therefore provides that principles only lead to rights to the extent that they are implemented in 
national law, or EU law in those areas where the EU has competence. Article 51(1) further 
emphasises the distinction, providing that rights must be ‘respected’, whereas principles must 
merely be ‘observed’. The EU institutions should not violate the principles, but they have no 
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mandate to implement them as rights outside their own competence.54 Is there any role for the 
principles the employment context?  
4.1. What role for the principles?  
 
Principles only become significant when the CJEU is called on to interpret or review acts 
adopted by the EU or by the Member States when implementing EU law.55 This is not to say 
that article 52(5) excludes the justiciability of all social rights, since the CJEU has already held 
that certain social rights are indeed judicially cognisable.56 The distinction between rights and 
principles was addressed by AG Cruz Villalón in AMS.57  He noted that, as is the case with 
most national constitutions, rights are usually designated as ‘social’ to indicate that no 
subjective—that is to say directly enforceable— rights are to be derived from them. Social 
rights may therefore be described as rights by their nature and content, but principles in terms 
of their operation.58 In contrast to rights, principles evoke a broader notion of the obligations 
on public powers.59 In addition, and as the Charter itself makes clear, principles can only 
function if they are subsequently implemented or rendered more concrete in legislation.60  
The AG concluded that the EU and Member States are under a clear obligation by virtue of 
articles 52(5) and 51(1) to promote principles through implementation, despite the permissive 
wording of the Charter.61 For the purposes of giving normative content to the principles, 
implementing acts should be understood as only those acts which ‘substantively and directly’ 
concretise the principle. Otherwise, whole areas of regulatory action could be considered 
implementation. On the other hand, when it comes to enforcement, implementing acts should 
be understood as being wider than mere acts that substantially and directly concretise the 
content of a principle.62 To hold otherwise would lead to the ‘vicious circle’ of requiring such 
implementing acts to be assessed against the benchmark of a principle (article 27), the content 
of which would be identical to that given to it in the implementing act itself.63 The AG 
concluded that article 27 was indeed a principle, given the limited scope of the provision, 
which was to be granted only ‘under the conditions provided for by Union law and national 
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laws and practices’, without setting out how the objective was to be reached.64 As the AG put 
it:  
quite apart from the actual proclamation of the right and the resulting duty to guarantee it, 
the scope of the right directly guaranteed by the provision is extremely weak [refers to 
national laws and practices] (…) This is confirmed by the fact that the article does not 
define any individual legal situations (…) specifies neither the kind of information nor the 
consultation arrangements (…) The content is so indeterminate that it can be interpreted 
only as an obligation to act, requiring the public authorities to take the necessary measures 
to guarantee a right. 65 
In addition to this textual argument, the AG also noted that there is a systemic argument 
pointing to article 27’s status as a principle. The group of rights found in the Solidarity Title 
are largely social rights and these social rights are largely worded in a manner similar to article 
27. This leads to the ‘strong presumption’ that those rights belong to the category of principles.  
This finding leads to two consequences, one relating to the operating conditions of the 
principles and the other to their justiciability. The first is connected to the ‘may be 
implemented’ element of the principle, in other words this is the ‘specific expression’ 
dimension already discussed. The second relates to the invocability of the principle. Here the 
AG finds that ‘it is evident (…) that its wording very implicitly but unequivocally excludes 
the possibility of directly relying on a “principle” so as to exercise an individual right based 
on that principle (…) confines the justiciability of “principles” to their (…) refined state as 
rules and acts’. 66 In other words, principles cannot be directly relied on by individual litigants.  
The CJEU did not explicitly address this issue, focusing not on the distinction between rights 
and principles but rather between those provisions that are sufficient in and of themselves to 
be relied upon and those which were not. From the perspective of private litigants, this 
approach is not entirely satisfactory, as the content of each Charter provision must be analysed 
separately in order to determine whether it is capable of being relied on.67 In any event, given 
the strong legislative acquis in the field of worker consultation, the effect of a finding that 
article 27 is a principle may not be so dramatic.68  
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The CJEU had occasion to clarify its approach in the case of Glatzel.69 This was the first case 
in which the CJEU explicitly addressed the rights/principles distinction. This case concerned 
the review of the compatibility with the Charter of conditions laid down in the Annex of EU 
legislation relating to physical ability to drive.70 The question that arose here was whether such 
conditions amounted to discrimination contrary to article 21 of the Charter governing non-
discrimination and article 26 on the integration of persons with disabilities. The CJEU found 
that it did not have sufficient information to strike down the Annex, but it did engage in a 
useful discussion of the rights/principles distinction.  
Rather than reviewing the compatibility of the measure with both articles 21 and 26 in 
combination, the CJEU treated them separately. The reason for so doing was that, unlike article 
21, article 26 was a principle and not right. The CJEU arrived at this conclusion as article 26 
‘does not require the EU legislature to adopt any specific measure’ and that ‘in order for that 
article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in EU law or national 
law’.71 This conclusion is not, however, controversial as the Explanations explicitly mention 
article 26 as an example of a principle. Nonetheless, it shows that rights are a much stronger 
standard of review than principles.  
Olsson points out that the CJEU actually adopted two different approaches in AMS and Glatzel. 
In AMS, the CJEU focused on the wording of article 27 to arrive at the conclusion that it was 
not clear enough to be relied on, while in Glatzel, the CJEU concentrated on article 26’s status 
as a ‘principle’.72 She goes on to note that the arguments against granting article 27 the status 
of a right ie it is vague, the substance relates to legislation and it is contained in the Solidarity 
Title apply equally to article 28 which may be a right.73 It would seem, then, that both the 
AG’s systemic and textual approaches to identifying principles in AMS can be discounted. This 
still leaves us in the dark as to the correct criteria to apply in identifying principles. Following 
both AMS and Glatzel, it is more appropriate to talk about the distinction not between rights 
and principles but rather between those rights that are sufficient in themselves and those that 
are not, although, the two categories may overlap ie non-directly effective rights may in fact 
be principles.  
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We already know, then, that article 27 of the Charter is probably a principle, but what of the 
other Employment Rights? Article 31 is the only provision not specified as being subject to 
‘Union law, national laws and practices’. This would suggest that this is a right which is 
sufficient in itself to be relied upon without further specification in legislation (although the 
details must be left to the legislation). In Dominguez, AG Trstenjak appeared to suggest that 
article 31 was indeed a right.74 In her words, ‘the very wording of this provision immediately 
suggests the conclusion that entitlement to paid annual leave was designed to be a 
‘fundamental right’, whereupon inclusion in the ‘principles’ referred to in Article 51(1) of the 
Charter, which do not create any direct subjective rights and indeed need to be given 
expression by the entities to which it is addressed, can instantly be ruled out’.75 Article 30 is 
guaranteed only in accordance with Union law, national law and practices which suggests that 
it is a principle. Furthermore, in Nagy, the CJEU noted that the applicants were acting under 
the misapprehension that article 30 was a directly effective right.76 Article 28, as we have 
already discussed, is somewhat unusual in that it is firmly couched in the language of rights 
and indeed the general principle has been recognised as such by the CJEU.77 However, we 
have already mentioned that in the UK there is no positive right to strike and article 28 is 
subject to Union law, national laws and practices. In any case, it is now clear that the 
rights/principles distinction acts as a potential barrier to the justiciability of fundamental 
employment rights. An additional and potentially more significant hurdle is the question of the 
very applicability of the Charter to private parties. 
4.2. Applicability to private parties  
 
The scope of the Charter is governed by article 51(1), which provides that ‘the provisions of 
the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (…) and 
to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’. The Charter is not 
explicitly addressed to private parties and it was ‘certainly possible to argue therefore that the 
Charter was not intended to apply to private disputes’.78 However, in AMS, the AG took some 
steps to clarifying this issue.79 AMS, a trade union, sought to rely on article 27 of the Charter 
to challenge a private employer’s refusal to establish worker consultation pursuant to Directive 
2002/14.80 Under the French legislation implementing the Directive, the employer was entitled 
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to exclude certain categories of employment contract from the calculation of the number of 
employees. We saw that the CJEU found that this aspect of the French legislation was not 
compatible with the Directive. Despite this, the remedies available to AMS were unclear, given 
the CJEU’s consistent rejection of the horizontal effect of Directives.81 AMS therefore sought 
to rely directly on article 27. We have already seen that the Charter’s principles are not capable 
of being relied on in this way. 
As to the broader argument that any provision of the Charter could not be invoked in a dispute 
between private parties, the AG noted that this was not a question of the horizontal application 
of the Directive as such. The AG roundly rejected the argument that because the Charter is 
addressed to the Union and the Member States, it cannot apply to private parties. It is often the 
case that constitutions do not expressly refer to the addressees and duty bearers of the rights. 
It therefore comes down to an issue of interpreting the Charter.82 For the AG, the entire purpose 
of article 51(1) was merely to clarify the extent to which fundamental rights are binding on the 
institutions and the Member States. It was not intended to address the question of horizontal 
effect. In any event, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights is already known in EU law, 
for example the equality principle, and so the Charter could not have been intended to change 
things for the worse without explicitly doing so.83  
The influence of the Charter on private parties depends on the individual provisions in 
question. Some rights are particularly apt to be invoked in the private sphere while others less 
so. Article 27 is an example of former as the ‘heading of the article is [refers to] within the 
undertaking [and so it] must be accepted that “the undertaking” is in some way involved in the 
effectiveness of that right (…) [even though the primary obligation is on the public authorities 
to ensure the right exists]’.84 
The CJEU accepted that the French legislation in question could be considered an 
implementing measure of the Directive and could thus engage the Charter.85 On the other hand, 
the provision of the Directive prohibiting the exclusion of certain types of contract from the 
calculation of employee numbers could not be said to derive from the wording of article 27.86 
For that reason, the CJEU was able to distinguish the present case from its earlier finding in 
Kücükdeveci that employees could invoke the general principle of non-discrimination on the 
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grounds of age, which was given expression in article 21(1) of the Charter against private 
employers.87 This is because article 21(1) contained a clear prohibition of discrimination, 
which was in itself sufficient to lead to a subjective individual right. The CJEU instead relied 
on its established case law on the alternatives to the absence of horizontal direct effect of 
directives including consistent interpretation and state liability. Despite this, the CJEU is 
implicitly accepting the idea that the Charter is applicable to private parties provided that the 
Charter provision in question is sufficiently precise, clear and requires no further legislative 
implementation. The AG in Dominguez also insisted that despite being a right, article 31 is not 
capable of horizontal direct effect.88 Despite the limitations placed on the principles, certain 
Member States have insisted on further measures to prevent the development of social rights. 
The UK was one such Member State.  
4.3. The UK opt out  
 
At the time of the Charter’s drafting, the British delegation was not content that the Charter’s 
horizontal provisions would be enough to prevent the creep of social rights. A second line of 
attack was opened up, with the UK seeking an opt out from the Charter altogether.89 As 
Barnard has pointed out, however, this opt out marks the ‘triumph of rhetoric over reality’ 
given that the Charter most certainly applies to the UK as an EU Member State when it acts 
within the scope of EU law (for example, when it implements EU legislation). Certainly, in 
the case of article 31, the relevant rights have been provided for in national law via 
implementing legislation. In addition, because article 31 does not refer to national law or 
practice, it is unlikely that the interpretative value of article 31 is diminished when applied to 
the UK.90 The only true opt out from the Charter, Barnard suggests, is to be found in article 
1(2) of Protocol 30 which provides that ‘[i]n particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing 
in Title IV (…) creates justiciable rights applicable to (…) the United Kingdom except in so 
far as (…) the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law’. This provision 
serves the role of ‘making sure that if any of the provisions of Title IV are in fact classed as 
rights they are not justiciable in respect of the UK’.91 This may have particular implications 
for articles 31 and 28 which are ‘rights’ and can therefore not be directly relied upon in the 
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UK.   
 
In any event, the intended purpose of the Protocol was largely political, not legal. As Dougan 
notes, debate surrounding the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty centred on the ‘accusation that the 
economic and social rights contained in Title IV of the Charter would provide the basis for a 
judicial assault upon the UK’s (neo-) liberal employment legislation’.92 As such, the 
‘Protocol’s primary purpose is to serve as an effective political response to a serious failure of 
public discourse. Indeed, the Protocol emerges as a fantasy solution to a fantasy problem: the 
Charter is not actually a serious threat to UK labour law’.93  
The above limitations on the invocability of the employment rights may negate their status as 
human rights. Perhaps therefore, in the context of the Charter, it is time to abandon the human 
rights paradigm (if it was ever truly applicable). 
 
5. Abandoning the human rights paradigm?   
 
It is notable that the Charter refers to ‘fundamental’ rights as opposed to ‘human’ rights. It 
should be remarked that the EU institutions also refer to ‘Human and Fundamental Rights’, 
thereby distinguishing between the two concepts, without, however setting out the differences 
between them.94 A potential rationale for this distinction may be the inclusion in the Charter 
of references to the four fundamental ‘freedoms’ of the EU legal order namely, goods, services, 
establishment and capital. The term ‘fundamental’ rights is therefore all embracing, covering 
classic human rights such as the right to life as well as the Union-specific rights such as the 
freedom to establish a business anywhere in the EU. Of course, a downside to this all-
embracing approach may be to undermine classic human rights by placing them alongside the 
economic rights of potentially non-human actors. The freedom to conduct a business, analysed 
in greater detail below, is a case in point.  
Looking again at the language adopted by the Charter itself, beyond references to the ECHR, 
the Charter adopts the term ‘human rights’ only once. Article 53 provides that ‘[n]othing in 
this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognised in their respective fields of application, by Union law and 
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international law and international agreements’. In other words, the sole mention of human 
rights is in reference to rights contained in other more explicitly ‘human rights’ documents. 
Having said that, the term ‘human’ is mentioned several times in the Charter ‘human dignity’, 
‘human community’, ‘human body’, ‘human beings’, ‘inhuman’, ‘human health’ mostly in the 
opening Titles concerning dignity and freedoms. The sole reference in the Solidary Title is to 
‘human health’. None of the Employment Rights make any pretence at being human rights at 
all. Rather, the terms adopted here are the more restrictive ‘workers’95, ‘their representatives’96 
‘every worker’.97 It could be countered, of course, that this is merely a reflection of the fact 
that employment rights must necessarily be restrictive in their personal scope. Only workers 
or employees can enjoy such rights; they are not universally applicable human rights and, as 
we saw, this is often the primary criticism addressed to advocates of labour rights as human 
rights.  
A more appropriate terminology might therefore be ‘fundamental Union rights’, or even 
‘fundamental principles of European Union employment law’, an autonomous notion free 
from the constraints of ordinary human rights theories. Clapham refers to ‘fundamental 
Community rights’ in his discussion of early social rights cases such as Defrenne.98 He notes 
that the fact that this equal pay case arose in the context of a private employment relationship 
was no obstacle to the application of rights considerations, in this instance the equality 
principle. The vehicle through which the rights were applied was the Union notion of direct 
effect, a legal tool that is usually unavailable in the context of other rights documents.99 In 
addition, he highlights that far from being universally applicable, reliance on the EU notion of 
equality ‘may depend on being a [Union] national or on the [Union] transnational context in 
which they operate’.100 As such, we can see that sometimes EU law goes further than ordinary 
human rights instruments in allowing litigants to rely on the principle of direct effect to 
vindicate their rights, while in others it is more restrictive, applying only to Union nationals. 
Expressing employment rights as being specific to the EU would also have serious 
repercussions for UK labour law post-Brexit, more of which below.   
 
From the above, it can be seen that it is often difficult to discern the precise status of the 
Employment Rights contained in the Charter, given that they derive from other international 
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rights instruments such as the ECHR, International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, 
Community Social Charter and the ESC as well as the general principles and even ordinary 
EU employment legislation. However, the fact that these rights have been re-proclaimed in the 
Charter is the strongest possible indication of their status as fundamental rights. In addition, 
the clear intention of the Treaty drafters was to grant the Charter the same value as the Treaties 
and thereby constitutional status. Once again, for their very inclusion in a constitutional rights 
text, we can claim that the Charter Employment Rights are indeed constitutional rights. This 
is, of course, all very well in the abstract, but what are the practical consequences of this 
constitutionalisation process?  
 
B. Constitutionalising the Employment Rights  
 
It has already been noted that the ability of litigants to rely on the Employment Rights has been 
impeded in a number of respects, so to what use can they be put? Jääskinen  suggests six 
possible functions for social rights that derive largely from Finnish legal doctrine.101 First, 
social rights may create for the individual a (subjective) right that can be exercised without the 
need to invoke other legislative provisions. Second, social rights may confer the legislator with 
a power to adopt provisions that would otherwise be excluded (competence effect). Third, they 
may create a mandate for the legislator to achieve a certain objective. Fourth, social rights can 
require the derogation or non-application of a provision that conflicts (derogation effect). Fifth, 
social rights may have an interpretative effect in the sense that other provisions have to be 
interpreted to the extent possible in a way that is in harmony with the right. Finally, social 
rights may have a programmatic effect in the sense that there is a ‘best endeavours’ obligation 
to realise the rights as far as possible. Some of these effects are expressly excluded by the 
Charter. For example, the Charter is not intended to extend the competences of the Union in 
the employment field. To date, the most prevalent effect of the Charter can be seen in its use 
as both a standard of review (derogation effect) and a tool of interpretation (interpretative 
effect). We begin with the Charter’s role as ground for reviewing EU legislation.   
 
1. Standard of review of EU law 
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Human rights as general principles of EU law have long been used as a ground for reviewing 
not only the legality of EU acts102 but also Member State acts falling within the scope of EU 
law. Falling ‘within the scope of EU law’ are situations in which Member States implement 
EU law,103 derogate from EU law,104 and act within the sphere of EU law. This role of the 
general principles has now been taken up by the Charter, as the following examples illustrate.  
1.1. An example from equality law  
 
There are no examples of Employment Rights being used as a standard against which to assess 
the compatibility of EU law with the Charter but illustrative of this possibility is the case of 
Test-Achats.105 In that case, the CJEU was asked to determine whether the lack of a ‘sunset 
clause’ in a derogation contained in Directive 2004/113/EC on equal access between men and 
women to goods and services was compatible with articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, governing 
equal treatment. The derogation allowed insurance companies to continue discriminating 
between men and women, when calculating insurance premiums, for a seemingly indefinite 
period.  
Human rights considerations are front and centre in this judgment, with the CJEU starting by 
referring to the recitals of the Directive which contain a strong reference to article 6 TEU and 
the Union’s commitment to fundamental rights.106 The Directive then notes that ‘Equality 
between men and women is a fundamental principle of the European Union. Articles 21 and 
23 of the Charter (…) prohibit any discrimination on grounds of sex and require equality 
between men and women to be ensured in all areas’.107 Particular emphasis is placed on the 
purpose of the Directive, namely ‘to lay down a framework for combating discrimination 
based on sex in access to and supply of goods and services, with a view to putting into effect 
in the Member States the principle of equal treatment’.108 As a derogation to this principle, 
article 5(2) permitted Member States to allow proportionate differences in premiums to be 
attributed to sex. 
The referring Belgian Constitutional Court did not explicitly refer to the Charter in its 
questions, but rather to article 6(2) TEU. The CJEU nevertheless immediately assessed the 
compatibility of the derogation with the Charter rather than the general principles, holding that 
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‘Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter state, respectively, that any discrimination based on sex is 
prohibited and that equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas. Since recital 
4 to Directive 2004/113 expressly refers to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, the validity of 
that directive must be assessed in the light of those provisions’.109 The CJEU went on to find 
that when the EU decides to take action to achieve equality, ‘it must contribute in a coherent 
manner, to the achievement of the intended objective, without prejudice to the possibility of 
providing for transitional periods or derogations of limited scope’.110 As no temporal limitation 
was placed on the derogation period, article 5(2) was not compatible with the Charter. 
This case demonstrates the ability of the Charter to act as strong standard for reviewing EU 
legislation, having the effect of overturning, or at the very least clarifying, the intention of the 
legislature. It also demonstrates the importance that will be attached by the CJEU to references 
to the Charter contained in the recitals of the legislation itself. This approach could already be 
seen in early case law on paid annual leave, in which the CJEU showed a willingness to rely 
on international social rights norms such as the ILO Conventions if it was expressly referred 
to in the legislation.111 As much of the existing EU legislative acquis in the employment 
context pre-dates the Charter, it remains to be seen whether the Employment Rights may have 
a potentially similar role to the equality concept.  
1.2. The potential of the Employment Rights  
 
Because there is no case law on the matter, the potential for the Employment Rights to act as 
a standard of review of EU legislation must be largely speculative. It has been suggested that 
the WTD, with its myriad opt outs and derogations may be particularly apt for review in light 
of the Charter. According to O’Leary, such opt outs may be ‘viewed in a different, and perhaps 
stricter light if the right from which they derogate has been included in the Charter as a 
fundamental right to which the EU adheres’.112 It may well be the case that the granting of 
legal status to the Charter will have the effect of limiting the ability of the Union to adopt 
legislation restricting or further derogating from a right contained therein. Article 53 of the 
Charter provides that ‘[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised [by EU law, international law 
and Member State constitutions]’. This is a standstill clause and is particularly relevant in 
relation to article 31(2). The right to paid annual leave has consistently been held to be a 
                                                          
109 Case C-236/09 Test-Achats para 17.  
110 ibid para 21.  
111 For eg the AG opinion in Case C-350/06 Schultz-Hoff. 
112 O’Leary (n 52) 324.  
44 
 
fundamental social right from which there can be no derogation. It may follow that paid annual 
leave is also an inderogable right under the Charter.113  
What of the other rights provided for in article 31? We know that article 31 posits the right to 
limited working hours, rest periods and paid annual leave. As mentioned above, however, we 
are not told the specific time periods over which these rights are to be calculated. Again, we 
have to rely on the WTD to further flesh out these rights. The WTD specifies, for example, 
that workers have a right to a maximum working week of 48 hours.  
This again demonstrates that it is not possible to view the Charter in isolation, but despite this 
symbiosis it would also be a mistake to consider the Charter and the Directive as synonymous. 
As Bogg warns, ‘the codification of the 48-hour working limit would be mistaken in framing 
the right under Article 31(2). The requirement that the maximum be “reasonable” under Article 
31(2) (…) would allow the flexible setting of maxima to be calibrated by relevant factors such 
as the intensity of work in a particular industry’.114 It has even been suggested that the existing 
opt outs and derogations in the current WTD might not be compatible with article 31 and 
would therefore be held invalid if challenged. Once again, we are confronted with the complex 
relationship between the Charter and employment legislation. We know that the Charter was 
intended merely to codify existing rights, for example the right to a limited working week 
found in the WTD. Now it might be suggested by Bogg that article 31 may only have 
transposed part of that right, ie the right to limited working hours stripped of the derogations 
contained in the Directive. It has been suggested that such an approach is consistent with the 
fact that article 31 is not specified as being subject to Union law, national laws and practices. 
The rights contained in article 31 are not therefore capable of limitation via legislation.115  
With respect, this position is not tenable. Attributing any intent to the Charter’s drafters (and 
thereby the Member States) to undermine the derogations contained in the Directive is difficult 
given the longstanding struggles associated with the review of the existing WTD. As Bogg 
admits, ‘[t]here may be some scope for derogation under Article 31(2), but within much stricter 
limits than are currently envisaged by Article 22 of the Directive’.116 In addition, article 52(1) 
which governs the permissible limitations on Charter rights applies to each of the Charter’s 
provisions. This article specifies that any limitation must be provided for by law, respect the 
essence of the right, be proportionate, necessary and genuinely meet objectives of the general 
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interest. Therefore, none of the Charter’s rights are absolute and the only means of limiting 
them is via EU or domestic legislation.  
Beyond article 31, it has been posited that article 27 may also serve a possible shielding effect 
thereby ‘supressing EU attempts to restrict rights on information and consultation provided by 
EU secondary legislation or proposed amendments and/or attempts to restrict national 
legislation’.117 Article 30 is a less likely candidate given its weaker connection to EU 
employment legislation, but it may nevertheless act as a buttress or reaffirmation of rights 
contained in existing legislation such as equality law and its protection against discriminatory 
dismissal. Similarly, article 28 has no direct relationship with EU legislation.  
The CJEU also now uses the Charter when assessing the compatibility of Member State law 
with human rights standards.118 The scope of application of the Charter is the same as the 
general principles. In other words, it will also apply to the Member States when they act ‘within 
the scope of EU law’.119 The CJEU has since clarified that the mere fact that the EU had powers 
in a certain area was not sufficient to bring national action in that area within the scope of EU 
law.120 Rather, it was necessary to establish a more specific connection to EU law. The criteria 
identified by the CJEU include: whether the national rule implements EU law; whether the 
rule pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law and whether there are specific EU 
law rules governing the matter of capable of having effect on it.121 It is often difficult in the 
case law to separate out the question of interpretation and that of review. This can be seen from 
the case law in which the national court will seek a preliminary reference from the CJEU on 
the interpretation of EU legislation which will then have a bearing on the validity of national 
law with that legislation. For the sake of clarity, then, we move now to look at the Charter as 
an interpretative tool before then examining its role as a standard for the review of national 
legislation.  
 
2. Tool of interpretation of EU law  
 
The role of the Charter as a tool of interpretation is confined solely to EU law as the CJEU 
does not have the competence to interpret national law. This is an area in which the potential 
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impact of the Charter on the employment relationship has been most keenly felt. In order to 
set the scene, it is useful to outline the CJEU’s pre-existing methods of interpreting legislation 
both generally and more specifically in the employment context. The limitations of the literal 
approach to interpreting EU legislation are discussed before turning to the CJEU’s preference 
for contextual and teleological approaches. This is followed by an examination of the Charter’s 
Employment Rights as a tool of interpretation before looking at the uneasy relationship 
between fundamental rights arguments and the interpretation of employment legislation.122  
The aim here is not to consider the purposive approach to the interpretation of the Charter’s 
provisions themselves, which is an issue common to most human rights instruments, notably 
the ECHR.123 Rather, the idea is to consider how the Charter’s Employment Rights have been 
used to steer a purposive interpretation of EU employment legislation.  
2.1. The existing interpretative methods of the CJEU  
 
According to Fennelly, the object of interpretation ‘lies in [uncovering] the true intention of 
the lawmakers, whether they be framers of a constitution or a treaty, legislators, or drafters of 
secondary legislation’.124 First, we must determine when a provision of EU law may need to 
be interpreted. It goes without saying that legislation requires interpretation when there are 
doubts as to the meaning of its provisions. This may be for a number of reasons, including 
linguistic uncertainty, vagueness, ambiguity, imprecision, incompleteness, value pluralism, 
rule instability, gaps in the law, and most importantly in the context of Union legislation; open-
textured language.125 There are additional complications associated with the interpretation of 
EU law, notably multilingualism and a rather opaque legislative drafting process associated 
with the quest for compromise and consensus. These specific features only serve to heighten 
the difficulties associated with interpretative tools found in all national legal systems.  
An added difficulty for the interpretation of EU legislation is that it must be interpreted in 
accordance with the Treaties. This is further complicated by the fact that the Treaties 
themselves require interpretation and often contain even vaguer and more open-textured 
language than legislation. Such indeterminate values as ‘human dignity’, ‘freedom’, 
‘democracy’, ‘equality’, ‘ever closer union’, ‘solidarity’, ‘cooperation’, ‘justice’ and 
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‘citizenship’ pepper the Treaty, without any guidance as to how such values should be used or 
interpreted. Some of these concepts have been further developed in secondary legislation 
leading to a certain symbiosis or indeed circularity, more of which below. 
An additional factor in EU law is that it is not always clear that a question of interpretation 
even needs to be referred to the CJEU in the first place. In CILFIT, the CJEU clarified that 
national courts are not obliged to refer a question in cases ‘where previous decisions of the 
Court have already dealt with the point of law in question (…) even though the questions at 
issue are not strictly identical’.126 A question is further defined as acte clair when ‘the correct 
application of [Union] law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt 
as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved’.127 A final complicating factor 
is the structure of the CJEU’s judgments, which have been so heavily influenced by both 
French legal reasoning and by the French language. This has led to what Beck describes as 
certain ‘building blocks’ in the CJEU’s judgments, ‘that is, paragraphs which occur again and 
again in identical or nearly the same form in the Court’s case law on particular subjects’ which 
serves to further promote ‘vagueness and general uncertainty about the precise meaning of the 
Court’s pronouncements and the state of the case law’.128  
Having determined that a provision needs to be interpreted, we must look to the tools used to 
interpret it. Turning to the Treaties or secondary legislation for guidance is of little use as 
neither contain any provision governing interpretation, although this is usually absent from 
any international treaty. It is of necessity, therefore, that we must turn to the case law of the 
CJEU to discover its interpretative criteria. From a very early stage, the CJEU has insisted that 
in interpreting the Treaties ‘it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the 
wording’ of the relevant provision.129 Itzcovich identifies three more precise interpretative 
criteria used by the CJEU, namely linguistic, systemic and dynamic.130 Linguistic criteria 
involve the derivation of legal arguments from the semantic and syntactic features of the 
different language versions of an EU provision (wording). Such an approach includes a 
determination of the ‘proper meaning of the words’ which is at the heart of literal 
interpretation.131 Given the peculiarities of EU law, such an approach is not always appropriate 
or desirable. As such, the CJEU has benefited from more expansive interpretative tools. This 
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brings us to the second criteria, namely systemic or contextual interpretation which takes into 
consideration other provisions of the same legal text or other areas of the legal system (general 
scheme). In such cases, the legal provision is to be interpreted in a way which is consistent 
with the ‘system’.132 Finally, dynamic criteria of interpretation look not to the text, but the 
objectives pursued by EU law (spirit).133 It is these dynamic criteria of interpretation that are 
‘the most characteristic of the [CJEU’s] legal reasoning’.134  
Dynamic reasoning may be further broken down into three related categories. First, there is a 
functional interpretation, which assumes that a provision should be interpreted in the manner 
that best ensures the realisation of the goal it seeks to achieve. Second, and most importantly 
in the EU context, there is the teleological or purposive approach under which a provision 
should be interpreted in accordance with the goals or purposes of a legal order or legislative 
scheme. Finally, there is the consequentialist approach which considers the practical 
consequences of a chosen interpretation.135 The use of non-literal methods of interpretation is 
not unique to the Charter. George Letsas, discussing the ECHR argues that far from stemming 
exclusively from vague language, the purposive approach necessarily arises because ‘legal 
practitioners do not share the same linguistic criteria on how to identify the truth of legal 
propositions and that disagreement in law is widespread and deep’.136 In any event the 
classification of interpretative methodologies set out above is beset by limitations, but for 
present purposes, it acts as useful shorthand for the division of interpretative approaches 
adopted by the CJEU. We now turn to examine how the CJEU applies these methods to the 
interpretation of employment legislation. 
2.2. Interpreting employment legislation  
 
In the interpretation of secondary employment legislation, the CJEU adopts the same 
purposive/teleological method used in other contexts.137 EU employment legislation contains 
specific terms that must be given autonomous Union meanings. We need only think of the 
controversy surrounding the definition of the ‘worker’ or ‘pay’ in Union law and the complex 
relationship between the Union definition and national legal systems.138 In this respect, a literal 
interpretation would be wholly inadequate. Therefore, the CJEU will ‘seek to resolve the legal 
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uncertainty by reference to the purpose, general scheme and/or normative status of the measure 
as well as the context in which it is to be applied’.139 As we shall see, the closest thing we have 
in legislation as a guide to interpretation are the recitals which often themselves contain 
concepts that ‘are either open-textured, vague and/or essentially contested’.140 Again, the 
notion of ‘autonomous concepts’ and their interpretation is not unique to EU law. The ECtHR, 
for example, has been alert to the need to prevent contracting states from avoiding the 
Convention’s application. One way of achieving this has been to guarantee an autonomous 
interpretation for key concepts within the Convention’s provisions.141 As Letsas notes, ‘the 
autonomous concepts of the Convention enjoy a status of semantic independence; their 
meaning is not to be equated with the meaning that these very same concepts possess in 
domestic law’. 142Having identified these issues, we can now examine the CJEU’s pre-Charter 
approach to interpreting employment legislation in order to assess the impact of the 
Employment Rights.  
a. The pre-Charter case law  
 
Even the briefest of glances at the pre-Charter case law on the interpretation EU employment 
legislation demonstrates teleology in action. The usual—although not universal—result is an 
employee-protective reading of the relevant legislation. Once again, we turn to the WTD.  We 
have already seen that the WTD’s purpose is to lay down minimum requirements intended to 
improve the living and working conditions of workers through approximation of national 
provisions concerning, in particular, the duration of working time. The recitals of the Directive 
show that it has a highly worker-protective telos; ‘[t]he improvement of workers’ safety, 
hygiene and health (…) is an objective which should not be subordinated to purely economic 
considerations’; ‘[a]ll workers should have adequate rest periods’; ‘the organisation of work 
according to a certain pattern must take account of the general principle of adapting work to 
the worker’. The recitals go on to recognise the need for flexibility, but even this is said to be 
conditional on ‘ensuring compliance with the principle of protecting the safety and health of 
workers’.  
The Directive itself contains a comprehensive list of definitions. Working time is defined in 
article 2(1) as ‘any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and 
carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practices’. This 
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seemingly comprehensive definition is, in reality, emptied of all content in the absence of 
further fleshing out, a task that has been left to the CJEU. The Court has consistently held that 
both working time and rest time may not be interpreted in accordance with national law but 
rather ‘constitute concepts of [Union] law which must be defined in accordance with objective 
characteristics by reference to the scheme and purpose of the [Working Time Directive]’.143 
The reason for adopting the purposive or teleological approach in this context was to secure 
the full efficacy and uniform application of those concepts in all Member States, as any other 
interpretation would ‘frustrate’ the objective of the Directive. Furthermore, the CJEU declared 
that this interpretation was the only one that accorded with the purpose of the Directive.144 This 
approach is particularly interesting, as the CJEU is saying that although it has been left the 
task of interpreting the legislation—which was clearly open to interpretation or the question 
would never have arisen—it was only realistically capable of one interpretation. As such, the 
CJEU was able to adopt an expansive interpretation of ‘working time’ in SIMAP to include 
inactive on-call time.145  
The CJEU has repeatedly held that, in view of both the wording of the Directive (literal 
interpretation) and its purpose (purposive/teleological interpretation) and scheme (schematic 
interpretation), its various provisions ‘constitute rules of [Union] social law of particular 
importance from which every worker must benefit as a minimum requirement necessary to 
ensure protection of his safety and health’.146 This led the CJEU in Commission v United 
Kingdom, to reject the distinction drawn by the UK Government between limits and 
entitlements in the WTD. For the UK, the employer was only under an obligation to actively 
ensure that workers actually benefit from limits to working time but not entitlements such as 
rest periods. The CJEU held that such a distinction was unsustainable as ‘neither the various 
language versions of that directive nor the Court’s case-law relating to that directive, its 
objective and the nature of the rights to rest which it lays down’ support the distinction between 
entitlements and limits.147  
In the context of paid annual leave, we see the CJEU once again repeating the formula that 
this entitlement is ‘a particularly important principle of Union social law from which there can 
be no derogations’. This led the CJEU in BECTU to find that the expression contained in article 
7(1) WTD ‘in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of such leave 
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laid down by national legislation and/or practice’ must be interpreted as referring only to the 
arrangements for paid annual leave and not the existence of that right.148 
What can we take from the CJEU’s pre-Charter approach to the interpretation of employment 
legislation? We can see that invariably the structure of the judgments starts by setting out in 
some detail, the relevant legislative provisions (including the preambles) of both the EU 
legislation and the relevant national implementing legislation. In some cases, the CJEU leaves 
it at that, referring back to these provisions only sparingly. In other cases, the CJEU draws 
heavily from the recitals which play a strong role in the subsequent interpretation.149  We also 
see that the CJEU places less emphasis on the legal basis of the legislation in the Treaty. The 
CJEU will limit itself to interpretation within the framework of the legislation, turning only to 
primary law if the telos is not clear. In other cases, the CJEU has drawn heavily from 
international rights instruments.150 All of the above is done is pursuit of the purpose of the 
legislation, 151 whilst ensuring the effectiveness and uniform application of EU law.152 The 
CJEU usually does so without violating the meaning of the words, but has the advent of 
fundamental rights had any impact on the CJEU’s approach?  
2.3. Fundamental rights as a vehicle of interpretation  
 
Having set out the CJEU’s purposive approach to the interpretation of employment legislation, 
we can now proceed to examine the place of fundamental rights within this interpretative 
scheme. With all the discussion surrounding the Charter as an interpretative tool, we may lose 
sight of the fact that the fundamental rights have long been used as a tool of interpretation in 
the guise of general principles of EU law.  
a. Lessons from the general principles  
 
It will be recalled that the general principles of EU law are those principles that have been 
derived—largely by the CJEU—from unwritten rules not contained in the Treaty or secondary 
legislation. The reason for the CJEU’s ‘discovery’ of fundamental rights as general principles 
results largely from the absence of any explicit commitment to fundamental rights contained 
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in the founding Treaties. The background to the development of the general principles is 
expanded upon in the next chapter. For now it suffices to note that a major function of the 
general principles is to act as an aid to interpretation, allowing the Court to ‘follow an evolutive 
interpretation and be responsive to changes in the economic and political order’.153 The general 
principles are highly value-based and inherently vague and ‘[l]inguistic uncertainty at the level 
of principles therefore translates directly into secondary interpretative legal uncertainty’.154  
Initially, the CJEU was reluctant to allow litigants to invoke the fundamental rights they may 
have enjoyed under national law. This approach changed significantly following the Stauder 
case in which the CJEU held that the right to human dignity, found in German law, was part 
of the legal order of the Union itself.155 Although the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights 
via the general principles is to be broadly welcomed, the potential for unforeseen consequences 
was largely underestimated at the time. In fact, the debate as to the place of fundamental rights 
within the EU’s legal order continues to prove contentious, a situation that, as we shall see, 
has not been resolved by the introduction of the Charter. As Leczykiewicz has remarked, 
‘[d]oes the category of “fundamental rights” as concepts of EU law infuse that legal system 
primarily or exclusively with social values or is it perhaps a vehicle of another transformation, 
towards greater liberalization and deregulation?’.156 Despite such uncertainties, the CJEU’s 
approach to interpretation in fundamental rights cases even more closely conforms to the 
purposive/teleological paradigm, reflecting a number of factors including ‘the lack of detailed 
secondary legislation, conceptual vagueness in the key treaty provisions and value pluralism 
in the sense that many cases involve a clash between conflicting norms of roughly equal 
status’.157 In the employment context, the impact of the general principles has been most 
keenly felt in the equality field.  
Take, for example, the case of P v S, where the general principle of equality was used to grant 
an expansive reading to the Equal Treatment Directive (ETD).158 The CJEU was tasked with 
determining whether discrimination on the grounds of gender could be extended to cases of 
gender reassignment. The CJEU held that ‘the scope of the directive cannot be confined to 
discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other sex. In view of its purpose and 
the nature of the rights that it seeks to safeguard, the scope of the directive is also such as to 
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apply to discrimination arising, as in this case, from the gender reassignment of the person 
concerned’.159 As O’Leary notes, ‘[t]he sequence of the Court’s reasoning in this case in 
instructive. It recalled that the ETD was but the expression, in a particular field, of the principle 
of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of EU law and that the right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of gender is one of the fundamental human rights whose 
observance the Court has a duty to ensure’.160 In other words, the CJEU took as its starting 
point the need to respect fundamental rights (read the need to respect the purpose/objectives 
of the legislation) when determining the scope of the legislation, rather than first assessing the 
scope and then verifying whether fundamental rights had, in that context, been respected.161  
A complicated, and as yet unanswered, question is the relationship between the general 
principles and the Charter. Given that the Charter was merely intended to codify or render 
more visible existing EU fundamental rights, this then begs the question of whether the Charter 
was intended to replace the general principles or whether the two sources are coterminous and 
mutually dependent. Most commentators agree that the CJEU’s primary point of reference is, 
and should now be, the Charter as this is ‘in keeping with the intentions of the Treaty authors, 
which granted the Charter the same value as that of the Treaties’ and is ‘also more in keeping 
with national constitutional cultures which, bred in a civil law tradition, feel more comfortable 
with written lists of rights’.162 Leaving aside the CJEU’s use of the general principles, what is 
the role for the Charter itself in the interpretation of EU employment legislation?  
2.4. The Charter as an interpretative tool  
 
As already noted, from the outset, the Charter has been characterised by its limited ambitions. 
However, O’Leary suggests that ‘[t]he inclusion of a subject matter, whether in the form of a 
right or a principle, in the Charter, will of necessity influence the manner in which the Court 
will consider the precise content of the right or principle in question, its range of application 
and the weighing of conflicting interests’.163 That the Charter has a role to play in the 
interpretation of EU legislation should be unsurprising given that it is not in itself a source of 
rights, but rather a list of Union rights deriving from various other sources, including 
legislation.  
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A major difficulty in using the Charter as a vehicle of interpretation is that the Charter 
provisions themselves must first be interpreted. If we look to the Explanations, we are either 
confronted with equally vague statements, or we are referred to existing legislative provisions 
and jurisprudence. This has led to the somewhat circular position that EU legislation will be 
interpreted against the backdrop of a Charter which itself is to be interpreted through the lens 
of EU legislation as already interpreted by the CJEU. It should not be surprising that 
inconsistent results begin to emerge. In addition, the Charter can only act as a tool of 
interpretation if the CJEU chooses to engage with it. In many cases, where a fundamental 
rights link may have been thought to exist, the CJEU either finds that the Charter is 
inapplicable as the case is outside the scope of EU law, or it simply ignores the fundamental 
rights aspect altogether.164  
Barnard has spoken of the silence of the Charter.165 She argues that in some cases, the CJEU 
has been unjustifiably reticent in its use of the Charter. In other cases, she points to situations 
in which the CJEU has rightly refused to engage with fundamental rights arguments. Finally, 
she argues that there are other contexts still in which the CJEU would be perfectly justified in 
keeping silent. Her concerns largely focus on democratic legitimacy, arguing that the CJEU 
should not overturn legislative compromises.166 Another concern is that the use of the Charter 
may in fact obscure the real arguments rather than bringing any clarity. The following 
represents not so much a plea for silence in certain situations, but rather a recognition of the 
Charter’s inherent limitations as an interpretative tool in the employment context despite the 
interpretative role it has been given. It is shown that the Charter, already beset by 
contradictions, is simultaneously inert and unpredictably dynamic. What then is the added 
value of bringing fundamental rights arguments to the interpretative task? Do they in fact add 
clarity to judicial reasoning or are they a vehicle for judicial activism and incoherent 
interpretation? 
2.5. The Charter and the interpretation of employment legislation  
 
The CJEU is by now well-used to dealing with the Charter in the employment context. It is 
not, however, enough to assess the Charter’s impact from the mere fact that its provisions have 
been cited by the CJEU or an AG. What is the real impact of the Charter arguments? If we 
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look again at the WTD, we saw at the beginning of this chapter that the CJEU’s approach in 
cases like BECTU heralded a promising start to the life of the Charter, as the Court was willing 
to infuse its interpretative task with fundamental rights arguments. If we delve deeper, 
however, can it be said that the Charter has made any real difference? 
a. Continuation of the purposive approach  
 
The CJEU is still adopting a strongly purposive approach, continuing to refer to the recitals 
and the objectives of the legislation but now simply adding the Charter into the teleological 
mix. We can see this approach in ANGED,167 a case in which the CJEU was asked whether 
article 7(1) WTD must be interpreted as precluding national provisions under which a worker 
who becomes unfit for work during a period of paid annual leave is not entitled subsequently 
to the paid annual leave which coincided with the period of unfitness for work. The CJEU 
starts by using its well-worn mantra that paid annual leave ‘must be regarded as a particularly 
important principle of European Union social law from which there can be no derogations’.168 
In the next breath, the CJEU states that not only is the right particularly important, but that it 
is also ‘expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the Charter’.169 This is the last we hear of the 
Charter. The CJEU instead reverts to its usual approach, noting that ‘the purpose of entitlement 
to paid annual leave is to enable the worker to rest’.170  
This pattern is continued in subsequent cases. The CJEU starts by reaffirming that paid annual 
leave is ‘a particularly important principle of European Union social law from which there can 
be no derogations’.171 It then notes, almost in passing, that the right is also contained in article 
31(2) of the Charter.172 The Court moves on to look at the purpose and objectives of the 
legislation (as it has always done),173 to find that, in accordance with settled case law, concepts 
such as working time and paid leave must be interpreted broadly.174  
It is also remarkable that many of the paid leave cases in which the Charter is cited do not 
come with an AG opinion.175 This may be suggestive of the fact that the CJEU has significant 
experience in dealing with the question of paid annual leave and this may also be a factor 
                                                          
167 Case C-78/11 ANGED. 
168 ibid para 16. 
169 ibid para 17.  
170 ibid para 19.  
171 Case C-219/14 Greenfield para 26; Joined Cases C-229/11 and C-230/11 Heimann para 22; Case C-178/15 
Sobczyszyn para 19; Case C-337/10 Neidel para 28.  
172 Case C-219/14 Greenfield para 27; Case C-178/15 Sobczyszyn para 20; Case C-155/10 Williams para 18.  
173 Case C-219/14 Greenfield para 29; Case C-539/12 Lock para 15; Case C-178/15 Sobczyszyn para 23  
174 Case C-539/12Z Lock para 14, Joined Cases C-229/11 and C-230/11 Heimann para 23.  
175 Case C-219/14 Greenfield; Case C-337/10 Neidl; Case C-178/15 Sobczyszyn; Case C-78/11 ANGED.  
56 
 
accounting for the somewhat formulaic judgments handed down since the Charter came into 
force. Just how pervasive, then, is this approach and is it at all possible to unpack the role of 
the Charter in the Court’s decision making? In other words, is the Charter instrumental to 
deciding employment cases or is it merely a rhetorical device?  
b. Assessing the Charter’s role  
 
One way of determining the Charter’s impact might be to examine a case in which the AG 
referred extensively to the Charter while the CJEU was able to reach the same conclusion 
without mentioning it at all. It will be recalled that this is precisely what happened in BECTU, 
the foundational Charter judgment in the context of paid annual leave. There are also other 
examples. In Schultz-Hoff, the question that arose was whether a former employee who had 
been on sick leave was entitled to an allowance in lieu for paid annual leave that he was unable 
to take by the time the employment relationship had terminated.176 Many of the arguments put 
forward by the parties revolved around the issue of the purpose of the WTD. The respondent 
employer argued that to allow the employee to carry over periods of leave from year to year 
without restriction would be at odds with the purpose of the Directive, namely to grant the 
worker minimum rest periods. To allow this would also encourage employers to terminate the 
relationship rather than risk allowing paid leave to accumulate.177 The UK Government went 
further, arguing that the ‘appellant was not working whilst on sick leave and therefore had no 
need for “actual rest” from work’.178 The Commission, on the other hand, sought to distinguish 
between the purpose of sick leave and paid annual leave, noting that ‘sick leave is a 
consequence of the worker’s incapacity for work and is not for the purpose of rest, time to 
recover and recuperation but rather recovery and the restoration of health and capacity for 
work’.179 This case essentially revolved around the interpretation of article 7 WTD, in 
particular the phrase ‘in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of, 
such leave, laid down by national legislation and/or practice’.  
AG Trstenjak’s opinion is particularly noteworthy for opening (as AG Tizzano had done in 
BECTU) with a section headed ‘[t]he entitlement to paid annual leave as a fundamental social 
right’. Again adopting the language of BECTU, the AG commented that ‘I take the view that, 
in order to be able to give a meaningful answer to the national court, it is necessary to step 
back and view the entitlement to paid annual leave both as implemented in secondary law 
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within the [Union] legal system and in the wider context of fundamental social rights’.180 The 
AG began by setting out the purpose of the Directive before commenting in language 
reminiscent of Mangold/Kücükdeveci that ‘in interpreting Article 7 (…) it should be borne in 
mind that the right to minimum paid annual leave was not upheld for the first time in the 
working time directive; it has long been included, together with an indication of the period of 
leave guaranteed, amongst fundamental social rights recognised by international law’.181 She 
goes on to note that ‘[e]ven more significant, in my view, is the fact that the inclusion of this 
right in the Charter (…) appears to provide the most reliable and definitive confirmation that 
it constitutes a fundamental right’.182 This has the ‘consequence’ of establishing ‘the right to 
annual paid leave as a human right available to all.’183 Although she did accept that the Charter 
was not yet legally binding, the AG suggests that paid leave may be a general principle of EU 
law—although this was subsequently rejected by the AG in Dominguez— and could therefore 
be relied on in the interpretation of the WTD.184 Once again, however, it is not at all apparent 
how this declaration follows through in the rest of the opinion. Rather, reference is instead 
made to ‘effectiveness’ of EU law and frustrating the ‘objectives’ of the legislation.185 Finally, 
the AG concluded that ‘[o]n the basis of the abovementioned case-law, the grant of sick leave 
to the detriment of paid annual leave must be prohibited since otherwise this fundamental right 
could be deprived of its substance’.186  
Yet again, we see that the prior case law has a particularly heavy bearing on the decision, with 
the effect of the inclusion of paid annual leave in the Charter being merely confirmatory or 
even incidental to the outcome. In this case it was held, relying on Schultz-Hoff, that being on 
sick leave could be no impediment to an additional right to paid annual leave or payment in 
lieu. That the Charter did not make a significant difference is evidenced by the fact that the 
CJEU did not rely on it. In its judgment, the CJEU simply repeated the phrase that we have 
seen time and again that ‘[a]ccording to settled case-law, the entitlement of every worker to 
paid annual leave must be regarded as a particularly important principle of [Union] social law 
from which there can be no derogations’.187 Despite this, the CJEU found that the WTD does 
not preclude, as a rule, national legislation which lays down conditions for the exercise of the 
right to paid annual leave expressly conferred by the WTD, including even the loss of that 
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right at the end of a leave year or of a carry-over period, provided however that the worker 
who has lost his right to paid annual leave has actually had the opportunity to exercise the right 
conferred. But, the WTD also had to be interpreted as precluding national legislation or 
practices which provide that, on termination of the employment relationship, no allowance in 
lieu of paid annual leave not taken is to be paid to a worker who has been on sick leave for the 
whole or part of the leave year and/or carry-over period, which was the reason why he could 
not exercise his right to paid annual leave.  
There are also examples which on the face of it show heavy reliance by the CJEU on the 
Charter. In Fenoll, the question to be addressed by the CJEU was whether a worker who had 
become sick and had leftover paid annual leave was entitled to a payment in lieu of that leave 
upon termination of the relationship. The situation was complicated by the fact that the 
applicant’s status as a worker was called into question. The judgment opens in paragraph one 
with a reference to the Charter, seemingly suggesting that article 31 would have a strong 
influence on the subsequent judgment. It becomes apparent, however, that the strong reference 
to article 31 actually stemmed from the wording of the question referred by the national court 
which asked whether ‘[a]rticle 31 of the Charter [must] be interpreted as meaning such a 
person as described (…) can be classified as a “worker” within the meaning of Article 31?’ 
and ‘[m]ay such a person as described in the first question rely directly upon the rights 
conferred on him by the Charter (…)?’.  
It is clear that the judgment would, of necessity, revolve around the interpretation and 
application of the Charter.188 Nevertheless, the CJEU once again started by noting its early 
case law in which the worker concept had been interpreted broadly.189 On the question of the 
invocability of the Charter, the CJEU found that because the factual situation had arisen prior 
to the Charter being granted legal effect, it could not be relied upon here.190 Therefore, despite 
emphasising the fundamental nature of the rights found in the Charter, the CJEU paid short 
shrift to its application to the case.  
Fenoll demonstrates that the Charter cannot be expected to resuscitate an argument that could 
not have been made using ordinary legislative principles. It is not clear what would have 
happened had the CJEU found that he was not a worker for the purposes of the WTD and the 
Charter did not apply. It is suggested that it would have made no difference. If the legislation 
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(as interpreted by the CJEU) could not be relied upon, then the Charter would be of no 
assistance in seeking to achieve the same status.  
That article 31(2) does not make a great deal of difference to the substance of the reasoning is 
perhaps unsurprising if we remember how closely linked article 31(2) is to the wording of the 
WTD itself. Turning again to Fenoll, for example, we saw that the CJEU was asked to interpret 
the term ‘worker’ for the purposes of the WTD. In this case, the CJEU more carefully linked 
the question to the Charter, noting that ‘[t]he question to be answered is, therefore, whether 
Mr Fenoll carries out that activity as a worker within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 
2003/88 and of Article 31(2) of the Charter’.191 In other words, the concept had the same 
meaning in both the Directive and the Charter. Looking to the Charter alone would not provide 
any help with determining the appropriate interpretation of the ‘worker’ concept. The CJEU 
therefore relied on its earlier case law, defining the ‘worker’ broadly.192  
AG Mengozzi also highlighted the fact that any interpretation of ‘worker’ within the meaning 
of the WTD must also apply to article 31(2) of the Charter ‘in order to ensure the uniformity 
of the scope of application ratione personae of the right to paid leave’.193 He continued that it 
‘is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that every worker’s right to paid annual leave 
must be regarded as a particularly important principle of Union social law, henceforth 
enshrined in Article 31(2) of the Charter’.194 The ‘henceforth’ is important in demonstrating 
continuity and merely serves to highlight the fact that the Charter will become a new point of 
reference. Having said that, the legislation itself remains key as it must be read ‘in conjunction’ 
with the Charter.195 An unanswered question is whether the CJEU considers ‘a particularly 
important social right’ and the Charter’s social rights to be coterminous. If they are, then again, 
we should not be surprised if the Charter has no real bearing on the interpretative outcome. 
An example of article 31(2) being referred to outside the paid leave context can be seen in the 
opinion of AG Wathelet in Hälvä.196 This case concerned the interpretation of article 17 WTD 
on permissible derogations for unmeasured work or for work that is determined by the workers 
themselves. The question here was whether relief foster parents could be classed as workers 
and whether they came within the scope of the WTD. The AG first set out the principles of 
interpretation underpinning the WTD.197 The AG noted that ‘[s]uch is their importance that 
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the limitation of maximum working hours, and entitlement to daily and weekly rest periods 
and to an annual period of paid leave, have been expressly recognised as fundamental rights 
in Article 31(2)’.198 Once again, this is the sole reference to the Charter, with the AG able to 
reach the conclusion that the applicants were indeed workers and that they did not come within 
the scope of the article 17 derogation by conducting a detailed analysis of existing case law 
and the WTD itself.  
Finally, the post-Charter case law continues to show the purposive/teleological approach will 
not always lead to an interpretation that protects employees. Although the CJEU had held in 
Schultz-Hoff that article 7 WTD does not preclude the loss of paid leave provided that the 
worker actually had the opportunity to take leave,199 that right is qualified where a worker is 
on prolonged sick leave, with the risk of accumulated periods of leave that this would entail.200 
The CJEU here used the purposive approach to achieve an employer-protective reading of the 
legislation, holding that ‘in light of the actual purpose of the right to paid annual leave (…) a 
worker who is unfit for work for several consecutive years and who is prevented by national 
law from taking his paid annual leave during that period cannot have the right to accumulate, 
without any limit, entitlements to paid annual leave’.201  
Outside the field of article 31, the Charter’s employment rights have had less of an impact, 
although there are some signs of potential future developments. In Pujante, for example, the 
issue was whether fixed term workers counted towards the threshold requirements contained 
in the Collective Redundancies Directive (CRD).202 AG Kokott in interpreting the provisions 
of the Directive held that ‘[u]ltimately these guarantees [contained in the Directive] flow from 
the basic right to protection against unjustified dismissal’.203 Although article 30 of the Charter 
was not referred to again, nor was it taken up by the CJEU, it is clear that the fundamental 
right infused the interpretation of the Directive from the outset. This approach makes it 
somewhat difficult to ascertain the beginning and the end of the Charter’s influence. This 
confusion stems largely from the fact that, as already discussed, the Charter finds its origins in 
existing legislation which it is then used to interpret.  
The CJEU’s rather lacklustre approach to the interpretation and application of article 28 can 
be explained by the absence of a clear link between that provision and EU employment 
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legislation. This approach can be contrasted with the altogether more radical effects of article 
11 of the ECHR, which governs freedom of association. In Demir, the ECtHR came to the 
rather narrow finding that Turkish law interfering with the rights of civil servants to form a 
trade union was not compatible with article 11.204 As Ewing and Hendy note, this narrow 
finding masks the Court’s radical departure from its pre-existing case law denying that certain 
trade union rights formed the core of article 11.205 As the authors note, ‘the ECtHR is pulling 
in a different directions form its Luxembourg counterpart, with the mouth-watering possibility 
of a High Noon conflict between the two’.206 The ECtHR in Demir, in adopting a ‘living 
instrument’ approach to the Convention, also drew heavily form external standards found in 
other rights instruments such as the ESC and indeed the Charter, holding that ‘The Court, in 
defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must take 
into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such 
elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common 
values’.207 This review of the case law on the Employment Rights as a tool of interpretation 
demonstrates the difficulty in assessing the precise role of the Charter. For the time being, 
there is very much a link between the pre and post-Charter case law, with the CJEU continuing 
to adopt a purposive approach to the interpretation of EU employment legislation. This is 
hardly surprising given that the CJEU has generally adopted an employee-friendly reading of 
legislation which already had the expressed legislative purpose of protecting workers. The 
Charter merely serves to emphasise this and adds an extra layer of credibility to the CJEU’s 
approach. The use of the Charter to review national law is perhaps more controversial, as 
evidenced by its more limited role in that field.  
 
3. Standard of review of national law  
 
We have determined that due to the link between legislation and the Charter, fundamental 
rights have the potential to act as a standard of review of national implementing legislation, 
but as mentioned, the issues of interpretation and review are not always easy to separate. In 
many cases the CJEU is first asked to interpret legislation (whether in light of the Charter or 
not) or interpret the Charter itself before then considering the compatibility of national 
legislation with that interpretation. This is made somewhat more opaque by the division of 
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competences between the CJEU and the national courts. In Mayor, the CJEU reiterated the 
well-established point that ‘the Court has no jurisdiction, in proceedings [preliminary 
reference] to rule on the compatibility of rules of national law with Community law. On the 
other hand, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the guidance 
as to the interpretation of [Union] law necessary to enable that court to rule on the compatibility 
of those rules of national law with [Union] law’.208 In other words, the CJEU does not decide 
national cases, but rather leaves it to the national court to decide in the final instance, taking 
into account the guidance issued by the CJEU, which can be more or less detailed. To what 
extent, then, have the Employment Rights been relied on in this context?  
Article 30 has been a weak standard of review (defined as the level of deference the CJEU is 
willing to give to legislative measures that might arguably infringe the Charter), with the CJEU 
usually finding that the issue at hand is outside the scope of EU law and therefore the Charter 
is of no application or that a Directive relating to article 30 is not really at issue.209 For example, 
in Poclava, the CJEU was asked first to interpret EU legislation before using it as a standard 
against which to review Spanish legislation implementing Directive 1999/70, itself 
implementing the framework agreement on fixed term work.210 Poclava, who was Bolivian, 
worked as a cook for a hotel. She started on a full-time contract of indefinite duration, with a 
one-year probationary period. This type of contract, with a probationary period, was 
introduced to ease the burden on employers during the financial crisis. As such a period was 
not usually available, the question arose as to whether there was discrimination between 
different types of employee. In other words, the national legislation establishing the contract 
of indefinite duration to support entrepreneurs had to be assessed for compatibility with article 
30.  
The CJEU, having interpreted the Directive, found that ‘[i]t follows from the definition of 
“fixed-term worker” in Clause 3 of the Framework Agreement and from the national 
legislation applicable to the case before the referring court that an employment contract such 
as that under which Ms Poclava was employed cannot be categorised as a fixed-term 
contract’.211 This case therefore fell outside the scope of the Directive and thereby EU law, 
meaning that the Charter could not apply.  
AG Mengozzi was more explicit in his opinion in Mono Car, holding that: 
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[w]e cannot disregard the decision made by declaring, in that article, that the protection 
should cover every worker against any ‘unjustified’ dismissal. That qualification 
makes clear that the protection is not provided, as a fundamental individual right, with 
respect to every kind of irregularity that a dismissal might involve. It makes clear that 
there must be a serious irregularity (…) Breaches of Directive 98/59, on the other hand, 
do not appear to be such as to justify reference to Article 30’.212  
It is clear that article 30 is not capable of addressing every issue relating to the dismissal 
process.  
Article 27, as we know, has served litigants little better as a standard of review. We saw that 
AMS concerned the review of national legislation in light of Directive 2002/14/EC, which 
‘implemented in detail the right now declared in Article 27’.213 Once again, the Charter had 
been raised by the referring court in its question when it asked ‘[m]ay the fundamental right 
of workers to information and consultation, recognised by Article 27 (…) and as specified in 
the provisions of Directive (…) be invoked in a dispute between private individuals (…) In the 
affirmative, may those same provisions be interpreted as precluding a national legislative 
provision which excludes [certain employees] from the calculation of staff’. 
Article 28 has perhaps had the weakest role to play either as a tool of interpretation or as a 
standard of review. It is well known that in both Viking and Laval, the CJEU declared the 
fundamental rights status of the right to strike as a general principle of EU law. In Laval, the 
CJEU held that ‘[a]lthough the right to take collective action must therefore be recognised as 
a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of [Union] law the 
observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that right may none the less be subject 
to certain restrictions. As is reaffirmed by Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, it is to be protected in accordance with [Union] law and national law and 
practices’.214 Since then, the use of article 28 has been confined to considering whether rules 
set down in collective agreements could be reviewed for compatibility with EU law. The CJEU 
has been emphatic that they can.  
The CJEU invariably starts by noting the importance of collective bargaining. For example, in 
Hennigs, the CJEU held that ‘[t]he nature of measures adopted by way of a collective 
agreement differs from the nature of those adopted unilaterally by way of legislation or 
regulation by the Member States in that the social partners, when exercising their fundamental 
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right to collective bargaining recognised in Article 28 of the Charter, have taken care to strike 
a balance between their respective interests’.215 Nevertheless, the CJEU went on to note that 
‘[w]here the right of collective bargaining proclaimed in Article 28 of the Charter is covered 
by provisions of European Union law, it must, within the scope of that law, be exercised in 
compliance with that law’.216 In that case, it was found that age was not an appropriate criterion 
to determine pay scales, with the fact that this rule derived from a collective agreement making 
no difference. As the CJEU concluded, ‘[t]he fact that European Union law precludes that 
measure and that it appears in a collective agreement does not interfere with the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements recognised in Article 28 of the Charter.’217 This 
pattern is repeated in subsequent cases.218 
Once again, article 31 is the Employment Right that has been most frequently invoked in the 
review of national legislation, although this may simply reflect the fact that the WTD has been 
the subject of the most litigation. In Heimann, the question was whether article 31(2) of the 
WTD had to be interpreted as precluding Member State practice according to which a 
reduction in days worked would lead to a pro rata adjustment in entitlement to paid leave.219 
If so, the next question was whether the Directive and the Charter precluded the imposition of 
zero-hour contracts leading to the loss of entitlement to paid annual leave.  Here, a social plan 
provided for the extension of the contracts of dismissed workers for one year, while suspending 
their obligation to work and the employer’s obligation to pay a salary (zero hours short-time 
working). The employer argued that during this period, the employees were not entitled to paid 
annual leave. The CJEU referred to its earlier case law in which it was held that the concept 
of paid annual leave could not be interpreted restrictively.  
However, the case law relating to concurrent periods of sick leave and annual leave could not 
be applied mutatis mutandis to the position of a part time worker.220 A person in this position, 
unlike the case of a worker on sick leave, is capable of resting. According to the CJEU, ‘it 
follows from all the foregoing considerations that the answer to the first question must be that 
[the Charter and the WTD] must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national 
legislation or practice (…) under which the paid annual leave of a worker on short-time 
working is calculated according to the rule of pro rata temporis’.221  
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The ‘it follows’ is a non-sequitur as the CJEU did not deal with the Charter in any way in the 
preceding paragraphs, or indeed anywhere else in the judgment. This presents a real difficulty 
in trying to ascertain the impact of the Charter. The articulation of its influence is confined to 
references to preceding case law in which the Charter may have had an influence on the 
interpretation of the WTD. What we are really presented with then is the Directive (as 
interpreted by the Charter) as a standard of review. Given, however, that we have seen that the 
Charter’s Employment Rights have had a particularly weak influence as a tool of 
interpretation, this seems to narrow the role of the Charter even further.  
Recently, however, the CJEU has begun more clearly to express the precise role of article 31. 
This approach is most evident in the opinion of AG Tanchev in King.222 In that case, a Mr 
King had been employed under a ‘self-employed commission only contract’ which was silent 
on the issue of paid annual leave. He was subsequently offered a standard employment contract 
that did deal with annual leave but turned this down, preferring to remain self-employed. He 
was dismissed on his 65th birthday and sought to claim allowance in lieu for the leave that he 
had not taken over the course of his employment.  
The question for the AG was whether a worker such as Mr King, who had been afforded a 
right to paid leave only part way through the employment relationship (if at all) lost the right 
to paid annual leave if he did not take steps to enforce or invoke that right. The UK Working 
Time Regulations at regulation 13 stipulated that employees must take their paid annual leave 
in the relevant year or the right is extinguished. The Charter plays a prominent role in this case 
with the AG holding that ‘I have come to the conclusion that, in the light of the considerable 
normative weight of the right to paid annual leave under EU, international and Member State 
law, requiring a worker rather than an employer, to take steps to create an adequate facility for 
the exercise of paid annual leave would unlawfully make the existence of the right subject to 
a pre-condition’.223  
According to the AG ‘The dominance in the case-law of disagreements concerning the 
conditions for the exercise of paid annual leave, rather than its existence, might well be 
reflective of the status of the right (…) embedded as it is in the corpus of fundamental rules of 
labour law to which adherence is generally rigorous’.224 This is an interesting observation in 
that the AG seems to suggest that the description or recognition of a right as fundamental or 
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particularly important has a bearing on national compliance with that right and therefore the 
type of disputes that come before the CJEU.  
The AG then attempts to convey more precisely the impact and significance of article 31. It is 
said that this provision ‘is a specific manifestation of respect for human dignity’ which is 
further evidenced by the Explanations which point to the human rights credentials of paid 
annual leave.225 Although the precise mechanisms for ensuring respect for this right was left 
to the Member State court, the effect of article 31 is to remove ‘any doubt whether it is the 
employer or the worker who should bear the risk of non-compliance with the right (…) at least 
with respect to which of them is to create the facility for its exercise’.226 Finally, the AG 
provides a welcome clarification as to article 31’s status as a right rather than principle. It is a 
right given its wording, its imperative nature in EU law and its substantial normative value.227 
In any case, both rights and principles enjoy the same role in interpreting EU legislation and 
thereby national legislation. In the present case, consistent interpretation of UK law was 
possible, so it was not necessary to address the question of whether the right to paid annual 
leave might be a general principle of EU law qua Mangold. The AG is also explicit that the 
opt out is of no relevance here given that the right to annual leave is clearly expressed in 
domestic legislation.  
Once again, it can be seen from the case law that while article 31(2) remains the most 
prominent employment provision, it still has an uncertain record as a standard for the review 
of national legislation. Is it perhaps the case that the CJEU is reluctant to invoke the Charter 
in this context in order to avoid national sensitivity (or indeed antipathy) towards the Charter? 
In any event, it can be stated that the Charter’s Employment Rights have not had the effect that 




This chapter has served the function of setting out the background and content of the 
employment provisions in the Charter’s Solidarity Title, namely article 30 on unjust dismissal, 
article 31 on fair and just working conditions, article 27 on worker information and 
consultation and article 28 on collective bargaining. The preferred term to describe these 
provisions was Employment Rights, a term used to designate those rights with a particularly 
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close connection to the employment relationship, as opposed to the broader notion of social or 
labour rights. Avoiding the term social rights also circumvents some of the arguments that are 
traditionally raised to deny human rights status to such rights. The Employment Rights can be 
described as human rights due to their content and origin in other international rights texts as 
well as for their inclusion in the Charter itself. It was also shown that the text of the Charter 
only gets us so far, as it must be considered in relation to its underlying values which are 
further fleshed out in the Explanations, legislation and CJEU case law. Having said that, 
although it may be possible to characterise the Employment Rights as human rights, little may 
be gained from such a characterisation. This is because the Employment Rights have already 
been granted constitutional status and thereby a clear constitutional function. There are three 
aspects to this function, namely a tool of interpretation of EU law and a standard of review of 
both EU law and Member State law falling within the scope of EU law. It has been 
demonstrated that the role played by the Employment Rights in each of these contexts has 
represented an exercise in continuity.  To an extent, the Employment Rights’ limited role can 
be explained by the barriers impeding the effectiveness of those rights. First, there is the rights 
and principles distinction. Second, there is the question of whether the Charter can apply to 
private parties. Third, at least in this country, there is scepticism or downright hostility to the 
Employment Rights, as evidenced by the UK’s (attempted) opt-out, and indeed to some extent, 
Brexit. Finally, the CJEU itself has been, at times, reluctant to fully engage with the 
Employment Rights. It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that the extent of the Charter’s added value 
appears to be that the CJEU is more comfortable in relying on a written human rights text. To 
this extent, the CJEU has been emboldened in that its long-held approach to interpreting 
provisions of legislation (or at least the concept of paid annual leave) as important social rights 
has now essentially been codified in the Charter, although there is a certain irony in a return 
to textualism to bolster a purposive approach. More democratically legitimate it may be, 
revolutionary it is not. As a standard of review, the Employment Rights have been even 
weaker. Articles 27, 28 and 30 have rarely been invoked as standards of review, but have in 
certain cases been used as rhetorical devices, for example the use of article 28 to reinforce the 
importance of collective bargaining. Article 31 is the most frequently invoked Employment 
Right but even here the CJEU tends merely to refer to previous case law where the Charter 
may have played a role. The extent of the Charter’s influence on the employment relationship, 
if viewed through the lens of the Employment Rights alone, has been rather disappointing. 
Beyond the interpretative field, the influence of the Employment Rights on employment 
legislation has remained largely untested. The same cannot be said for article 16 on the 
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III. The ‘Aberrant Veneration’ of Contractual Autonomy as a 
Fundamental Right in the Employment Field 
 
This chapter sets out the notion of contractual autonomy and its limitations in EU law. This 
enables us to assess where Alemo-Herron fits into this historical context and also allows for a 
determination of the Charter’s role in this field. Section A starts by outlining the concept of 
freedom of contract as a general principle of EU law. It then turns to explore the content of 
article 16 of the Charter, which provides for the freedom to conduct a business. Section A 
concludes with a consideration of the specific limitations on contractual freedom found in EU 
law. Section B begins by setting out the background to the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 
(TUD). This is an area in which the potential negative consequences of a newly energised 
notion of contractual autonomy have been most keenly felt. This takes us to our analysis of the 
fulcrum of this thesis, namely the highly deregulatory decision of the CJEU in the case of 
Alemo-Herron. The background to that case is set out here, before turning in subsequent 
chapters to consider its broader consequences for the regulation of the employment 
relationship. Finally, section C considers the relationship between the Charter and the general 
principles, both generally and within the specific context of business freedom.  
 
A. The Concept of Contractual Autonomy and its Limitations in EU Law  
 
This section sets out the notion of contractual autonomy and its limitations in Union 
employment law. We examine freedom of contract as a weak general principle and a weak 
fundamental right before turning to some specific considerations in the employment field.  
 
1. Freedom of contract as a (weak) general principle 
 
Freedom of contract as a general principle of EU law has always been rather limited, 
particularly in the face of competing social rights. It is worth bearing in mind that the early 
case law on the general principles as fundamental rights is deeply entwined with the concept 




The CJEU’s first recognition of business freedom as a general principle came in Nold.1 The 
proceedings in Nold concerned a decision of the European Commission taken under the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty relating to the operation of a German 
coal company, Ruhrkohle AG. Pursuant to this decision, the Commission made the right to 
purchase coal directly from that company conditional upon the conclusion of a contract of two 
years’ duration under which the purchaser would buy at least 6000 metric tons of Ruhr coal 
for the domestic sector. As a result, Nold lost its right to act as a direct wholesaler of Ruhr 
coal.  
Nold sought to argue that this decision infringed its property rights and its freedom to pursue 
a business activity. Advocate General (AG) Trabucchi agreed that the right to property and 
business freedom were indeed protected by Member State constitutions and that the CJEU was 
obliged to take these into consideration as they now form part of the [Union] legal order.  
However, the company’s argument that the Commission’s decision infringed its commercial 
rights was simply too broad to be sustained as: 
[t]o impose conditions on the right of direct access to coal supplies implies that, 
however wide these conditions may be, there might always be an undertaking which is 
unable to satisfy them and which is consequently deprived of the possibility of carrying 
on direct trade. In that way, the result would be to deny the [Union] executive any 
power to intervene in the economy.2   
The idea, taken largely from national constitutions and international treaties, is that property 
rights are not absolute but must be subject to limitations in the public interest.3 The AG in 
Nold further commented that ‘[r]ecognition by the Constitution does not mean that the subject 
matter is no longer subject to any rules’.4 We can see here the idea that the constitutionalisation 
of a particular right does not make it immune from competing considerations. It may be, 
however, that context is key here.  
From reading the opinion, it is clear that the AG considered the ECSC Treaty to be inherently 
concerned with the organisation of the economy, an approach reflected in the most recent 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court decisions concerning the TUD set out below. 
According to article 2 of the ECSC Agreement, its objective is to contribute ‘through the 
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common market for coal and steel, to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising 
standard of living’. In order to achieve this, the institutions, as then constituted, had the task 
of ensuring an orderly supply to the common market by enabling equal access to sources of 
production, the establishment of low prices and improved working conditions.  
The aims of the modern EU are rather more ambiguous, with article 2(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) committing the Union to ‘the establishment of an internal market 
based on sustainable development, balanced economic growth, price stability and a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’. Some of 
these aims are potentially contradictory and there is certainly a strong debate over whether 
they are best achieved through state intervention or deregulation.  
In Nold, the CJEU agreed with the AG’s conclusions, holding that although property rights 
and commercial freedoms were indeed general principles of EU law: 
[f]ar from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be viewed in the light of the social 
function of the property and activities protected thereunder. For this reason, rights of 
this nature are protected by law subject always to limitations laid down in accordance 
with the public interest (…) on condition that the substance of these rights is left 
untouched.5 (Emphasis added).  
 
This case is noteworthy on two fronts. First, the CJEU clearly recognised a right to engage in 
commerce. Second, the case is equally noteworthy for the short shrift given by the CJEU to 
arguments based on this right, with no guidance offered as to what constitutes the ‘substance’ 
of this commercial freedom. It is apparent that the CJEU considered the freedom to conduct a 
business to be a decidedly weak general principle. Indeed, in virtually all subsequent cases, 
the CJEU has been equally reluctant to allow business freedom to defeat competing social or 
economic goals.   
For example, in Hauer, the CJEU confirmed its finding in Nold and held that the restrictions 
on the freedom to pursue a trade—in this case wine growing—could be justified by the same 
reasons generally used to justify restrictions on property rights, notably reasons in the general 
interest. At the same time, the opinion of AG Capotorti is noteworthy for its expansive 
approach to the permissible restrictions on commercial activity, notably by drawing a 
distinction between property rights and the right to undertake economic activity:  
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[i]t is true that that as a result of the prohibition on new plantings of vines the owner of 
a plot of land is prevented from pursuing wine-making activity by using the resources 
of his land hitherto not planted with vines, but it is clear that the owner retains the 
possibility of growing vines on other plots of land, belonging to him or other persons, 
on which vineyards already exists. Therefore the limitation imposed affects the 
exercise of the right to property, not the exercise of the right to undertake economic 
activity, which is not guaranteed with regard to a particular sphere of application.6   
The CJEU makes the same distinction between property rights and commercial activity in its 
judgment, noting that the ‘right to property is guaranteed in the [Union] legal order in 
accordance with the ideas common to the constitutions of the Member States, which are also 
reflected in the first Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights’.7 The question then becomes one of ‘whether the restrictions introduced by the 
provisions in dispute in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the [Union] 
or whether, with regard to the aim pursued, they constitute a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference with the right of the owner impinging upon the very substance of the right to 
property’.8  
The CJEU confirms that despite the need to distinguish between the concepts, the freedom to 
pursue a trade ‘far from constituting an unfettered prerogative, must, likewise be viewed in the 
light of the social function of the activities protected thereunder’.9  Again, the CJEU in this 
case seems to go out of its way to find a justification for the restriction of economic activity, 
holding that it was ‘undeniably in the public interest’ to prevent a market surplus of wine. 
As Oliver has noted, the cases that followed Nold and Hauer have reiterated the principles that 
the freedom to pursue an economic activity is not absolute, but must rather be considered in 
relation to its social function and provided that any restrictions are proportionate, in the public 
interest and do not impair the substance of the right (each of this elements is dealt with in detail 
in section C).10 In all of these cases, the pleas based on the freedom to conduct a business 
failed. This line of case law is characterised by its consistency, spanning over 40 years of 
jurisprudence restricting the application of commercial freedom as a general principle. One 
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such case, Spain and Finland, occurs in the employment context and is therefore worth 
considering.11  
In this case, the Spanish and Finnish Governments sought the annulment of Directive 
2002/15/EC on the organisation of working time of persons performing mobile road transport 
activities.  Article 1 of the contested Directive sets out its objective as being the establishment 
of ‘minimum requirements in relation to the organisation of working time in order to improve 
the health and safety protection of persons performing mobile road transport activities and to 
improve road safety and align conditions of competition’. Self-employed drivers were 
originally excluded from the Directive, but this exclusion was removed. The claimants argued 
that the inclusion of the self-employed had the effect of ‘preventing self-employed carriers by 
road from devoting all their time and effort to the prosperity of their undertaking and 
constitutes an impermissible infringement of their freedom to pursue an occupation and their 
freedom to conduct a business’.12   
It was further argued that ‘while there is indeed justification for regulating the working time 
of employees, in view of their subordinate position as regards their employer, no such need 
for protection exists for self-employed workers, who must be free to organise their activities 
as they wish’.13 In addition to arguments based on the freedom to conduct a business, the 
Finnish Government argued that the subjection of self-employed drivers to the Directive also 
breaches their freedom to pursue an occupation ‘under which an operator must be able to 
decide freely on the amount and the organisation of the working time he intends to devote to 
his business activities’.14   
It is not clear what differences may be discerned between these two freedoms (freedom of 
occupation and freedom to conduct a business), a topic which will be addressed further below. 
The CJEU in Spain and Finland recognised that the freedoms are linked and that both have 
previously been recognised as general principles. Given the legitimate [Union] interest in 
promoting road safety, the CJEU held that ‘the regulation of the working time of self-employed 
drivers envisaged in the contested directive cannot be regarded as a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference impairing the very substance of the freedom to pursue an occupation 
and the freedom to conduct a business, or as a breach of the principle of proportionality’.15 As 
Albors-Llorens has noted, it is ‘hard to avoid the conclusion that only where a [Union] measure 
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essentially led to the exclusion of an economic activity could a holder of an economic right be 
successful in proving the infringement of that right’.16 
The first explicit recognition of a freedom of contract as opposed to the more general freedom 
to pursue a trade or economic activity can be found in Sukkerfabriken.17  In this case, the CJEU 
found that EU legal acts, which restrict contractual freedom, might only be permissible to the 
extent that the acts themselves give explicit authority for the intervention in private contractual 
relations, as ‘no rules or information are provided on the prescribed procedure, the forms or 
the competent authorities for the action contemplated, such as would be expected if a 
restriction were to be placed upon the freedom of contract’.18 One could certainly be forgiven 
for missing this supposed commitment to contractual autonomy. In addition, the CJEU in 
Spain v Commission has held that the authorising act must simply stipulate the exact forms 
and procedures to be followed by the intervening authority. The CJEU in that case held that 
‘the right of parties to amend contracts concluded by them is based on the principle of 
contractual freedom and cannot, therefore, be limited in the absence of [Union] rules imposing 
specific restrictions in that regard’.19 The relationship between freedom of contract and 
freedom to pursue an economic activity must be considered further.  
1.1. Freedom of contract and the freedom to pursue economic activity  
 
The Explanations to the Charter make clear that the freedom to conduct a business contained 
in article 16 is composed of three distinct elements. The first element is the freedom to pursue 
an economic or commercial activity. The Explanations provide the cases of Nold and Eridania 
as sources for this element of the freedom. Strikingly, however, Nold uses no such formula, 
referring instead to the right ‘freely to choose and practice their trade or profession’, which is 
much narrower than the broader concept of economic activity expressed in the Explanations. 
This is even more so when we consider that in the same paragraph of Nold the CJEU goes on 
to state that ‘[a]s regards the guarantees accorded to a particular undertaking, they can in no 
respect be extended to protect mere commercial interests or opportunities, the uncertainties of 
which are part of the very essence of economic activity’.20  
                                                          
16 Albors-Llorens (n 3) 255.  
17 Case C-151/78 Sukkerfabriken.  
18 ibid para 20.  
19 Case C-240/97 Spain para 99.  
20 Case C-4/73 Nold para 14.  
75 
 
In the case law following Nold, the CJEU is inconsistent in its terminology. In some cases it 
repeats the ‘trade or profession’ formula.21 In other cases such as Alliance for Natural Health, 
the CJEU removes any reference to pursuing a trade or profession and instead states that ‘[i]t 
is clear from settled case-law that the right to property and (…) the freedom to pursue an 
economic activity, form part of the general principles of [Union] law’.22 In other cases still, 
the CJEU refers to both the exercise of a trade or profession and the right to pursue a 
commercial or economic activity.23 Finally, the second case set out in the Explanations, 
Eridania provides that ‘the carrying on of economic activities must be guaranteed’.24 Ignoring 
both that the Explanations misspell the case name and the fact the second paragraph referenced 
does not support the proposition that commercial freedoms are protected,25 this is still a bald 
statement rather than an express commitment to business freedoms.  
The second element of the freedom to conduct a business as set out in the Explanations is 
freedom of contract. The Explanations rely on two cases in this respect, although again they 
cite aspects of the judgments that do not support the proposition. In the first of these, 
Sukkerfabriken, the CJEU held that the legislation in question provided no rules ‘on the 
prescribed procedure, the forms of the competent authorities for the action contemplated, such 
as would be expected if a restriction were to be placed upon freedom of contract’.26 In Spain, 
the CJEU held that the right of parties to amend contracts concluded by them is based on the 
principle of contractual freedom and cannot, therefore, be limited in the absence of [Union] 
rules imposing specific restrictions in that regard’.27 The third and final element of the freedom 
to conduct a business is the right to free competition which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
It is clear, then, that both the right to pursue a commercial or economic activity and freedom 
of contract are constitutive elements of the freedom to conduct a business. It is not at all clear, 
however, that the right to pursue a commercial activity should be a subset of the freedom to 
conduct a business at all, but rather they appear to be coterminous. In addition, the relationship 
between this right to pursue a commercial activity and freedom of contract is equally unclear. 
Surely, without freedom of contract, any right to conduct a business or to pursue an economic 
activity would be meaningless. Nonetheless, the Charter does indeed distinguish between the 
two elements of freedom to conduct a business. Everson and Gonçalves Correia remark that 
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‘[t]o date the Court has confirmed that, in line with its established case law, commencing with 
Nold, the freedom to conduct business under article 16 will continue to encompass not only 
freedom to engage in commercial activity, but also a principle of contractual autonomy’.28  
Furthermore, it is clear that there must be many more elements to a freedom to conduct a 
business than the three listed in the Explanations to the Charter. What the Charter teaches us, 
then, is that the case law on the general principle, far from representing a comprehensive 
statement of business freedom, rather consists of a selective approach to the freedom. The 
uncomprehensive nature of the general principle was lamented by AG Cruz Villalón in Alemo-
Herron when he remarked that ‘the case-law has not, in fact, provided a full and useful 
definition of this freedom. The judgments in which the Court has had occasion to rule in this 
area have gone no further than either referring to the right to property or simply citing the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Charter’.29 It is to this article 16 and the freedom to conduct a 
business as a fundamental right to which we now turn.  
 
2. Freedom of contract as a weak fundamental right  
 
Article 16 of the Charter provides that ‘[t]he freedom to conduct a business in accordance with 
Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’. It is immediately striking that this 
provision adopts very similar wording to that found in the Charter’s Employment Rights. The 
freedom (not the right) is merely recognised and even then, only in so far as it accords with 
Union law and national laws and practices. It would appear that article 16 must, following the 
approach adopted by the AG in AMS, be classed as a principle given the limitations found in 
the wording of the provision itself. It is certainly true that the freedom to conduct a business 
has largely been reserved for extreme cases, with its primary function being as a counterweight 
to other fundamental rights.30 It is worth considering these cases despite the fact that they tend 
to deal with the freedom to conduct a business more generally, rather than specifically with 
freedom of contract.  
 
As we have seen from the Explanations, freedom of contract is a constituent element of the 
freedom to conduct a business. It will be demonstrated that although the freedom to conduct a 
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business is a fundamental right, it is not absolute. Rather, just as with the general principle, it 
must be considered in relation to its social function, provided that any restrictions placed on 
this right are in the public interest and do not impair the very substance of the right.  
2.1. Early case law on article 16  
 
Most of the early case law on article 16 followed the pattern of the general principle, with 
arguments based on the freedom to conduct a business being largely unsuccessful. 31  Some of 
these cases restate the standard formula found in the case law on the general principle32 that 
the freedom to conduct a business ‘may be restricted, provided that those restrictions 
correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and that they do 
not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference which would affect the very 
substance of the right so guaranteed’.33 This also reflects the language used in article 52 of the 
Charter which sets out the permissible limits on all Charter rights.  
Everson and Gonçalves Correia comment that article 52 reproduces the CJEU’s case law and 
for this reason ‘the strong presumption must be one that historic limitations imposed by the 
Court will continue to apply’.34 This is not entirely true. Article 52 of the Charter does indeed 
provide that ‘[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary 
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others’. What can be seen from article 52 and some of the 
case law on article 16 is that the formula contained in the general principle case law has been 
somewhat truncated, with the following being excluded ‘[b]oth the right to property and the 
freedom to pursue a trade or business form part of the general principles of [Union] law. 
However, those principles are not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to their social 
function’.35 Having said that, the CJEU does, at times, use the same formula including 
reference to the social function.36 
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In other cases, arguments based on infringements of article 16 appear to have been ‘tacked on’ 
to the end of a judgment, with the General Court expressing frustration in one case at ' the 
mere abstract reference to such an infringement’.37 Other cases deal with article 16 (however 
briefly) but do not refer to the case law on the general principle.38 Tellingly, many of the AG 
opinions containing references to art 16 are not subsequently taken up by the CJEU.39 
In one such opinion, Alrosa, a case concerning a competition law commitment not to contract 
with a particular party, AG Kokott seems to resolve the distinction between commercial 
freedom more generally and contractual autonomy specifically: 
[c]ontractual freedom is one of the general principles of [Union] law. It stems from the 
freedom to act for persons. It is also inseparably linked to the freedom to conduct a 
business. In a [Union], which must observe the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition, contractual freedom must be guaranteed. The case-law of the 
Court of Justice also recognises that economic operators must enjoy contractual 
freedom.40 
Despite this, the AG went on to confirm the restricted approach to the freedom of contract 
whereby contractual autonomy can be limited following due legislative procedure.41 
According to the AG, the Commission decision to restrict potential contractual partners was 
not ‘unfair, but a completely lawful means by which the Commission pursues the legitimate 
aim of effectively protecting competition against distortion’. Indeed, the risk of losing a 
desired contractual partner is one which ‘must be borne (…) like any other economic operator 
in an open market economy. This does not impair the contractual freedom enjoyed’.42 
In this case, the AG has been described as having ‘proceeded to confirm the restricted 
procedural approach to contractual autonomy that the historic Court had pursued (…) whereby 
contractual freedom might be restricted following due legislative procedure’.43 Everson and 
Gonçalves Correia go on to note that ‘[f]or now, the assumption must accordingly be that 
contractual freedom will form a part of the jurisdiction of Article 16, but that its ambit remains 
restricted’.44 Their first prediction was correct, freedom of contract is indeed part of the 
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jurisdiction of article 16, although even the Charter’s Explanations (however weakly) already 
pointed to this conclusion. Their second prediction that the freedom would continue to be 
restricted may have been misplaced as can be seen from a closer examination of the CJEU’s 
case law on article 16.  
2.2. Sky Österreich: Continuity with the general principles  
 
Of particular note is the CJEU’s judgment in Sky Österreich,45 which concerned the validity 
of certain provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.46 Articles 15(1) to 15(5) of 
the Directive required broadcasters to provide competitor access to coverage of ‘events of high 
interest to the public’. Article 15(6) further stipulated that compensation for such access could 
not exceed ‘the additional costs in providing access’.  
Sky Sports Austria held the exclusive rights to broadcast certain high-profile football matches 
in Austrian territory. Sky later entered into a contract with ORF, granting it the right to produce 
short news segments in return for a fee. ORF subsequently challenged this fee before the 
domestic courts, arguing that it exceeded the actual cost incurred by Sky in granting access to 
the footage (such costs were in fact non-existent in this case). The Austrian court decided to 
refer a preliminary question to the CJEU, asking essentially whether the Directive was 
compatible with article 16. The CJEU found that the provisions of the Directive prevented the 
holder of exclusive broadcasting rights from deciding the price to charge for access and thus 
amounted to an interference with the business freedom protected by article 16.47 Despite this, 
the CJEU went on to hold that the restriction was justified. The CJEU held, drawing from the 
general principle jurisprudence, that the freedom to conduct a business is not absolute but must 
be viewed ‘in light of its social function’.48 
The CJEU considered that the contested provision did not affect the core content of the 
freedom to conduct a business since it did not ‘prevent a business activity from being carried 
out as such by the holder of exclusive broadcasting rights’.49 The CJEU then went on to note 
that on the basis of the general principle case law and:  
in the light of the wording of Article 16 of the Charter, which differs from the wording 
of the other fundamental freedoms laid down in Title II thereof, yet is similar to that of 
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certain provisions of Title IV of the Charter, the freedom to conduct a business may be 
subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public authorities which may 
limit the exercise of economic activity in the public interest.50 
As Oliver points out, the CJEU views the words ‘in accordance with Union law and national 
laws and practices’ in article 16 as giving greater leeway to public authorities to restrict 
business freedoms in the public interest than they otherwise would have. In addition, he notes 
that the CJEU ‘considers this language to have been inserted into article 16 so as to reflect its 
own case law which has always been ambiguous towards the freedom to conduct a business’.51  
It is also clear from this case that the CJEU prefers to rely on other Charter rights when faced 
with a restriction of a fundamental right, a topic explored further in Chapter IV. In the present 
case, the Court was reassured by the fact that the purpose of the legislation was to safeguard 
the fundamental freedom of citizens to receive information and the freedom and pluralism of 
the media, which are both contained in article 11 of the Charter.52  
The CJEU concluded that the legislature had ‘ensured that the extent of the interference with 
the freedom to conduct a business (…) are confined within precise limits’.53 This is the only 
pre-Alemo-Herron judgment to deal specifically with freedom of contract as well as the more 
general business freedom. However, no reference is made to the cases on freedom of contract 
as a general principle set out in the Explanations to the Charter.54 This judgment is particularly 
remarkable for its brevity. The CJEU, as with the general principle, is quick to accept the 
freedom to conduct a business as a fundamental right but is equally quick to limit that right in 
the face of competing fundamental rights contained in the Charter.55 This also stands in marked 
contrast with AG Bot’s detailed analysis of the impugned provision’s effect on commercial 
freedom.56 The CJEU has not always adopted this restrictive approach and an example of the 
CJEU having found a measure to be in violation of article 16 can be seen in Scarlet Extended.57 
2.3. The Scarlet Extended ‘balancing approach’  
 
In Scarlet Extended, a Belgian copyright society (SABAM) brought an action against Scarlet 
Extended, an Internet Service Provider for allegedly authorising the sharing of files by users 
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of its services. The first instance court agreed and granted an injunction against Scarlet, 
requiring that it monitor all electronic communications on its services and to block them if 
necessary. The cost of this monitoring was to be borne by Scarlet and for an unlimited period. 
Scarlet appealed this decision to a higher court, which in turn made a preliminary reference to 
the CJEU. The question before the CJEU was whether the injunction granted against Scarlet 
was compatible with a number of EU Directives read in light of article 16 of the Charter.58  
This case is particularly interesting for its balancing of two competing fundamental economic 
rights found in the Charter, namely the protection of intellectual property contained in article 
17(2) and the freedom to conduct a business in article 16. The CJEU seemed less reluctant to 
allow a claim based on article 16 when it was confronted with another economic right as 
opposed to a social right. The CJEU, as it has always done, stressed the need to strike a fair 
balance between these interests and went on to hold that the injunction failed to strike such a 
balance as it ‘has no limitation in time, is directed at all future infringements and is intended 
to protect not only existing works, but also future works that have not yet been created at the 
time when the system is introduced’.59  
Once again, the CJEU buttressed its conclusions by reference to additional Charter rights, 
notably articles 8 and 11, which guaranteed the fundamental right of Scarlet’s customers to the 
protection of personal data and the right to receive and impart information.60 It is clear, 
therefore, that the CJEU continued to use article 16 with trepidation and only found an 
infringement of that provision in conjunction with EU legislation and additional fundamental 
rights and after a careful consideration of competing interests.61  
Despite this, Scarlet was perhaps an early indication that fundamental rights arguments might 
‘offer private parties a more concrete and entrenched mechanism of resisting regulatory effects 
of national and EU law’.62 Perhaps this case was also a warning shot in the run up to Alemo-
Herron and tellingly is the first case on commercial autonomy (excluding the two cases on 
freedom of contract as a general principle) not to mention the ‘social function’ of business 
freedom nor indeed any limitation on that freedom.  
What we can take from the early case law on article 16 is that it very much reflects the case 
law on commercial freedom as a general principle, including the inconsistency in that case 
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law. Some cases refer to the social function of commercial freedom. Others omit such a 
reference but nevertheless restrict the freedom through the proportionality principle. With the 
exception of Scarlet Extended, commercial activity arguments were defeated in all cases. This 
approach would change radically in the wake of the decision in Alemo-Herron and the CJEU’s 
aggressive reading of freedom of contract as a fundamental right in the employment field.  
 
B. Freedom of Contract as an ‘Aggressive’ Fundamental Right in the 
Employment Field  
 
In its recent jurisprudence in the context of the TUD, the CJEU has demonstrated its 
commitment to a particularly strong notion of contractual autonomy, at the expense of 
vulnerable employees. This section sets out the pre-Charter interpretation of the TUD, a similar 
exercise carried out in Chapter II with the WTD, before turning to the CJEU’s decision in 
Alemo-Herron, which has been described as standing for a newly energised notion of 
contractual autonomy. First, it is necessary briefly to sketch the interaction between the TUD 
and the concept of contractual autonomy. 
 
1. Legislative restriction of contractual autonomy  
 
It has already been noted that freedom of contract in its guise as a general principle has a 
limited role to play in EU employment law. EU employment legislation contains a number of 
mandatory terms that may not be derogated from in Member State legislation or the contract 
of employment.  
It is perhaps unsurprising that concerns about the restriction of contractual autonomy by EU 
employment legislation have been most evident in cases concerning the TUD. From its very 
inception, the Directive has given rise to much litigation often on ‘highly technical and fact-
specific points’.63 As the CJEU has remarked, the main aim of the Directive is ‘to ensure as 
far as possible the continuation without change of the contract of employment or the 
employment relationship with the transferee in order to avoid workers being placed in a less 
favourable position by reason of the transfer alone’.64 To achieve this, the TUD qualifies the 
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contractual autonomy principle by replacing the need for consent with one of automatic 
novation. Essentially, the Directive is a partial harmonisation measure which seeks to 
safeguard following the transfer, the rights which existed in national law before the transfer.65 
The Directive was first introduced in the 1970s amidst fear that individual employees would 
suffer from the process of business restructuring due to the increased competition brought 
about by the creation of the internal market.66 As Barnard notes, continental legal systems—
notably France—have long protected existing provisions of employment contracts upon the 
transfer of an undertaking, although this was largely to ensure that the new employer acquired 
an already-trained workforce.67 This position contrasts sharply with the approach of English 
law, which viewed the employment contract as a non-transferable personal contract.68  
At common law, the transfer of a business to another employer had the effect of terminating 
the contract of employment.69 In addition, it was not possible to substitute the transferee 
company as a party to the contract of employment without both its consent and the consent of 
the employees. This need for mutual consent has been described as ‘a clear consequence of 
the contractual basis of the employment relationship’.70 The idea here is that it would be 
unconscionable to require employees to work for a new employer without their consent, as 
‘[t]he contracts of employment, being personal to the employees concerned, cannot be treated 
in the same way as other business assets of the employer’.71 Thus, the common law position 
reflects the idea that although the foundation of the employment relationship remains largely 
contractual, it is not an everyday contract but rather the position of the employee as a weaker 
party must be considered. In this respect, privity of contract, which may suggest the non-
transferability of the employment relationship, must be qualified. 
One of the effects of the TUD, at least on English law, was to undermine the importance of 
this consensual basis. Unsurprisingly, therefore, much of the debate surrounding the adoption 
of the Directive, at least in the United Kingdom, has been directed towards its influence on 
contractual autonomy and its interference with business freedoms more generally. It was 
suggested, in particular, that the Directive not only inhibits the ability of employers to 
restructure their workforces but it may also dissuade companies from acquiring new 
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undertakings.72 Indeed, the UK implementing regulations have been said to ‘constitute a major 
limitation on both the principle of freedom of contract and the power of employers to arrange 
their own commercial and corporate affairs in such a way as to minimise or fragment their 
employment law liabilities’.73 Thus, it can be said that not only does the TUD interfere with 
the freedom of contract of the parties, but it also negates their freedom from the employment 
contract and the intendant obligations this entails, although, the right of employers to avoid 
the employment contract has never had a strong foundation. Nevertheless, the potentially 
extensive impact of the TUD on the principle of contractual autonomy is not in doubt. 
Another change when compared with the traditional English approach is that under the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE, the UK 
implementing legislation) the novation is automatic and is not dependent on the employee 
obtaining notice of the transfer or of the identity of the transferee.74 There is no requirement 
that the transferee must accept the transfer, however, the consent of the employee is a 
continued requirement.75 At common law, where the business of one employer is sold to 
another, there is no automatic novation or transfer of contracts of employment. Employment 
in English law is regarded as a personal contract with Lord Atkin describing the consent 
principle as ‘ingrained in the personal status of a citizen under our laws’.76  
It is clear that the TUD has a strong interaction with the contractual autonomy principle. It 
should not be surprising, therefore, that when it came to engage with the freedom to conduct 
a business found in article 16, it was in the transfer of undertakings context that the freedom 
was most prevalent, particularly as an interpretative tool.  
 
2. Article 16 as an interpretative tool  
 
The Explanations attached to article 16 make no reference to EU legislation as being a source 
for that right. The role of article 16 as an interpretative tool is not, therefore, as immediately 
apparent as it was in relation to article 31 and the WTD. Nevertheless, as explained, article 16 
is particularly relevant for the interpretation of the TUD given that the very rationale for the 
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Directive was the limitation of business freedom upon the transfer of a business from one 
employer to another. In order to assess article 16’s role here, it is necessary to contrast the pre 
and post-Charter approach of the CJEU, as we did with article 31(2) above.  
2.1. Pre-Charter interpretative approach  
 
The preamble to the TUD recognises that ‘economic trends are bringing in their wake, at both 
national and [Union] level, changes in the structure of undertakings, through transfers’. It 
further emphasises that ‘it was necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the 
event of a change of employer, in particular to ensure that their rights are safeguarded’. In 
other words, the Directive is intended to protect those employees who are performing the same 
job but under the orders of a different employer and, as such, the term ‘rights and obligations’ 
is broadly construed.77 As Barnard notes, the CJEU has been particularly influenced by this 
wording,78 being prepared to give a purposive interpretation to ‘ensure as far as possible that 
the contract of employment or employment relationship continues unchanged with the 
transferee, in order to prevent the workers concerned from being placed in a less favourable 
position solely as a result of the transfer’.79  
For the rights to be engaged there must have been a transfer of an undertaking. How the notion 
of a ‘transfer’ is interpreted becomes crucial, and yet being typical of EU employment 
legislation, it is left (deliberately) vague. If we turn to article 1(b) of the Directive, we see that 
there is a transfer where (1) an economic entity; (2) has been transferred and (3) that entity 
retains its identity following the transfer. Article 1(1)(a) provides that the Directive’s 
provisions apply to the transfer of an undertaking as a result of a ‘legal transfer or merger’. 
This concept has been defined purposively. A number of language versions of the provision 
seemed to suggest that only contractual transfers were covered, whereas other versions—
notably the English term ‘legal transfer’—suggested it was wide enough to cover other forms 
of non-contractual transfer.80 The CJEU rejected the narrower definition, looked to the purpose 
of the Directive and found that it can apply to all types of transfer.81  
Particularly problematic has been the CJEU’s interpretation of the third limb, namely that the 
entity has retained its identity post-transfer. In early cases, the CJEU tended to look at the 
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labour law test focusing on similarity of activity. Adopting this labour law test was more 
employee-protective as it was likely to lead to a finding that a transfer had taken place.82 This 
was entirely consistent with the Directive’s employee-protective objectives. However, in 
Süzen, the CJEU adopted a commercial law test and found that the fact that activities pre and 
post-transfer were similar, even identical, did not lead to the conclusion that an economic entity 
had retained its identity.83  
To determine whether the transfer of an ‘economic entity’ had taken place, the CJEU 
distinguished between two different types of business, assets-based, and non-assets based. 
With assets-based companies, there would be a transfer only where significant tangible or 
intangible assets were transferred. With non-assets-based businesses, ie in labour-intensive 
businesses, there would be a transfer only where the transferees take over a majority of the 
transferor’s staff. Either approach would allow the transferee to avoid its obligations under the 
Directive as ‘if few assets are transferred the transferee can avoid the Directive by refusing to 
employ the ‘major part’ of the workforce. This test renders the Directive in many cases a 
‘voluntary obligation’, contrary to the spirit of a Directive designed to give employment 
protection.84 What this shows is that although the CJEU also employs a purposive approach to 
interpretation in the context of the TUD, this does not always lead to an employee-protective 
result.  
2.2. Implementing the TUD 
 
The TUD was implemented into UK law via TUPE. The Regulations, like the Directive itself, 
ensure that upon the transfer of an undertaking, the contract of employment is not terminated 
but rather, the transferor’s rights and obligations—including those towards the employees—
are transferred to the transferee.85 Once the transfer has been completed, the acquiring 
undertaking must observe existing employment conditions, including the terms of existing 
collective agreements, until a new agreement can be negotiated. Regulation 4(2)(a) provides 
that the effect of a transfer is to assign to the transferee ‘all the transferor’s rights, powers, 
duties and liabilities under or in connection with the contract of employment’. The CJEU has 
held that the equivalent TUD provision is non-derogable.86  
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As mentioned above, the approach of the common law was to hold that the contract of 
employment was terminated upon the transfer to a new employer. After the introduction of the 
TUPE regime, however, English law embraced a strong notion of the transferability of 
collectively agreed terms and conditions as contained in a dynamic bridging clause, seemingly 
allowing post-transfer changes to the collective agreement to take effect. In English law, 
collective agreements are incorporated into the individual employment contract via a bridging 
term. It is this contractual bridging term that is transferred. The English courts could see no 
conceptual difficulty in private sector employers binding themselves to future public sector 
pay rates. 87 The question was whether EU law would adopt a similar approach.  
2.3. Werhof: A tentative renaissance for contractual autonomy  
 
In Werhof,88 the CJEU was asked to rule on the interpretation of article 3(1) of the TUD which 
provides that ‘[t]he transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment 
or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such 
transfer, be transferred to the transferee’.  
Werhof had been an employee of the company DUEWAG. According to the employment 
contract, the relationship was to be governed by the framework collective agreement, and by 
the wage agreement in force for the Nord Rhine-Westphalia iron and steel, metal and electrical 
industry. This collective agreement had been concluded between the NRW metal and Electrical 
Industry Federation (AGV)—of which Werhof was a member—and the trade union for the 
metal industry (IG Metall).  
The company was subsequently converted into Siemens DUEWAG and was later transferred 
to Freeway, the defendant company. Freeway was not a member of any employers’ association 
and so was not involved in any collective agreements. Subsequent to the transfer, Werhof 
agreed via a works agreement to waive all individual rights to wage increases pursuant to 
collective agreements entered into prior to the works agreement. This was followed by a 
supplemental provision to the employment contract setting out basic pay and performance 
bonuses. IG and AGV later concluded a new collective agreement, providing for wage 
increases. Werhof sought to claim these additional wages from Freeway.  
The German appeal court found that Werhof had no claim based on paragraph 613(a)(1) of the 
Civil Code (which implements article 3 TUD). The court was, however, uncertain as to the 
compatibility of this provision of domestic law with the TUD and referred a preliminary 
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question to the CJEU. Essentially, the CJEU was asked to determine whether article 3(1) of 
the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking was transferred, and 
a contract of employment referred to a collective agreement to which the transferor was a party 
but not the transferee, the transferee was not bound by collective agreements subsequent to the 
one in force at the time of that transfer.  
Werhof urged the Court to permit a ‘dynamic’ interpretation of the clause incorporating a 
collective agreement into an employment contract (the bridging term). This would allow for 
the continuation of the collective agreement, despite the fact that the new employer was not 
involved in the negotiation of that agreement. It was argued that this approach follows from 
the spirit and purpose of the TUD, namely, the protection of employees in the event of a change 
of owner of the undertaking and, in particular, the safeguarding of their rights.89 Freeway, on 
the other hand, argued that only the collective agreement in force at the time of the transfer is 
applicable. To hold otherwise, would be to impose such an obligation on the new employer 
that would hinder his freedom of association and his freedom to contract, which could be 
equated with expropriation of his property.90  
AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer agreed with Freeway, noting that the ‘right of the person acquiring 
an undertaking must prevail over any other of lesser importance, such as the right of the 
employee to the financial advantages arising from the development of the collective 
agreements signed by the transferor of the company’.91 Nowhere in the TUD is it suggested 
that any such right of an acquiring undertaking exists, let alone prevails over the competing 
rights of employees. Nonetheless, the CJEU was of the same mind, noting that an essential 
characteristic of any contract is the freedom of the parties to arrange their own affairs and that 
‘in a situation such as the one in the main proceedings where the defendant is not a member of 
any employers' association and is not bound by any collective agreement, the rights and 
obligations arising from such an agreement do not therefore apply to it, as a rule'.92 The Court 
did note once again, however, that contractual autonomy was not absolute. To hold otherwise 
would be to erode the rights of employees, which would defeat the very purpose of the 
legislation, which was to protect such employees from the absolute application of the principle 
of freedom of contract.93 This was not, however, the only interest to be protected and ‘the 
interests (…) of the transferee, who must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes 
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necessary to carry on his operations, cannot be disregarded'.94 The CJEU went on to find that:  
article 3(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as not precluding, in a situation where 
the contract of employment refers to a collective agreement binding the transferor, that 
the transferee, who is not party to such an agreement, is not bound by collective 
agreements subsequent to the one which was in force at the time of the transfer of the 
business.95  
Essentially, the CJEU was holding that the TUD does not require the permissibility of dynamic 
incorporation clauses. The Court further highlighted the fact that the freedom of association is 
protected by article 11 of the ECHR and is a fundamental right protected by the Union legal 
order.96 The Court concluded that to apply the dynamic interpretation as submitted by the 
claimant ‘would mean that future collective agreements apply to a transferee who is not party 
to a collective agreement and that his fundamental right not to join an association could be 
affected’.97 This corollary of the freedom of association, that is to say the freedom to dissociate, 
has also been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).98 As a result, an 
employer who was not a member of an association and therefore was not involved in 
negotiating the collective agreement could not be bound by it.99 To hold otherwise would 
infringe the principle that contracts cannot impose obligations on third parties. A further effect 
might be to impose more obligations ‘on an employer who had not been a party to an 
agreement than on the person who had been, leaving the former in uncertainty and exposed to 
the risk that conditions might be introduced behind his back’.100 It is clear from this case that 
the CJEU was willing to permit the static approach, which is characteristic of German contract 
law. As the following discussion will show, however, the CJEU has recently departed from 
this pre-Charter position, holding that not only does the Directive permit a static interpretation, 
it actually requires it. This is the case of Alemo-Herron which stands at the boundary between 
the pre and post-Charter approach and has been described as standing ‘for a newly energised 
deregulatory thrust driven by Article 16 of the Charter’.101  
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2.4. Alemo-Herron: A ‘newly energised’ notion of contractual autonomy 
 
The question which arose in Alemo-Herron was once again whether, in a situation in which 
contracts incorporating the terms of collective agreements transfer to new employers, they 
should be bound only by those terms in force at the time of the transfer (static approach) or 
whether new collective agreements negotiated after the transfer should also bind the new 
employer (dynamic approach).  
The company in this case sought to rely on Werhof to challenge TUPE’s allowance of the 
continuation of a collective agreement, despite the fact that the new employer was not involved 
in the negotiation of that agreement. The claimant was a former employee of Lewisham 
Borough Council, a UK local authority, working under an employment contract which 
expressly incorporated the terms of collective agreements—including pay—‘as negotiated 
from time to time’ by the National Joint Council (NJC), which is an external negotiating body 
for local authority employees. The local authority in question sold its leisure activities to a 
private undertaking, which subsequently transferred the business to Parkwood Leisure, the 
respondent in the present case. The problem was that the NJC agreement in question had 
expired before the transfer to Parkwood had taken place and a new agreement had yet to be 
negotiated. Parkwood refused to recognise the outcome of the subsequent negotiations, which 
introduced a retrospective agreement, as it was not a party to this new collective agreement. 
On that basis, Parkwood considered that the terms of the agreement were not binding on it, 
and refused to apply those terms when carrying out pay reviews.  
The employees brought a claim before the Employment Tribunal (ET) which was dismissed 
in 2008. The Tribunal said that the judgment of the CJEU in Werhof ruled out the possibility 
of any transfer of dynamic clauses referring to collective agreements in the context of the 
transfer of an undertaking. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) set this decision aside 
and found for the employees, noting that Werhof did not apply to circumstances such as those 
covered by UK law. The EAT remarked in particular that ‘[i]t is not uncommon for an 
employer to agree with employees or a trade union that it will abide by wages set in a different 
forum by a third party, here a local authority bargaining structure’.102  
The EAT continued that ‘TUPE and the Directive are both measures aimed at protection, or 
safeguarding, of employees’ rights, and it would to be odd if those rights which are accepted 
to be part of the canon in domestic labour law could be taken away by a subsequent 
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interpretation of the Directive, as to which Member States have a margin’.103 The Court of 
Appeal disagreed—albeit reluctantly—noting that ‘[b]ut for the decision in Werhof, [it] would 
regard the claimants’ case as unanswerable. The inclusion in their contracts of a term providing 
(inter alia) for their pay from time to time to be fixed by a third party body was a conventional 
contractual provision’.104 The CJEU’s decision in Werhof, which the Court of Appeal (CoA) 
considered indistinguishable from the present case, was decisive.  
Finally, the employees brought an appeal to the UK Supreme Court (UKSC). Again, it was 
remarked that ‘had this issue been solely one of domestic law, the question would have been 
open only to one answer'.105 Lord Hope noted that the dynamic approach was  
[e]ntirely consistent with the common law principle of freedom of contract (...) There 
can be no objection in principle to parties including a term in their contract that the 
employee’s pay is to be determined from time to time by a third party such as the NJC 
of which the employer is not a member or on which it is not represented. It all depends 
on what the parties have agreed to, as revealed by the words they have used in their 
contract.106  
In other words, the domestic approach combining common law and legislation was entirely 
adequate to protect the interests of employees.  
The UKSC stayed the proceedings in order to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU. The 
CJEU was tasked with determining whether the dynamic approach adopted by English law 
was compatible with article 3 of the TUD read alongside Werhof. The UKSC was essentially 
asking whether the CJEU’s reading of article 3(1) TUD in Werhof is to be interpreted as 
prohibiting the transfer of dynamic clauses and if this was the case, was there any possibility 
for national courts to be more generous in interpreting equivalent domestic implementing 
provisions, ie did the TUD operate as a floor or a ceiling on employment rights?107 
a. Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón  
 
The Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón provides a strong, but nuanced commitment to contractual 
autonomy while at the same time acknowledging the legitimate social objectives of the 
TUD.108 As a starting point, the AG noted that the effect of Werhof was clearly to rule out the 
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possibility that the TUD required Member States to permit the transfer of dynamic clauses 
referring to future collective agreements. The remaining reasoning of the CJEU in that case 
was, however, largely determined by the specific circumstances which ‘were appreciably 
different from those of the case now before the Supreme Court’.109 Parkwood, unlike Freeway, 
had taken over an undertaking that was originally in the public sector. Consequently, 
Parkwood could neither take part in nor indirectly influence the collective bargaining process 
that takes place within the NJC, which is exclusively a body for local government collective 
bargaining.110  
The AG concluded that ‘in the context of the transfer of an undertaking, there is no obstacle 
to Member States allowing a transfer of dynamic clauses referring to future collective 
agreements’.111 He noted that although the principal aim of the Directive was to protect 
workers in the event of a change of employer, there were also several employer-protective 
elements that could be discerned.112 The AG thought that Werhof should not be read as laying 
down any general principle that it was ‘incompatible with the Directive to preserve the effects 
of dynamic clauses referring to future collective agreements’.113 Rather, Werhof should be 
confined to the specific circumstances in that case which dealt with certain peculiarities of 
German contract law. Furthermore, ‘the “expectations” created by this clause for the 
employees of the transferred undertaking are markedly different from those generated by a 
static clause such as that in Werhof. In Werhof, the contractual clause was explicitly static and 
there was no real question that it could be interpreted dynamically. In the present case, the 
entitlements relied on were ‘more in the nature of certainties, as the clauses have been freely 
and expressly agreed between the parties, in accordance with the law in force at the time and 
are recorded in the contract of employment'.114  
The TUD was therefore no ‘impediment to the United Kingdom allowing parties to use 
dynamic clauses referring to future collective agreements and accepting that such clauses are 
transferable as a consequence of the transfer of an undertaking'.115 This part of the AG’s 
opinion is no more than a confirmation of the accepted view that the TUD, far from 
constituting a ceiling on Member State action, would allow for the continuation of the long-
standing English approach to dynamic clauses referring to future agreements.  
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The next stage of the opinion becomes more problematic, as in a somewhat surprising and 
indeed controversial move, the AG rather tersely dealt with the argument raised in Werhof that 
the freedom of association, which is guaranteed by both the Charter and the ECHR was being 
infringed. According to the AG, the issue in Alemo-Herron was not that the new employer 
would be compelled to join an organisation in order to influence the contractual terms, but 
rather that it had no means of being so represented, as the NJC was a public body.116  
Why did the AG feel the need to jettison the freedom of association arguments put forward 
and subsequently accepted by the CJEU in Werhof? The reason seems to be that the UKSC 
itself did not see it as an issue.117 As Lord Hope put it:  
[t]his point was directly relevant in Mr Werhof’s case because of the way German 
employment law deals with collective agreements (…) Parkwood has not sought to 
argue that regulation 5 of TUPE is objectionable because it breached its article 11 
Convention right of freedom not to join an association. There is no question of its being 
forced to become a member of one of the participants in the NJC. The appellants’ 
contracts do not require this, and in any event it would not be eligible to do so.118 
Put simply, the freedom of association point was not relevant here and in any event the issue 
had not been raised by the claimant company. Rather, the real issue was the employer’s 
‘fundamental right to conduct a business’, this was despite the fact that the company had also 
failed to raise this as an argument.119  
This is the most controversial aspect of the AG’s opinion as he raises of his own volition, the 
rarely invoked freedom to conduct a business contained in the Charter. Having said this, it is 
perhaps the case that the AG did no more than take his lead from Werhof in which the CJEU 
had already highlighted the impact of the dynamic approach on the contractual autonomy 
principle. The AG here simply took the analysis one stage further by invoking contractual 
autonomy as a fundamental right in article 16 of the Charter, albeit as we shall soon see, this 
subtle change in emphasis would in fact come to represent a sea change. In addition, the TUD 
has always been recognised as interfering with freedom of contract. This is indeed its very 
purpose. It is perhaps not entirely controversial that the contractual autonomy principle and 
article 16 were engaged in such a case.  
In any event, despite highlighting the importance of the freedom to conduct a business in article 
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16, the AG went on to hold that a dynamic interpretation would not run contrary to article 16 
so long as it was not unconditional or irreversible.120 The AG noted that although freedom of 
contract was indeed a component of the freedom to conduct a business, the absence of extended 
rulings on the matter and the lack of binding force of collective agreements in the UK meant 
that article 16 had not been violated in the present case.121  
For this reason, the AG’s approach might be best described as a tentative renaissance of 
contractual autonomy. Although the importance of the principle as a fundamental right is 
recognised, it is easily defeated by competing social rights considerations. It is clear that the 
AG was concerned with overly interfering with the traditional English approach to the 
treatment of employment contracts, under which the applicability of dynamic clauses was the 
norm. It might therefore have been thought the English ‘market facilitative’ approach to 
contractual autonomy, discussed below, which allows for a dynamic interpretation of 
contractual terms, would have been permissible.122 It is further worth noting that the UK (at 
the time) chose not to benefit from the limitation period on the continuation of collective 
agreements which is contained in article 3(3) TUD and which provides ‘Member States may 
limit the period for observing such terms and conditions with the proviso that it shall not be 
less than one year’. Despite the tentativeness of the AG’s approach, the article 16 genie had 
been let out of the fundamental rights bottle and would be seized upon by the CJEU.   
b. Judgment of the CJEU  
 
In its judgment, the CJEU, ostensibly relying on Werhof, preferred to adopt the German static 
approach, holding that where a transferee does not have the opportunity to participate in 
negotiations that are concluded after the date of transfer, the outcome of the negotiations 
should not be binding. The Directive must therefore be interpreted as precluding dynamic 
clauses referring to collective agreements negotiated after the date of transfer being 
enforceable against the transferee.123 Like the AG, the CJEU held that a fair balance must be 
sought between the competing interests of employers and employees with due weight being 
given to the employer’s freedom of contract found in article 16 of the Charter: 
[i]t is apparent that, by reason of the freedom to conduct a business, the transferee must 
be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and 
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to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its 
employees with a view to its future economic activity. 124 
To hold otherwise would be to reduce employer freedom ‘to the point that such a limitation is 
liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business’.125 This was 
despite the fact that article 8 TUD permits the Member States to provide for greater employee 
protection.  
The CJEU went on to note that a dynamic interpretation would limit the employer’s room for 
manoeuvre to make adjustments and changes, particularly given that ‘the transfer is of an 
undertaking from the public sector to the private sector, the continuation of the transferee’s 
operations will require significant adjustments and changes, given the inevitable differences 
in working conditions that exist between those two sectors'.126 Given the employer’s need for 
room to manoeuvre, the dynamic interpretation would be ‘liable to undermine the fair balance 
between the interests of the transferee in its capacity as employer, on the one hand, and those 
of the employees, on the other’.127 This approach is particularly troubling as employees 
moving from the public to the private sector are especially vulnerable to changes in their 
employment conditions.  
It is apparent that the CJEU is willing to give precedence to an employer’s freedom of contract 
over the rights of employees as expressed in the Directive.128 It might have been thought 
obvious that a constitutional guarantee of freedom of contract contained in the Charter would, 
by its very nature, have an impact on how the CJEU might perceive contractual autonomy. It 
is, however, the extent of this impact in the employment field that has been most surprising 
and controversial. Indeed, it is now abundantly clear that the CJEU has been far from 
consistent in its approach to freedom of contract, a situation that has been thrown into even 
further confusion by the introduction of the Charter.  
As we saw, in its earlier case law on the matter, article 16 had largely been neglected by the 
CJEU, which seemed ‘unreceptive to any embrace of newly aggressive deregulatory bite 
driven by the Charter’.129 Even in cases where the CJEU accepted the application of article 16, 
it was heavily conditioned by competing social interests, notably the protection of consumers. 
Alemo-Herron can therefore be said to constitute a significant departure from existing case law 
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on contractual autonomy.130 However, the precise nature of the CJEU’s differing conceptions 
of freedom of contract as a general principle and freedom of contract as a fundamental right is 
far from clear. The CJEU certainly provides no indication that it was departing from its earlier 
conception of freedom of contract—perhaps an inevitable consequence of the quest for 
consensus on any issue which provokes such sharp divisions between Member State legal 
traditions.  
c. Problems with the judgment  
 
Prassl argues that the real problem with the CJEU’s approach to freedom of contract lies 
neither with its recognition of contractual autonomy as a general principle nor with its 
application of the Charter. Rather, it ‘is the aggressive interpretation of the hitherto rarely 
applied Article 16 (…) to justify the abrogation of employees’ rights that breaks with well-
established case law’.131 The consequences of this departure are two-fold. First, the freedom 
of contract is elevated to a more significant position in article 16, which is not evident from a 
reading of the text. Second, the CJEU goes on to give this freedom too much weight by 
explicitly linking ‘the freedom to conduct a business to a particularly strong notion of freedom 
of contract’.132 
In addition, the analysis adopted by the CJEU reveals the Court’s predisposition to reject the 
dynamic approach. In its judgment, the CJEU proceeded in two steps, the first of which was 
to find that there was a need to reconcile the competing aims of the Directive, that is to say 
between the protection of employees and the need for employer flexibility. This approach is 
in and of itself controversial and the CJEU might have felt compelled to reinforce this novel 
reading of the Directive by turning to article 16, regardless of the future consequences for 
employment regulation. Furthermore, the CJEU adopts a subtle yet fundamental change in 
language between the present case and its earlier jurisprudence on freedom of contract. In 
Scarlet Extended, for example, the CJEU noted that a ‘fair balance’ needed to be achieved 
between article 16 and competing fundamental rights.133 In Alemo-Herron, on the other hand, 
the CJEU has moved towards the test of the ‘core content’. Under the former Scarlet Extended 
test, litigants merely had to show that the outcome represented a fair compromise between two 
competing fundamental rights of equal value. The latter Alemo-Herron approach requires that 
the irreducible core of one right has not been affected ie there is no need to balance. Once the 
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core content of contractual autonomy has been eroded, it is irrelevant that a competing—and 
perhaps stronger—social right has been invoked.  
It is also the case that Alemo-Herron is not even consistent with the CJEU’s decision in 
Werhof, which it purports to apply. The CJEU in that case interpreted the Directive as not 
precluding the fact that the transferee was not bound by subsequent collective agreements’.134 
Put differently, the Directive does not require Member States to adopt a dynamic 
interpretation. This is quite different from the ruling in Alemo-Herron that the Directive 
prohibits such dynamic interpretations and so this case pushes ‘some distance beyond 
Werhof’.135 This case represents an unexpected rupture with existing jurisprudence and aptly 
demonstrates the potential use of the Charter to defend employer flexibility against the 
protection of employees. This has been described as the 'aberrant veneration of contractual 
freedom',136 but has this treatment of article 16 been maintained in subsequent cases?  
3. Subsequent use of article 16 as an interpretative tool  
 
In Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, a case also concerning the interpretation of article 3 
TUD, the CJEU relied on the most uncontroversial elements of Alemo-Herron while seemingly 
overlooking article 16 of the Charter.137 This case concerned the potential continuation, in the 
event of a transfer, of the effects of a rescinded collective agreement. The relevant Austrian 
legislation provided that ‘the legal effects of the collective agreement shall continue after its 
termination in respect of employment relationships which are covered by it immediately before 
its termination unless a new collective agreement takes effect in respect of those employment 
relationships or a new individual agreement is concluded with the employees concerned’.138  
The referring court further clarified that under Austrian law, collective agreements do not 
become part of the employment contract, but rather have the same effect on that contract as 
legislation. The dispute in the present case arose between the Austrian Confederation of Trade 
Unions and the Austrian Chamber of Commerce’s sectoral transport federation which is 
authorised to represent its member undertakings for the purpose of signing collective 
agreements. A collective agreement was concluded for a parent undertaking belonging to a 
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group of undertakings in the aviation sector.  The agreement was to apply to all airlines in that 
group, provided their activity was not limited to regional transport. 
A subsequent, more specific, collective agreement was concluded for a subsidiary of the group. 
Due to losses in the sector, the parent company decided to transfer its aviation activity to that 
subsidiary. Under this arrangement, the employees of the transferred business would now be 
subject to the less advantageous collective agreement applicable to the subsidiary’s employees. 
The agreement applicable to the parent company was rescinded by the Chamber of Commerce 
and, in retaliation, the Confederation of Trade Unions also rescinded the collective agreement 
applicable to the subsidiary. As a result, the internal rules of the company came into force, 
leading to a significant reduction in wages. The unions argued that since the subsidiary was no 
longer subject to any collective agreement, the parent’s agreement should continue to apply to 
the transferred employees under the domestic legislation, which seeks to remedy the absence 
of a collective agreement.139 On the other hand, the Chamber of Commerce argued that an 
expired collective agreement cannot be imposed on the transferee as such an agreement could 
not logically ‘continue’ to apply if it is already rescinded.140  
The Austrian Supreme Court stayed proceedings and made a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU asking whether article 3(3) TUD, providing for the continuation of collectively agreed 
terms, must be interpreted as also covering terms laid down under a collective agreement 
which has continuing effect indefinitely under national law, despite the termination of the 
agreement, until a new agreement—whether collective or individual—has been concluded. In 
addition, the CJEU was asked to rule on whether the term ‘application of another collective 
agreement’ that was contained in the national legislation was to be interpreted as including the 
continuing effect of the likewise terminated parent agreement.  
The CJEU reiterated that the TUD is only a partial harmonisation measure and was not 
intended to create uniform protection across the Union.141 The CJEU further noted that the 
purpose of article 3(3) TUD was not the continuation of collective agreements as such, but 
rather the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of their origin.142 Therefore, such 
terms come within the scope of the Directive, ‘irrespective of the method used to make those 
terms (…) applicable to the persons concerned’, including in this case national legislation 
maintaining the effects of collectively agreed terms.143 Such an interpretation accords with the 
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purpose of the TUD, which is to avoid a sudden rupture in the terms and conditions of 
employment. In addition, the interpretation adopted conforms to the TUD’s (contested) 
objectives of ensuring a fair balance between the interests of employees and the transferee 
employer which must, citing Alemo-Herron, ‘be in a position to make the adjustments and 
changes necessary to carry on its operations’.144  
The CJEU, adopting a generous approach, held that ‘[t]he rule maintaining the effects of a 
collective agreement (…) has limited effects, since it maintains only the legal effects of a 
collective agreement on the employment relationships directly subject to it before its rescission 
(…) In those circumstances, it does not appear that such a rule hinders the transferee’s ability 
to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations’.145  
The contrast between both the tone and substance of this judgment and that adopted in Alemo-
Herron is remarkable. In the former, the CJEU had no difficulty in concluding that the 
continuation of the collective agreement did not interfere with the employer’s room for 
manoeuvre, while in the latter, an equally innocuous provision was struck down as intolerable 
interference. This dissonance is all the more apparent in the opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, as 
he too delivered the opinion in Alemo-Herron (although in that case he, unlike the CJEU, 
upheld the validity of the dynamic approach). In the present case the AG held that: 
[t]he primary objective of continuing effect is that of a guarantee; it simply maintains 
the status quo in the interests of legal certainty. In such cases, the rights and obligations 
arising from a collective agreement with continuing effect, a mere extension of the pre-
existing situation, are “the terms and conditions agreed”.146 
The AG noted that in this case, the collective agreement with continuing effect was, from the 
point of view of the Austrian Government, both a weaker and temporary extension of the 
effects of a pre-existing agreement. It was weaker in so far as the provisions of the continued 
agreement could always be waived by agreement of the parties and it was temporary as it 
would cease to apply when a new collective agreement was concluded. The AG went on to 
note that the most prominent feature of a collective agreement with continuing effect was its 
legal framework as: 
[i]n Austria, as also appears to be the case of a number of Member States of the EU, a 
collective agreement is not converted into an agreement with continuing effect as a 
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result of a decision of one or both parties to the employment relationship [but rather] 
because the legislature has expressly provided that, in exhaustively listed 
circumstances and with a view to maintaining legal certainty in the employment 
relationship, the agreement will continue to be observed on a weaker, temporary 
basis.147  
This interpretation was according to the AG, wholly consistent with Werhof in which the 
continuing effect of the ‘dynamic clause’ was rejected on the grounds that the TUD was not 
intended to protect mere expectations: 
[i]n other words, Directive 2001/23 is not intended to perpetuate a contractual situation, 
particularly where the situation perpetuated encompasses future rather than current 
rights. That is the kind of continuation of effects which upsets the balance of the 
contractual relationship between employer and employee, something which is 
prohibited by Directive 2001/23 and the case-law.148  
In the present case, on the other hand, there was an express statutory provision in force at the 
time of the contract’s conclusion stipulating the continuation of collective rights, albeit in a 
weaker and temporary form, this was accordingly ‘far from being a “mere expectation” or a 
“hypothetical advantage flowing from future changes to collective agreements”’.149 The 
contrast between the approach adopted by both the AG and the CJEU in the present case and 
that taken by the CJEU in Alemo-Herron, which relegated to the last footnote of the AG’s 
opinion, could not be more striking. Is it the case that the CJEU is now willing to invoke only 
the least controversial elements of Alemo-Herron, that is to say the principle of contractual 
autonomy stripped of the trappings of a fundamental right? 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the CJEU viewed the contractual arrangement in 
Alemo-Herron as more invidious from a contractual autonomy point of view simply because 
of the absence of negotiation—that is to say the exclusion of the employer from the collective 
agreement machinery in the first place. Perhaps then the simplest solution to Alemo-Herron 
would have been to open up the NJC negotiating structure to private employers, or at least 
those which had acquired public undertakings.  
In addition, the source of the continuation of collectively agreed terms seems to have played a 
role (despite the AG insisting that this was irrelevant). In Alemo-Herron, it was the contract 
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itself, via the bridging term which was the source of the continuation (although it was thought 
that the legislation permitted this). In the Österreichischer case, on the other hand, the 
continuation was entirely a creature of legislation. This is illogical; on the one hand, the CJEU 
holds that in order to preserve contractual autonomy, an agreed contractual term must be 
ignored while, on the other hand, holding that legislatively imposed terms are compatible with 
contractual autonomy. It seems that the CJEU was swayed by the fact that the continuation of 
collective terms in the latter case was temporary, but was it not also temporary in Alemo-
Herron in the sense that the collective agreement could be renegotiated? 
The CJEU has since then continued to give mixed signals regarding the strength of contractual 
autonomy as a fundamental right. We have already looked at the case of AGET in which AG 
Wahl found that articles 27 and 30 of the Charter were not relevant in a situation in which the 
state had to authorise collective redundancies. This was because not every irregularity in the 
dismissal process could be said to have fundamental rights implications.  
In his opinion in AGET, the AG began by noting that the purpose of the Collective 
Redundancies Directive (CRD) was to both protect workers and to harmonise the costs 
involved for employers. On the question of whether the prior authorisation procedure 
constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment, the AG held that this was in principle 
a restriction but that ‘the provisions of EU law must be interpreted in accordance with the 
fundamental rights as set out in the Charter. Hence Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted in 
accordance with Article 16’.150 For the AG, the restriction on establishment ‘also amounts to 
a restriction on the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business. Moreover, it restricts the 
freedom of contract of employers, inasmuch as they are required to seek prior authorisation’.151 
He went on to note that ‘[t]he rule at issue applies in a non-discriminatory way. Therefore, it 
is necessary to consider whether the remaining criteria (…) are met, given that this exercise, 
in my view, is basically one and the same under Article 49 (…) and Article 16’.152 
Here we can see the intermingling between article 16 and four fundamental freedoms of EU 
law. The effects of this relationship on the ability of the EU to regulate the employment 
contract are further fleshed out in the next chapter. For now, it is worth noting that the two 
appear to be treated as coterminous. Does that also mean that the raft of case law on the 
freedom of establishment, including its interaction with social norms is now also to be 
transposed to article 16? It certainly seems so, with the AG recognising—as has long been 
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held in the context of freedom of establishment—that the protection of workers is an overriding 
reason in the general interest. As such, article 16 had to be balanced against the Solidarity Title 
but this was of little use given that none of the Charter’s Employment Rights were found to 
apply.  
Outside the context of the TUD, article 16 is also beginning to show that it may have some 
bite. The freedom to conduct a business has been raised in the headscarf cases – Achbita153 
and Bougnaoui.154 In Achbita, the CJEU was asked whether Directive 2000/78 had to be 
interpreted as allowing a private employer to ban a female Muslim employee from wearing a 
headscarf in the workplace and whether he was allowed to dismiss her if she refused to comply. 
AG Kokott found that such an interpretation was possible given that ‘[i]n a Union which 
regards itself as being committed to a social market economy (…) and seeks to achieve this in 
accordance with the requirements of an open market economy with free competition (…) the 
importance that attaches to the freedom to conduct a business is not to be underestimated’.155 
As such, it could not be ruled out that the Directive does allow a derogation from the equality 
principle but nonetheless, as a derogation, it must be interpreted strictly with the freedom to 
conduct a business itself being subject to a ‘broad range of restrictions’.156 The CJEU agreed 
that the employer’s wish to protect its image does engage its freedom to conduct a business, 
notably if the employee comes into contact with customers.  
In the second headscarf case, Bougnaoui, AG Sharpston accepted that the freedom to conduct 
a business found in article 16 does constitute a legitimate aim, being one of the general 
principles of EU law enshrined in the Charter but that the freedom is not an absolute principle 
but must be viewed in relation to its social function. Had the discrimination at issue in this 
case been found to be indirect discrimination (the AG thought it was direct) ‘the interest of the 
employer’s business constitutes a legitimate aim and that it is not the legislation’s objective to 
impede that freedom any more than is appropriate and necessary’.157 
What we can take from the case law on article 16 as an interpretative tool is that it is more 
powerful that its counterparts in the Solidarity Title in that the CJEU has been willing to 
overturn longstanding jurisprudence and an employee friendly reading of legislation in order 
to preserve the business rights of employers. Nonetheless, it is increasingly difficult to pinpoint 
the precise impact of article 16 arguments. In some cases, it is mentioned without being dealt 
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with in the substance of the opinion or judgment. In other cases, the CJEU comes close to 
accepting that Alemo-Herron was wrongly decided, avoiding reference to that judgment. This 
new-found reluctance to explicitly engage with article 16 has been more in evidence in recent 
case law on that provision as a standard of review.  
 
4. Article 16 as a standard of review  
 
The case law on article 16 as a standard of review immediately following Alemo-Herron 
showed a continued commitment to contractual autonomy as a fundamental right. Later 
decisions may have heralded a softening of the CJEU’s approach. As with the Employment 
Rights, it is often difficult to separate questions of review and interpretation.  
4.1. Continued commitment to contractual autonomy  
 
In AGET, the AG had to determine whether the national legislation requiring prior 
authorisation for collective dismissals was compatible with the CRD as interpreted in the light 
of the Charter. The Greek legislation in question provided at article 3 that ‘[e]mployers shall 
notify the competent public authority in writing of any projected collective redundancies’. 
Article 5(3) further provided that ‘[i]f there is no agreement between the parties, the prefect or 
the [minster] may, by reasoned decision (…) after taking account of the documents (…) and 
assessing the conditions in the labour market, the situation of the undertaking and the interests 
of the national economy, either extend the consultations (…) or not authorise some or all of 
the projected redundancies’.  
Here, a cement company considering collective redundancies submitted a request for approval 
to the Ministry of Labour. The employment directorate at the Ministry drew up a report taking 
into account (1) the conditions of the market, (2) the situation of the undertaking and (3) the 
interests of the economy and refused to authorise the redundancies. The company alleged that 
the Greek implementing legislation was not compatible with article 49 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) read in light of article 16. As for the national 
court, it held that although the CRD does not foresee any authorisation period, article 5 of the 
CRD permits Member States to increase the level of protection granted to employees.  
The question before the CJEU was whether this approach was nevertheless incompatible with 
the aims of the Directive read in light of the Charter and the Treaty. AG Wahl commented that 
the Directive ‘represented a compromise reached at EU level between the need to protect 
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workers and the consideration to be given to employers (…) Unilaterally imposing additional 
obligations (…) without providing any compensatory safeguard (…) risks upsetting the 
equilibrium from the point of view of Article 49 (…) and Article 16’.158  
The CJEU took a somewhat different approach. It started by recalling that the Directive was a 
minimum harmonisation measure but that ‘the fact remains that the limited character of such 
harmonisation cannot have the consequence of depriving the provisions of the directive of 
practical effect’.159 This would be the case with any authorisation procedure that actually 
prevented collective redundancies from ever taking place. As the CJEU put it, the Directive is 
based ‘on the premise that collective redundancies must—once the procedures established by 
those provisions have been exhausted (…) at least remain conceivable’.160  
On the freedom of establishment point, it was held that the decision to engage in collective 
redundancies is a fundamental decision in the life of an undertaking and that, as a result, the 
legislation at issue was likely to hinder or make less attractive that freedom. Consequently, the 
measure also hindered or limited the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business in article 
16, but it could be justified on the grounds of worker protection.161 The case would therefore 
turn on the issue of proportionality with the CJEU starting with the proposition that the 
authorisation procedure was not sufficient in itself to undermine the essence of article 16.  
In principle, therefore, a national framework aimed at enhancing the protection of workers is 
proportionate and so complies with both article 49 TFEU and article 16 of the Charter. It 
seemed, therefore, as if the CJEU would disagree with the AG and find that the Greek 
legislation was compatible with the Charter. This was not the case. The CJEU found that 
reliance on some of the criteria upon which the decision not to authorise could be based 
(reasons 1 and 2, the situation of the undertaking and the labour market) was acceptable in 
principle but that here they were formulated in very general terms. There were no details 
provided as to how the power would be exercised which would inhibit any judicial review of 
the decision.162 It followed that the Greek regime was not compatible with article 49 and ‘on 
identical grounds’ breached article 52 of the Charter and thereby article 16.163  
4.2. A potential retrenchment from contractual autonomy?  
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A potential softening of the CJEU’s approach to article 16 can be seen in Vittoria Graf.164 This 
case is particularly interesting as it also concerned (as Alemo-Herron had) the interpretation 
of article 3 TUD. The opinion of AG Bot is remarkable for its detailed analysis of the different 
approaches to interpreting article 3 taken in both Werhof and Alemo-Herron.  
The AG starts by explaining that the rationale for dynamic clauses, at least in Germany, is to 
allow employers to apply collective agreements to non-unionised employees and also to allow 
employers who are not (or cannot be) involved in any collective bargaining machinery to apply 
collective agreements to its workforce. The latter is precisely what happened in the present 
case but upon the transfer of the business, the transferee did not wish to honour future changes 
to the collective agreement. The AG found that the TUD precludes a transferee being forced 
to apply terms arising from future changes to collective agreements.165  
The AG notes that there are two divergent approaches that can be seen in the case law. In 
Werhof, the CJEU started from the position that the transfer of dynamic clauses, as the transfer 
of any contractual term or condition, is indeed within the scope of the TUD. This means that 
the dynamic clause is transferred regardless of whether the transferee is party to the collective 
agreement. That having been determined, the next step in the reasoning process was to ask 
whether the Directive must be interpreted as transferring only those terms and conditions that 
existed at the time of the transfer or whether the term incorporating the collective agreement 
must be construed dynamically. Although under article 3(1) the term is transferred, this must 
be read in light of article 3(3) which provides that a collective agreement is ‘to continue to be 
observed only until the date of its termination or expiry, or the entry into force or application 
of another collective agreement’. The same provision allows Member States to limit the 
obligation to respect collective agreements, but this period must not be less than one year. The 
final step in Werhof was for the CJEU to set the alleged dynamic interpretation of the 
contractual clause against the employer’s freedom of association.  
According to AG Bot, the reasoning in Alemo-Herron was different. The first step here was to 
recall that following Werhof, the TUD could not be interpreted as requiring a dynamic 
interpretation. The CJEU then observed that the TUD allows Member States to increase the 
level of protection given to employees and determined that a dynamic approach was more 
protective. The next question was the extent of the discretion left to the Member States. In 
making this assessment, the CJEU placed particular emphasis on the aims of the Directive 
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which sought to ensure a fair balance between the interests of employees and the transferring 
employer who must be in a position to make adjustments and changes necessary to carry out 
its operations, in particular in a transfer from the public to private sector. Next, the CJEU 
considered whether the dynamic interpretation of the Directive would be compatible with 
article 16. The CJEU found that it was not. Although Member States do enjoy some discretion, 
this could not be such as to undermine the essence of an employer’s business freedom.  
Having set out the two approaches, the AG considered that the approach adopted in Werhof 
more closely aligned to the present case. The AG sought to use this opportunity to clarify the 
interaction between articles 3 and 8 of the TUD. The starting point, as in Werhof, is to note 
that a contractual clause referring to a future collective agreement falls within the scope of 
article 3(1) and so is automatically transferred. The second step is that article 3(1) should be 
read in light of article 3(3). Article 3(3) ‘provides a compromise intended to reconcile the 
interests of the transferee and those of the employees’.166 The AG concluded that ‘the dynamic 
reference clause ceases to have effect (…) where [the collective agreement] expires, terminates 
or is replaced and, if the Member State has so provided, where at least one year has passed 
since the undertaking was transferred. Those clauses do not therefore apply to collective 
agreements concluded after the date of transfer, unless the new employer expresses a different 
wish’.167  
The question for the CJEU to address in the present case was whether it made any difference 
that the German legislation implementing the TUD allowed for both consensual and unilateral 
changes to be made by the transferor. The AG held that this was irrelevant as although article 
8 allows for greater protection, this could not be allowed to circumvent the rules in article 3. 
In the end, the AG was able to reach this conclusion entirely following the approach adopted 
in Werhof. There was no need (as had taken place in Alemo-Herron) to rely on article 16 at all, 
with the AG simply noting that ‘by refraining from imposing on the transferee in an unlimited 
and uncertain fashion obligations arising from future collective agreements over which it has 
no influence, the ruling I am advocating will address the concern to guarantee the transferee’s 
freedom to conduct a business’.168 The tentativeness with which both article 16 and Alemo-
Herron are being treated in this case is notable. 
The CJEU went further, choosing not to follow the AG and instead found that the German 
legislation in question was compatible with the TUD, holding that ‘it is clear from the decision 
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to refer and, in particular, from the wording of the questions referred (…) that the national 
legislation at issue (…) provides for the possibility, after the transfer, for the transferee to 
adjust the working conditions existing at the date of the transfer, either consensually or 
unilaterally’.169 Although the transferee alleges that in practice changes are unlikely to be 
achieved, this was an issue for the national court to determine. Therefore, the national rules at 
issue complied with the conditions set out in Alemo-Herron: ‘the transferee must be able to 
assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to negotiate 
aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees with a view to its 
future economic activity’.170 Finally, and again side stepping the Charter, the CJEU concluded 
that ‘[g]iven that the that case-law takes into consideration Article 16 (…) there is no longer 
any need to examine further the compatibility of the national legislation at issue (…) with that 
provision’.171  
We can see here that, just as with article 31, article 16 is now being subsumed into existing 
case law without being dealt with explicitly. In other words, article 16 is being used in a more 
covert manner, with the CJEU simply relying on earlier case law rather than dealing explicitly 
with the provision itself. This has worrying implications for the future of a rights document 
that had the explicit intention of rendering more ‘visible’ the EU’s human rights acquis. What 
does this selective approach to fundamental rights tell us about the CJEU’s use of the Charter 
in the employment context?  
4.3. Fundamental rights à la carte?   
 
A difference is emerging between the CJEU’s use of the economic and social provisions in the 
Charter. Not only do the social provisions, dismissed as ‘principles’, appear to be weaker 
interpretative tools, but the CJEU seems actively to prefer the freedom to conduct a business 
over competing social rights. If we look at Alemo-Herron itself, we see that no attempt was 
made to engage with competing Charter provisions that may have acted as a counterweight to 
contractual autonomy. This is a fundamental problem. Unless the CJEU chooses to engage 
with a Charter provision, then it will of necessity have no impact on its approach to 
interpretation or review. Even within the working time context, the Charter’s use has been 
most prevalent in paid leave cases. We also see that in cases such as AMS and Dominguez, the 
CJEU is very careful to avoid the Charter’s social provisions becoming directly enforceable 
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individual rights either because they are not sufficiently clear and precise, or because they are 
dependent on national laws and practices.172 Article 16 faces no such limitations despite being 
worded similarly to the Employment Rights. In fact, in the context of the freedom to conduct 
a business, the CJEU, as we have seen, is willing to ignore precedent, including its long-
standing case law on contractual autonomy as a general principle. It does so in a manner which 
overrides the limitations contained in the case law and which is expressly referenced in the 
Explanations attached to the Charter.  
It is apparent from Alemo-Herron that the CJEU is willing to give precedence to an employer’s 
freedom of contract over the rights of employees as expressed in legislation.173 Even if a piece 
of employment legislation engages article 16, it is likely to have been carefully drafted to 
assess competing interests. In its case law on freedom of contract as a general principle, and 
in its early jurisprudence on article 16, the CJEU adopted this deferential approach to the will 
of the legislature. EU legislation was only rarely found to constitute a negation of the core 
content of business freedom. For Prassl, this test ‘is likely to constitute the most important 
hurdle to the success of any action brought to vindicate an individual’s economic freedoms 
under Article 16 CFR, especially once it is applied in combination with the Court’s 
proportionality scrutiny against a right’s social function’.174 However, it is difficult to square 
this with the decision in Alemo-Herron itself. In that case, the CJEU found that what had been 
considered no more than an ordinary application of the common law freedom of contract did, 
in fact, violate the very core of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right.  
Had Alemo-Herron involved a clash between two competing fundamental rights, one social 
and one economic, would the outcome have been any different? As we saw from Chapter II, 
the ability of the Charter’s Employment Rights to counteract article 16 must be called into 
doubt. The question arises, therefore, whether there are any existing methods for counteracting 
this aggressive approach to contractual autonomy. Given that the Charter cases have been said 
to differ from those on contractual autonomy as a general principle, would it be possible to 
return to the approach adopted in that earlier case law?  
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C. Back to First (General) Principles?  
 
Having set out the CJEU’s aggressive vision of contractual autonomy in Alemo-Herron, this 
section questions whether a return to the concept of contractual autonomy found in the case 
law on the general principle may be possible or indeed desirable. What is the nature of the 
relationship between the Charter’s provisions and the general principles? Was the Charter 
merely intended to codify the EU’s approach to fundamental rights as they existed at the time 
of its entry into force, or does the Charter now replace the general principles covering the same 
area? If the latter is the case, can it really be said that article 16 of the Charter and the general 
principle of contractual autonomy overlap? Is it perhaps the case that the solution to the 
problems posed by Alemo-Herron’s aggressive reading of freedom of contract as a 
fundamental right is to be found in a return to general principles? It is hoped, that in addressing 
this problem, the question of whether the approach adopted in Alemo-Herron is consistent with 
the general principles will be resolved. If the two approaches really are consistent, contrary to 
what was suggested above, what are the potential consequences of blurring the distinction? If 
they are not, then the Charter must have made all the difference.  
As a starting point, it will be necessary to explore the nature and purpose of general principles, 
notably in the context of private employment relations. The relationship between the general 
principles and the Charter will then be outlined before turning to a more in-depth examination 
of the tension between the general principle of freedom of contract and article 16 of the 
Charter. The nature of the general principles and their role will be outlined. This will be 
followed by an examination of the applicability of the general principles to private parties 
before turning to the relationship between the general principles and the Charter. It will be 
asked whether the CJEU in Alemo-Herron could have relied on the already-existing general 
principle of contractual autonomy to achieve the same result in that case, rather than 
embedding the hitherto underused notion of contractual autonomy in the Charter.  
 
1. The sources and roles of the general principles  
 
It will be recalled that the general principles of EU law are those principles that have been 
derived—largely by the CJEU—from unwritten rules not contained in the Treaty or secondary 
legislation. As Tridimas notes, ‘where a reference is made to the general principles of law as 
a source of law (…) such reference usually connotes principles which are derived by the courts 
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from specific rules or from the legal system as a whole and exist beyond written law’.175 In 
addition, although they ‘provide strong arguments for a certain solution, they may even raise 
a presumption, but rarely do they dictate results in themselves’.176 The CJEU is mandated to 
develop the general principles by article 19(1) TEU which provides that the CJEU ‘shall ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed’. Reich points out 
that this wording has remained constant throughout the various treaty revisions, however, ‘its 
“upgrading” from what is now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (…) to the 
Treaty on European Union (…) containing the basic principles and institutions of the Union 
itself, shows its high standing and importance in the political and legal order’.177  
1.1. Sources  
 
Three principal sources of general principles have been identified, namely the constitutional 
traditions common to all Member States, international treaties to which the Member States are 
party and finally, the general principles which derive from the nature of the Union itself, as 
‘[i]t would simply not be possible to mechanically apply human rights as recognized in one or 
other national legal system without taking into account the specific qualities of [Union] 
law’.178  
Despite largely deriving from national and international law, once recognised by the CJEU, 
the general principles take on an autonomous EU character, becoming part of the Union’s legal 
order. As Tridimas remarks, ‘the general principles of law are children of national law but, as 
brought up by the Court, they become enfants terribles: they are extended, narrowed, restated, 
transformed by a creative and eclectic judicial process’.179  
A further point to note is that even when a general principle can be said to derive from national 
law, it is not necessary that such a right be contained in the constitutions of all Member States. 
In this respect, the CJEU ‘does not make a comparative analysis of national laws with a view 
to identifying and applying a common denominator’ as in any case ‘[s]uch an exercise would 
be as impractical as it would be futile’.180 Rather, the Court makes a ‘synthesis seeking the 
most appropriate solution in the circumstances of the case’.181 Nor does the CJEU necessarily 
engage in a maximalist approach, adopting the strongest level of protection available in the 
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national constitutions.182 Rather, there is a ‘mutual cross-fertilisation’ which ‘creates a 
continuous flux of ideas and exchange of opinions between the [CJEU] and its national 
counterparts, giving rise to a common constitutional space defined by a dynamic dialogue’.183 
This multiplicity of sources has been thrown into even further confusion with the adoption of 
the Charter, somewhat clouding the roles of the general principles.  
1.2. Roles 
 
Three potential roles for the general principles have been identified, namely an aid to 
interpretation, a ground for review and as a guarantee of the rule of law.184 EU legislation in 
breach of a general principle is to be held void and national law falling within the scope of EU 
law that contravenes a general principle must be set aside. Essentially, the general principles 
can be said to have a gap filling function, given the often vague nature of EU law as expressed 
both in the Treaty and secondary legislation.  
Of course, the general principles themselves might be described as inherently vague. In any 
case, ‘although the general principles of law were initially invoked to cover gaps in the Treaty 
and the written law of the [Union], their importance has not lessened as the [Union] legal order 
develops’.185 In addition, and perhaps more controversially, recourse to the general principles 
‘enables the Court to follow an evolutive interpretation and be responsive to changes in the 
economic and political order’.186  
A further, related task entrusted to the general principles is that of ensuring respect for the rule 
of law. This task is undertaken through the ‘discovery’ and ‘development’ of ‘general 
principles which guide the application and interpretation of EU primary and secondary law as 
“positive law”’.187 In this respect, it becomes clear that the general principles are not 
themselves positive law, but are rather ‘more general concepts which guide law interpretation 
and application’.188 Despite the inherent lack of specificity and consequent flexibility of the 
general principles, ‘[o]nce these principles have evolved and been recognised, particularly by 
repeated application, they become part of “the law”’.189 In any case, and as we have already 
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seen in relation to the Charter, ‘[t]he dividing line between “rules” and “principles” is not 
always easy to draw in practice’.190 We have also noted the relationship between the general 
principles and fundamental rights, with the CJEU having recognised early on that respect for 
fundamental rights was one of the general principles of EU law. Having said that, ‘[w]hilst the 
fact that the Union should be bound by fundamental rights is not generally contested, the extent 
to which such fundamental rights might also permeate in the domestic legal systems is more 
controversial’, particularly in relation to private law.191  
The classification of fundamental rights protection as a general principle has now been 
codified in article 6(3) TFEU with the same provision granting constitutional status to the 
concept of general principles of EU law. Of course, the granting of constitutional status to the 
general principles as fundamental rights says nothing of their scope of application. Three 
possible scenarios have been suggested for the application of the general principles.192  First, 
there is the question of the applicability of the general principles to acts of the EU institutions. 
This is the least controversial aspect as it has long been clear that the EU when acting as a 
regulator or administrative body must be bound by the general principles.  Second, the general 
principles may be applicable to acts of the Member States while implementing EU law. Again, 
this application had been thought to be largely uncontroversial but, as we shall see, subsequent 
developments in the employment field have called this into question. Finally, the general 
principles as fundamental rights may apply when the matter falls within the scope of 
application of EU law. The latter has been particularly controversial as it has not always been 
apparent what precisely is meant by the ‘scope of application’. A further complication is the 
question of whether the general principles can apply to private parties at all.  
 
2. The application of the general principles to private parties 
 
The role of the general principles has largely been confined to the public sphere. It might have 
been thought that they were of no relevance to private parties. As we also saw with the Charter, 
this position has in recent years been called into doubt, although the question is far from 
resolved and remains controversial, as ‘[a]lthough traditionally the case law was reluctant to 
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accept that general principles of law bind individuals, recent cases suggest otherwise’.193 The 
question of the applicability of the general principles to private parties can be divided into two 
issues. First, can the general principles be invoked in a dispute between two private parties, ie 
are they capable of being invoked? Second, there is the more normative argument as to 
whether the general principles, with their inherently vague nature, should be applicable to 
private disputes?  
A further distinction must be made between incidental horizontal effect—notably through the 
interpretation of legislation and horizontal direct effect tout court, or true horizontal effect. 
The use of the general principles to guide the interpretation is now largely uncontroversial, or 
so it was thought. A number of particularly activist judgments from the CJEU have more 
recently called into question even this seemingly uncontroversial use of the general principles 
in the context of private parties.194 This question is further complicated by a number of 
surrounding complex constitutional issues involving the sources of general principles and the 
scope of EU law.  
In this regard, Spaventa has sought to distinguish between two situations in which the general 
principles may have horizontal effect. In the first instance, private parties may be able to 
invoke the general principles in a dispute involving a national rule which falls within the scope 
of the Treaty.195 It is now beyond question that ‘when a national rule falls within the scope of 
the Treaty, either because the rule is giving effect to one of its provisions or because it is 
limiting it, the national rule must also comply with the general principles of Union law, 
including fundamental rights’.196 The same applies even in a dispute between private parties, 
as long as the Treaty provision in question is itself capable of direct effect. In addition, where 
a Treaty provision does apply horizontally—as is the case with the free movement rules—
private parties have been allowed to invoke general principles to resist the application of such 
rules.197 
The second scenario identified by Spaventa is where private parties seek to invoke general 
principles in a dispute involving a national rule falling within the scope of a Directive as 
opposed to the Treaty.198 This is the very well-known and controversial Mangold situation, a 
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case in which the CJEU has been described as having assumed the horizontal effect of general 
principles without any real discussion.199 A similar approach can also be seen in the more 
recent headscarf cases discussed above.  
In Mangold, the CJEU found that Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework on equal 
treatment did not lay down the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age.200 
Rather, the Directive was but a specific expression of the already-existing general principle of 
EU law. The CJEU adopted this novel and controversial approach owing to the fact that the 
deadline for the transposition of the Directive into national law had not yet expired and could 
not therefore be relied upon. Despite this, the CJEU still needed to find an element of EU law 
to latch on to, in order to bring the situation within the scope of Union law. In an example of 
adept judicial acrobatics, it did this by looking to Directive 1999/70 on the framework 
agreement on fixed term work.201 This was sufficient to bring the issue within the scope of EU 
law which in turn triggered the application of the general principle.  
This decision has been heavily criticised on a number of fronts. In the first instance, it has been 
noted that there is a paradox in that the CJEU argued that discrimination on the grounds of age 
is a general principle, which can be relied upon in the absence of the Directive, while at the 
same time going to great lengths to discuss the effects of the Directive. In other words, ‘[t]he 
role of the Framework Directive in activating the dormant general principle (…) is normatively 
unclear and methodologically unsound’.202 In addition, it has been noted that given the CJEU 
appeared to treat the general principle’s content as coterminous with the Directive, it may be 
that ‘only those provisions of the Directive which can be said to reflect the pre-existing general 
principle can have horizontal effect’.203 Despite the largely negative reaction to this case, it 
was followed by the CJEU in Kücükdeveci.204 
Although this line of case law comes close to confirming the horizontal direct effect of the 
general principles, the reality may not be as dramatic. Some authors have argued that far from 
representing ‘true’ horizontal effect, the CJEU ‘merely instructed the national court not to 
apply the legislation breaching the general principle of Union law much in the same way as it 
would if a national rule had breached the free movement provisions’, with the fact that the 
dispute happened to be between private parties being largely irrelevant.205 In this respect, the 
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Mangold ruling may have further significant consequences in the employment context given 
that it may be authority for the fact that it is not possible for the parties to contract out of a 
general principle as a fundamental right. As Spaventa remarks, ‘[r]egardless of any spillover 
effect on the contractual relationship between private parties, such application of Union law 
does not amount to horizontal effect’.206 Nevertheless, it is this spillover effect that is of most 
concern to employers. Fine distinctions between horizontality or lack thereof are unlikely to 
be of interest to employers where the very practical effect on their ability to contract according 
to their own wishes is affected either way. It is perhaps for all practical purposes, a distinction 
without a difference. 
In similar terms, Dougan has described the CJEU’s use of the general principle as a basis to 
‘meddle in the contractual freedom of two parties’ but suggests that the decision may not have 
gone as far as had been thought.  Rather, there is: 
an easy, though unfortunate confusion between the question of whether Union law 
which creates (public law) duties for the Member States can also be invoked 
collaterally during the course of horizontal proceedings between two private parties 
and the issue of whether Union law instead imposes (private law) obligations directly 
upon an individual which may be apt for enforcement in litigation before the national 
courts.207 
In this respect, it is suggested that the discrimination in Mangold did not derive from the 
exercise of contractual autonomy but rather had a clear public law basis. I am not so convinced. 
Although it was, of course, the case that the German legislation in question permitted 
employers to impose fixed term contracts on employees over the age of 52, it did not require 
it. The employer clearly exercised this choice in the present case. 
In any case, arguments as to the precise scope of Mangold/Kücükdeveci may have become less 
relevant in the wake of the Dominguez case, again in the employment context. In that case, 
AG Trstenjak addressed the difficulties in infusing secondary and primary sources (Directives 
and general principles). She set out three alternative approaches. The first approach was to 
note that the Charter, at article 31(2) also provides for the right to paid leave, ie it was a right 
and not merely a principle. However, article 51(1) of the Charter denies horizontal direct effect 
to its provisions. The second option was to invoke the right to paid leave as a general principle 
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as it clearly did pre-exist the WTD. The AG rejected such an approach as it could lead to 
inconsistency with the Charter.  
The AG considered that the right to paid leave as a general principle lacked sufficient 
specificity to be applied horizontally ie it was a principle and not a right. In that regard, the 
‘[a]pplication of a general principle against a private party should depend on whether it grants 
a “subjective right” and whether it is “substantively unconditional and sufficiently precise”’.208 
Finally, the third potential solution contained in the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach was 
considered. In other words, was the right to paid annual leave contained in the WTD a mere 
specific expression of a pre-existing general principle? This last approach was also rejected in 
that it risked mixing the sources of law and lacked certainty and as such ‘[i]ndividuals could 
not be certain if the source of a right provided in a directive could be an unwritten general 
principle with enhanced status and effects which would trump the specific provisions of the 
directive’.209 Again, the AG was swayed by concerns as to allowing litigants to avoid the 
Charter’s lack of horizontality. As we have already seen, however, the CJEU in Kücükdeveci 
was entirely unconcerned about the Charter and instead relied directly on Mangold.210  
The CJEU in its subsequent judgment in Dominguez demonstrated that it is not always 
receptive to fundamental rights arguments in the context of disputes between private parties. 
In this case, the CJEU was asked to interpret article 7(1) of the WTD which provides for an 
entitlement to paid annual leave. Essentially, the question at issue was whether such 
entitlements could be made conditional on having worked a certain number of days during a 
reference period. The CJEU, in contrast to the extensive analysis adopted by the AG, applied 
neither the general principles nor the Charter and in the absence of the horizontal direct effect 
of Directives, the employee was left without a remedy. Leczykiewicz remarks that this case 
‘constitutes (…) an indication of the Court’s caution in using fundamental rights to review 
individual contracts’.211  
In any event, in Audiolux, AG Trstenjak refuted the idea that a general principle (in this case 
a guarantee of equal treatment for minority shareholders) could apply to private parties.212 
However, the CJEU agreed that there was no such general principle and so avoided the 
question of its applicability to a private party. Therefore, there is ‘no authority to suggest that 
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the application of fundamental rights as general principles in cases falling within the scope of 
Union law by virtue of a directive can be invoked against a private party beyond the 
“exclusionary” effects endorsed by the Mangold case law’.213 
It has further been argued that the inherently constitutional or administrative nature of the 
general principles renders inappropriate their application to the activities of private parties.214 
The above discussion shows that at least to some extent, the notion that the general principles 
are irrelevant in the private sphere has been dispelled. Furthermore, various attempts to draw 
artificial distinctions between those general principles of constitutional relevance and those 
principles of ‘civil’ law have largely failed. Taking a step back from the above controversy, 
what is the justification for allowing or indeed prohibiting the horizontal applications of the 
general principles?  
As Tridimas notes, the reality is that cases of true horizontality are always going to be 
extremely rare, but it may be justified on a number of grounds: 
[i]t may be necessitated on functional grounds where a private entity exercises de facto 
public power (…) It may be justified because of the value that the principles 
incorporates. It may be said (…) that the prohibition of discrimination [is] of such 
constitutional value that they should trump the principle of private autonomy (…) 
Finally, horizontality may be dictated by the objectives and the effectiveness of a 
principle.215 
What is particularly remarkable about the above is that many of the justifications for the use 
of the general principles in the private sphere actually have a public law connection. We can 
see for example, the idea that a private body exercising public power should be controlled by 
the general principles. We can also see the suggestion that some general principles are of a 
particularly important constitutional nature that they need to be protected in all spheres. In 
addition, there is the idea of the effectiveness of a principle, which is a rather circular example 
in that effectiveness is in itself a general principle of EU law. Interestingly, Leczykiewicz 
further notes, however, that the general principle of legal certainty, mentioned above has been 
‘providing the first bulwark against the encroachment of horizontal private transactions by 
publicly-focused EU goals’.216 Although, she also goes on to note that ‘fundamental rights 
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offer private parties a more concrete and entrenched mechanism of resisting regulatory effects 
of national and EU law’.217 Having set out the nature, sources and roles of the general 
principles, we must now turn to the question of their relationship with the Charter.  
 
3. The relationship between the general principles and the Charter 
 
Having set out the function of general principles and their applicability to private parties, we 
must now turn to the vexed question of the relationship between the general principles and the 
Charter. Determining the precise nature of this relationship may become essential to resolving 
the issues raised in Alemo-Herron. In other words, what is the relationship between freedom 
of contract as a general principle and freedom of contract as a fundamental right in article 16 
of the Charter?  
Both the general principles and the Charter are now explicitly granted constitutional status in 
article 6 TEU but this provision says little about the relationship between the various sources 
of EU fundamental rights. It will be recalled from the opening chapter of this thesis that the 
Charter was merely intended to codify or render more visible existing EU fundamental rights. 
This then begs the question of whether the Charter was intended to replace the general 
principles or whether the two sources are co-terminous and mutually dependent.  
Most commentators agree that the CJEU’s primary point of reference is and should now be the 
Charter, but this may be to overlook the fact that the general principles themselves have been 
explicitly recognised in the constitutional text, although whether this grants constitutional 
status to their content remains unresolved. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s case law itself confirms 
that the Charter will be its primary point of reference. This is precisely what happened in 
Alemo-Herron, in which the CJEU completely overlooked its existing jurisprudence on 
contractual autonomy as a general principle. Given the lack of explicit reasoning in this and 
other judgments in which the Charter has been granted priority, it is perhaps the case that the 
CJEU merely uses the Charter as a starting point from a purely practical perspective. In any 
case, the Charter’s provisions which are often indeterminate in themselves will continue to be 
informed by the general principles. In most cases, therefore, the general principles will ‘be 
used to influence and morph the interpretation of the Charter rather than establish autonomous, 
self-standing rights’.218  
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Furthermore, the general principles will continue to have a role outside the Charter, serving to 
fill lacunae in the law, promoting consistent interpretation and the development of a ius 
communae.219 Finally, the CJEU confirmed in Franson that both the general principles and the 
Charter enjoy the same scope of application, namely they apply to the Member States when 
acting within the scope of EU law, as opposed to merely implementing it. This approach may 
also have particular relevance post-Brexit given that the general principles will continue to 
apply, albeit in a reduced form.220  
The interdependence between the general principles and the Charter is further borne out by the 
fact that the Charter itself may become a source of general principles. As Lenaerts and 
Gutiérrez-Fons note, by ‘rendering rights visible and by merging and systematising in a single 
document the sources of inspiration scattered in various national and international legal 
instruments, the Charter brings clarity for both citizens and national courts as to how 
fundamental rights are protected at the EU level’.221 This resolves the argument raised in 
Mangold that non-discrimination on the grounds of age was not recognised by the national 
constitutions and so could not be a general principle of EU law. Reich considers that the 
‘interpretative and review function of principles has therefore been expressly recognised by 
the Charter; principles may not be placed on the highest level in the hierarchy of constitutional 
norms, but they are still of constitutional relevance’.222  
Essentially, it remains an open question as to whether the Charter was intended to act as a 
ceiling on the general principles if a right is covered by both. It may well be that the Charter’s 
provisions will ‘in the future entirely displace the general principles of Union law as the 
primary reference point [in this case referring to the Mangold jurisprudence](…) or it might 
be that the case law develops through some more complex combination of the general 
principles and the Charter’.223 In summary, ‘by design Article 6 TEU recognises multiple 
sources of fundamental rights which are complementary and mutually reinforcing’.224 The 
result is a rather confused relationship, a mélange rather than a strict hierarchy. What are the 
consequences of this heady mix for freedom of contract as both a general principle and as a 
fundamental right as expressed in the Charter? Has article 16 now colonised the field of 
contractual autonomy or is it possible to return to the independence of the general principles?  
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4. Freedom of contract as a general principle  
 
As mentioned, one of the criticisms levelled at the CJEU’s decision in Alemo-Herron is that it 
marked a significant and unexplained departure from the general principle of contractual 
autonomy. It will therefore be interesting to contrast the CJEU’s position on freedom of 
contract as a general principle with its conception of freedom of contract as a fundamental 
right. Can it really be said that Alemo-Herron marks a significant shift, or does it merely 
represent another step on a long journey towards a strong notion of contractual autonomy? It 
will be recalled that freedom of contract as a general principle of EU law has always been 
rather limited, particularly in the face of competing social rights. This section further unpacks 
the nature of contractual autonomy as a general principle before contrasting it with freedom of 
contract as a fundamental Charter right. 
It is possible to discern a number of criteria from the case law which must be considered when 
examining the validity of legislative restrictions on commercial autonomy as a general 
principle: (a) commercial autonomy itself is not absolute but must be considered in relation to 
its social function; (b) the restrictions must be proportionate; (c) in the public interest; and (d) 
must not impair the very substance of the freedom. This rather simple formula belies a complex 
analysis, which is not at all apparent from a reading of the CJEU’s judgments on this issue. 
What is meant by the social function of a right to pursue a commercial or economic activity? 
How is the public interest determined? What is meant by the core or substance of commercial 
freedom? These questions will be thrown into even sharper focus when we realise that no such 
limitations have been explicitly imposed on the specific freedom of contract as a general 
principle.  
4.1. The social function of commercial freedom  
 
As can be seen from the above, the CJEU has consistently held that the right to pursue a 
commercial or economic activity is not absolute, but must rather be considered in relation to 
its ‘social function’. In the first instance, what is meant by a social function? Does commercial 
or economic freedom have such a social function (the CJEU clearly thinks it does)? What does 
it mean to be considered in relation to this social function?  
Despite the CJEU’s apparent glossing over of the term in its judgments, the concept of the 
social function of property hides a controversial and far from universally accepted notion of 
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the limits to be placed on property rights. In their introduction to a symposium on the issue, 
Foster and Bonilla remark that ‘the classical liberal conception of property dominates the 
modern legal and political imagination. The idea that property is a subjective and nearly 
absolute right controls the way in which most of the modern law and politics understands this 
institution (…) It is common for citizens, politicians and academics to view property as an 
individual right that is limited only by the rights of others and the public interest’.225  
An alternative to this liberal conception of property rights was put forward by the French jurist, 
León Duguit who argued that property is not a right but rather a social function. According to 
this view, ‘property has internal limits—not just external ones as in the case of the liberal right 
to property’.226 Duguit posits three challenges to the liberal conception of property rights. The 
first of these is his contestation of the existence of an isolated individual, the supposition from 
which liberal property rights depart. Second, he argues that even if such an isolated individual 
did exist, such a conception is inconsistent with the right to property given that if ‘people live 
separately from other members of society, it does not make sense to speak of a right that 
imposes negative duties on third parties’.227  Finally, Duguit challenges the classical notion 
that property exists solely to serve individual interests, a notion which ‘obscures the 
connections between the economic needs of the community and the wealth that is recognized 
and protected through the institution we know as property. It should also serve the 
community’.228 
Even from this superficial consideration of the theory of a social function of property, it 
emerges that it is far from uncontested. It is also unclear whether this is the theory the CJEU 
had in mind when it proclaimed that property and business rights must be considered in relation 
to their social function. Such an absence is regrettable. If this was indeed the CJEU’s intention, 
then its explanations for finding that such a conception of property rights exists at an EU level 
is far from satisfactory. In any case, labour lawyers in particular should be satisfied with the 
result. Property rights and commercial freedoms are not absolute, but have an internal social 
function, which limit the freedom to manoeuvre available to the holders of such rights.  
If this is indeed the case, then the CJEU’s decision in Alemo-Herron is all the more troubling. 
In that case, not only did the CJEU fail to consider the competing social goals which might 
limit the freedom of contract as a fundamental right, but it also manifestly ignored the potential 
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internal limitations on this freedom, in the form of its social functions, a conception of property 
rights it apparently subscribed to not long ago. The absence of a considered position on the 
part of the CJEU is to be regretted in both cases.  
As alluded to above, the liberal conception of property rights did recognise that there were 
potential limits on such rights in the form of competing rights of others, or the public interest. 
Given the reluctance of the CJEU to even consider potentially competing rights in Alemo-
Herron, can it be said that the CJEU has also now rejected a liberal conception of business 
freedom? If so, the lacuna in its reasoning is even greater. That is not to say that the social 
function theory is entirely incompatible with a liberal theory of property rights as it ‘is a 
concept with much plasticity. The idea that property owners owe affirmative obligations to the 
welfare of others, and to societal welfare more generally, can map onto a number of different 
ideological orientations, including classical liberalism’.229  
This confusion in relation to the right to pursue a commercial or economic activity is thrown 
into even sharper focus when we consider that the case law on freedom of contract as a general 
principle makes no mention whatsoever of that right being restricted by any social function. 
Indeed, in those cases, the CJEU gave no indication as to the permissible limits on contractual 
autonomy. As we have already seen, in Spain, the CJEU merely held that ‘the right of parties 
to amend contracts concluded by them is based on the principle of contractual freedom and 
cannot, therefore, be limited in the absence of [Union] rules imposing specific restrictions in 
that regard’.230 The CJEU went on to note that ‘provided that the purpose of the contractual 
amendment is not contrary to the objective pursued by the applicable [Union] rules and does 
not involve any risk of fraud, such an amendment cannot be regarded as unlawful’.231 In this 
case, the CJEU tacitly accepts the possibility of limiting the principle of contractual autonomy 
but provides only fraudulent activity and the Union’s objectives as specific examples of such 
limitations. In the second case involving contractual autonomy as a general principle, 
Sukkerfabriken, the CJEU is equally reticent. In that case, the CJEU held that the legislation 
in question provided no rules ‘on the prescribed procedure, the forms of the competent 
authorities for the action contemplated, such as would be expected if a restriction were to be 
placed upon freedom of contract’.232 
4.2. Proportionality  
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It has been remarked that the need to balance competing interests in this context is somewhat 
self-evident, but the assessment of the proportionality of the imposed limitations on private 
freedoms became crucial in the case law.233 In Hauer, the CJEU took as its starting point, that 
restrictions on the right to property on public interest grounds were lawful under both the 
ECHR and national constitutions. Following this initial step of holding that the restrictions 
could prima facie be justified, the CJEU turned to the examination of whether the restrictions 
were, in fact, proportionate: 
[i]t is still necessary to examine whether the restrictions introduced by the provisions 
in dispute in fact correspond to objectives in the general interest pursued by the [Union] 
or whether, with regard to the aim pursued, they constitute a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference with the rights of the owner, impinging on the very substance 
of the right to property.234 
Albors-Llorens has described this as a ‘three-tiered formula’ which ‘incarnated a very high 
threshold for full review: only disproportionate and intolerable restrictions that affected the 
very essence of the right could be found incompatible with EU law’.235 Subsequent case law 
has demonstrated that not only had the CJEU adopted a deferential approach to the EU 
legislature, but also that ‘the invalidity or annulment of a general measure would only follow 
in extreme cases of breach of an economic right or a general principle of law’.236 
In Alliance for Natural Health, the CJEU held that ‘the [Union] legislature must be allowed a 
broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, 
economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex 
assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that area can be affected only 
if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
institution is seeking to pursue’.237 Furthermore, there must be ‘no alternative measure suitable 
for achieving that objective’ which may impair the freedom to a lesser extent.  
In other cases on business freedom as a general principle, the proportionality hurdle has been 
equally easily met.238 Of course, these cases are no more than a restatement of the CJEU’s 
settled case law on proportionality which is itself a general principle of EU law.239 In the first 
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Bananas judgment240 the court ‘gave very little weight to the actual impact that the measure 
had on the traders, again dismissing arguments of lack of proportionality on the basis that the 
institution has a broad discretion to act in the field’.241 Without doubt, proportionality is not a 
panacea to ensure the protection of the general interest.  
4.3. In the public interest 
 
It emerges from the above case law that the CJEU takes a wide approach to defining the public 
interest in cases of restrictions on the right to pursue a commercial or economic activity. 
Justifications found to be in the public interest include the protection of human health,242 the 
satisfactory organisation of the wine market,243 preventing an over-production of milk,244 the 
control of inland waterway transport,245 the efficient operation of a levy scheme,246 road 
safety247 and the indication of geographical origins of wines.248  
4.4. Must not affect the core or substance of commercial freedoms  
 
This is one of the most important aspects of the CJEU’s formula, and yet it is one of the most 
difficult to ascertain. What is meant by the ‘core’ or ‘substance’ of a fundamental right, and 
the right to business freedom more specifically? Perhaps understandably, the CJEU does not 
give a definitive answer to this difficult question which is essentially fact specific. From the 
case law on the general principle, it can be seen that the CJEU has consistently found that the 
essence or core of commercial autonomy has been left untouched. The case law is remarkable 
for the ease with which the CJEU finds certain measures, which on their face appear to heavily 
interfere with business freedoms, are compatible with those very freedoms. The CJEU has 
found for example that a prohibition on the marketing of a certain product was compatible 
with freedom to pursue an economic activity,249 restricting third country imports of bananas,250 
the requirement to pay a levy,251 interference with the employment conditions of the self-
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employed,252 and the regulation of the use of geographical designations for food and drink 
products.253  
What can be taken from these cases is that restrictions on the right to pursue a commercial 
activity are usually found to be justified despite the often severe financial impact they have on 
the holders of that right. The CJEU is quick to dismiss arguments based on economic freedoms, 
often briefly noting that ‘such a requirement has, after all, only a marginal effect upon the 
taxable person’s freedom to pursue an occupation’, ‘since those provisions affect only the 
arrangements governing the exercise of that right and do not jeopardize its very existence’, 
‘they do not affect the possibility for the operators in question to engage in the production of 
products’. The CJEU sees such interference as restricting the modalities of the exercise of 
commercial autonomy as opposed to interference with the right itself, although this is a 
difficult distinction to maintain. Yet again, the cases dealing with freedom of contract 
specifically make no mention of any need to respect the core or substance of the freedom. 
Taking the case law as a whole, however, it may be that there is an implicit social function in 
both freedom to conduct a business and contractual autonomy, given the CJEU’s recognition 
of restrictions on those principles. Now that we have a clearer idea of the content of business 
freedom and freedom of contract as general principles, we can attempt to assess Alemo-
Herron’s consistency with those principles.  
 
5. Alemo-Herron’s consistency with freedom of contract as a general principle 
 
Where does Alemo-Herron fit into the scheme of commercial rights and contractual autonomy 
as general principles? Is it really a radical departure as certain commentators have suggested 
or is it merely the next step in a long line of evolving case law? We have already seen that 
reliance on fundamental rights as general principles has long been uncontroversial. In this 
respect, Alemo-Herron presents no difficulties. Prassl notes, however, that although freedom 
of contract as a general principle of EU law has also long been recognised, it is the aggressive 
interpretation of article 16 which represents a break with established general principles.254  
On a rather superficial level, it is true that Alemo-Herron distinguishes itself from most of the 
cases on the general principles in that the freedom of contract arguments in that case actually 
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succeeded. On a more substantive level, how different was the CJEU’s approach in Alemo-
Herron to that adopted in the cases on the general principle? 
The relationship between Alemo-Herron and freedom of contract as a general principle must 
also be viewed through the intermediary of the earlier case law on article 16 set out above, but 
we start with Alemo-Herron’s relationship to the general principle on freedom to pursue 
economic activity and contractual autonomy. As seen from the above case law, there are a 
number of elements to the CJEU’s assessment of commercial autonomy as a general principle. 
It is now proposed to contrast the approach of the CJEU in Alemo-Herron to each of these 
elements in turn. 
5.1. The social function of commercial freedom 
 
We have already seen from the case law on the freedom to conduct a business as a general 
principle that the concept is consistently held to be limited by its social function. Interestingly, 
this formulation has been entirely left out of Alemo-Herron. Indeed, no mention of the general 
principle is made in the Court’s judgment, although the AG does refer to it. At a first glance 
this appears to mark a departure from the general principle. However, the case which is said 
to represent the modern statement of freedom to conduct a business as a general principle, 
Zuckerfabrik255 also makes no mention of that freedom having any social function. Tellingly, 
this is one of the cases relied on by the AG in Alemo-Herron.  
Again, as mentioned above, a subtle distinction emerges between the case law on general 
commercial freedom as a general principle and the specific freedom of contract as a general 
principle. Cases such as Nold and Haeur make explicit reference to the social function of 
commercial freedoms: 
[i]n the same way as the right to property, the right of freedom to pursue trade or 
professional activities, far from constituting an unfettered prerogative, must be viewed 
in the light of the social function of the activities protected thereunder.256 
However, the cases dealing specifically with freedom of contract, such as Sukkerfabriken and 
Spain do not. Nor is there any reference in those cases to either Nold or Hauer from which an 
implicit restriction on contractual autonomy based on its social function could be inferred. 
Rather, there is simply no assertion that contractual autonomy is not absolute.  Having said 
that, there is a recognition in Spain that limitations on contractual autonomy are possible, with 
                                                          
255 C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik.  
256 Case C-44/79 Hauer para 7; Case C-4/73 Nold para14.  
127 
 
the CJEU observing that  ‘the right of parties to amend contracts (…) is based on the principle 
of contractual freedom and cannot, therefore, be limited in the absence of [Union] rules 
imposing specific restrictions in that regard’.257 Of course, this says nothing of the permissible 
extent of such limitations.  
In Sukkerfabriken, the CJEU noted that if the Union were to restrict contractual autonomy it 
would need to set out the prescribed procedure and the forms or the competent authorities for 
the action contemplated’.258 It is not quite obvious how this holding should be read. On the 
one hand, the CJEU may have been saying that freedom of contract can be easily limited by 
simply setting out a clear procedure for such limitation. On the other hand, it may be 
interpreted as holding that only a detailed explanation of the process and institutions involved 
in restricting contractual autonomy can ever justify its limitation. Either way, the case law on 
contractual autonomy as a general principle provides neither a strong basis for the existence 
of the concept nor for the Union’s ability to restrict it. Perhaps it really is a stretch therefore to 
say that Alemo-Herron marks a major departure from this case law on freedom of contract as 
a general principle. 
Other commentators have remarked that similar limitations to those placed on the commercial 
activity general principle should apply mutatis mutandis to freedom of contract.259 Prassl notes 
that ‘[a]s regards the content of that principle, first (…) it is very difficult to see how this could 
be imbued with a consistent meaning as an autonomous concept in Union law—not least given 
the many divergent meanings hiding behind a beguiling simple term. Even a brief survey of 
the case law cited in the [Charter] guidance illustrates, second, that the principle was always 
recognised subject to abrogation by legislation or other rules’.260 This is certainly true and, as 
mentioned above, the case law on freedom of contract as a general principle does recognise 
(however tentatively) that this principle can be limited. It does not, however, provide any 
useful guidance as to the extent of such limits nor does it introduce the concept of a social 
function. The absence of any reference to earlier case law on commercial freedoms in the 
contractual autonomy jurisprudence, combined with the omission of the social function 
proviso, remains unexplained.  
5.2. Proportionality  
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It will be recalled that in its jurisprudence on the freedom to pursue a commercial or economic 
activity as a general principle, the CJEU took as its starting point that restrictions on that right 
were prima facie lawful. In Alemo-Herron, the CJEU reversed this starting point, requiring 
justification for restricting business freedom from the outset, noting that ‘[i]n such a situation, 
such a clause is liable to undermine the fair balance between the interests of the transferee in 
its capacity as employer, on the one hand, and those of the employees, on the other (…) the 
interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 2001/23 must in any event comply with Article 16 of 
the Charter, laying down the freedom to conduct a business’.261  
What we learn from the case law on the right to pursue a commercial activity is that the CJEU 
tends to grant a wide margin of discretion to the Union legislature, particularly in fields 
involving complex and sensitive social, political and economic choices.262 No such discretion 
is granted to the Member States in Alemo-Herron. In fact, in that case, the CJEU showed 
insensitivity towards the domestic labour traditions of the United Kingdom. This is all the 
more remarkable when we consider that article 8 TUD grants a certain leeway to Member 
States to introduce measures which are more protective of employees. Of course, such 
measures cannot undermine the purpose of the legislation, which is, in itself, contested. In 
addition, and as the CJEU held, the TUD ‘cannot be interpreted as entitling the Member States 
to take measures which, while being more favourable to employees, are liable to adversely 
affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business’.263  
One major difference between Alemo-Herron and the general principle case law is the nature 
of the measure being challenged. In the former, it was the implementation of a directive by a 
Member State and therefore the interpretation of that directive that was being challenged. With 
the latter, the general measure itself (directives, regulations) were being challenged as 
incompatible with freedom to pursue economic or commercial activity. Should this make a 
difference? The CJEU seems willing to grant a wider margin of discretion to the Union when 
acting in sensitive areas than it is to the Member States.  
Another point of note is that in its earlier case law, the CJEU showed little concern for the 
actual impact of a measure on the traders’ business freedoms. 264 Again, this was largely based 
on the fact that the EU institutions need a broad discretion to act. In Alemo-Herron on the other 
hand, the CJEU shows greater concern for the effect of the interpretation of the TUD on 
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individual traders, holding that ‘a dynamic clause referring to collective agreements negotiated 
and agreed after the date of transfer of the undertaking concerned that are intended to regulate 
changes in working conditions in the public sector is liable to limit considerably the room for 
manoeuvre necessary for a private transferee to make such adjustments and changes’.265 The 
CJEU fails to set out precisely what this impact would be. Once again, we should look to the 
case law on freedom of contract as a general principle. In Sukkerfabriken and Spain the CJEU 
does not deal with the proportionality issue at all.  
5.3. In the public interest  
 
Again, it will be recalled that in its case law on commercial freedom as a general principle, the 
CJEU takes a wide approach to this issue, with relatively mundane restrictions of commercial 
autonomy being held to be in the public interest. In Alemo-Herron, there is no mention of a 
wider public interest. Admittedly, given the context, there is a discussion of the interests of 
employees and therefore implicitly the interests of society in regulating the employment 
relationship. It is on this point that Alemo-Herron does indeed depart from the case law on 
business freedom as a general principle. In this case, the CJEU treats the interests of employers 
and employees as being on the same level, attaching no particular weight to the public interest 
and remarking that: 
Directive 77/187 does not aim solely to safeguard the interests of employees in the 
event of transfer of an undertaking, but seeks to ensure a fair balance between the 
interests of those employees, on the one hand, and those of the transferee, on the other. 
More particularly, it makes clear that the transferee must be in a position to make the 
adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations.266 
Again, however, if we look to the case law on contractual autonomy as a general principle 
there is no explicit mention of the public or general interest. Spain refers to the Union financial 
interest267 whereas Sukkerfabriken speaks of the objectives of the common organisation of the 
market.268 
5.4. Must not affect the core or substance of commercial freedoms  
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This is perhaps the most difficult point on which to draw a clear comparison between the 
general principle and the fundamental right. As we have seen, there is a difficult distinction 
drawn in the case law between the exercise of a right and the substance of that right. This 
already tentative distinction is simply no longer tenable following Alemo-Herron. In that case, 
the CJEU held that what appeared on its face merely to be an issue of how the right was 
exercised turned out to affect the very core or essence of that right.  
The CJEU held that the Directive, whilst permitting Member States to grant higher protection 
to employees, ‘cannot be interpreted as entitling the Member States to take measures which, 
while being more favourable to employees, are liable to adversely affect the very essence of 
the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business’.269 Interestingly, the AG makes no specific 
mention of the essence or core of freedom to conduct a business. Instead he notes that 
‘although the United Kingdom may permit the parties to include dynamic clauses referring to 
collective agreements in their contracts of employment, this must not result in conduct contrary 
to the fundamental rights referred to in the Charter, including the freedom to conduct a business 
mentioned in Article 16’.270 The reason for this rather bald statement stems from the AG’s 
assertion that ‘the case-law has not, in fact, provided a full and useful definition of this 
freedom. The judgments in which the Court has had occasion to rule in this area have gone no 
further than either referring to the right to property or simply citing the provisions of Article 
16 of the Charter’.271 What is discernible from the case law and the Explanations to the Charter 
is that ‘the freedom to conduct a business acts as a limit on the actions of the Union in its 
legislative and executive role as well as on the actions of the Member States in their application 
of European Union law’.272 
The intermediary between freedom of contract as a general principle and Alemo-Herron is a 
raft of earlier case law on article 16. As already demonstrated, the freedom to conduct a 
business has largely been reserved for extreme cases, with its primary function being as a 
counterweight to other fundamental rights.273 What we can take from the early case law on 
article 16 is that it very much reflects the case law on commercial freedom as a general 
principle, including the inconsistency in that case law. Some cases refer to the social function 
of commercial freedom. Others omit such a reference but nevertheless restrict the freedom 
through the proportionality principle. With the exception of Scarlet Extended, commercial 
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activity arguments were defeated in all cases. In this respect, Alemo-Herron is indeed 
inconsistent with freedom to pursue a commercial activity as a general principle as well as the 
early case law on article 16 but it is not inconsistent with the case law on freedom of contract 
as a general principle. The question then arises as to whether Alemo-Herron, in departing from 
the general principles, represents a new interpretation of business freedoms or whether indeed 
it is just an isolated case to be ignored. If this is indeed the case, is a return to the general 
principles possible or even desirable?  
As already mentioned, most commentators agree that the Charter should now become the 
CJEU’s primary point of reference for fundamental rights. Furthermore, the general principles 
will continue to fill the lacunae in the Charter’s provisions. It is certainly difficult to think of 
a more laconic Charter provision that article 16. Despite this, Oliver argues that ‘Article 16 
seamlessly replaced the pre-existing fundamental right to conduct a business which had existed 
as a general principle of Union law’.274 For him, no purpose could be served by allowing the 
general principle to subsist alongside article 16 if the two were identical and even if they were 
not ‘what would be the point in maintaining in existence two overlapping but slightly different 
fundamental rights?’.275  
Oliver further argued that article 16’s open-ended wording leaves it sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the pre-existing general principle.276 In the same breath, he points out the 
uncertainty that would follow if two similar, but discrete fundamental rights existed. With 
respect, it is difficult to square the open-ended and flexible nature of article 16 with the need 
for legal certainty. Oliver continues that ‘in the absence of a clear ruling from the Court on 
this point, we shall proceed on the basis that, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the general principle first recognized by the Court in Nold has purely and simply been replaced 
by Article 16 of the Charter’.277 This somewhat contradicts his earlier view that the general 
principle will continue its gap filling function if there are difficulties in interpreting the 
Charter.278 Oliver then contends that ‘in its recent judgments on Article 16, the Court continues 
to refer to its pre-Lisbon case law, which also suggests that this provision has taken over the 
mantle of the general principle’.279 As already discussed, however, this is not entirely true. The 
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CJEU continues to adopt a pick and choose approach, sometimes referring to earlier case law 
on the general principles and sometimes ignoring it entirely.  
Finally, Oliver remarks that ‘the relatively weak language of Article 16 reflects the pre-existing 
case law on the right to conduct a business. In addition, this language reflects the drafting 
history of Article 16 which was introduced as a counterweight to (…) the social rights (…) the 
intention was to give Article 16 the same weight as those social rights’.280 Prior to Alemo-
Herron, it was expected that the Charter would take up where the general principles had left 
off, with article 16 being equally restricted. It was unforeseen that article 16 could have taken 
on a life of its own, departing from the existing case law. This has left litigants in the 
impossible position of knowing which line of case law to rely on. The negative reaction to 
Alemo-Herron demonstrates just how unpredicted this departure really was. On another level 
and as already stated, the pre-existing case law on the general principle, particularly those 
cases dealing with contractual autonomy was never entirely consistent in its approach to 
limiting business freedom. The real surprise is that in Alemo-Herron article 16 won the day, 
although Scarlet Extended was precedent even for this.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown that article 16, which contains the freedom of contract as a fundamental 
right, has had a much more radical effect than the Employment Rights found in the Solidarity 
Title of the Charter. We started by exploring the notion of contractual autonomy as both a 
general principle and fundamental right in EU law. It was shown that freedom of contract was 
a weak general principle, easily giving way in the face of competing social considerations, 
although there may have been a slight divergence between freedom of contract and business 
freedom more generally, with the latter being more explicitly connected to the notion of a 
social function. The Charter, just like the general principles, does not contain any 
comprehensive statement of freedom of contract and again espouses a complex and unresolved 
relationship between contractual autonomy specifically and business or commercial freedom 
more generally. This has meant that, until recently, freedom of contract has continued to be a 
weak and limited fundamental right. The CJEU was quick to recognise the right but 
demonstrated a readiness to limit it. This changed following the more expansive approach to 
contractual autonomy set out in the case of Alemo-Herron. In some respects, this was 
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unsurprising given that the TUD provided fertile ground for the further entrenchment of 
contractual autonomy principles. The problem with Alemo-Herron is not that article 16 was 
raised and applied but that it was given such an extensive reading. The Charter, as interpreted 
in Alemo-Herron, has had the effect of disrupting the CJEU’s existing balanced approach to 
the recognition of business freedom and contractual autonomy as both general principles and 
in its early case law as fundamental rights. Highlighting these problems also allowed us to 
contrast article 16’s subsequent use as a tool of interpretation and standard of review with the 
effects of article 31 on the same functions as set out in Chapter II. In the CJEU’s subsequent 
use of article 16 it has continued to give mixed signals. Sometimes, article 16 is explicitly 
relied on while at other times, the CJEU overlooks it entirely or adopts an approach similar to 
the case law on the general principles. As a standard of review, the case law immediately 
following Alemo-Herron showed a continued commitment to contractual autonomy but this 
was followed by cases which demonstrate a softening of the CJEU’s approach. In reality, there 
are probably too few cases to come to a definitive conclusion, but it is clear that article 16 in 
cases such as Alemo-Herron, AGET and Achbita has shown much more bite than its 
Employment Rights counterparts.  
It was then questioned whether a return to freedom of contract as a general principle would be 
possible or desirable. It is clear that the Charter and general principles will continue to have a 
mutually reinforcing relationship even if this is not made explicit in the judgments of the 
CJEU. The precise composition of the case law on business freedom and contractual autonomy 
as general principles was then explored in more detail. It was shown that these principles 
diverge in the language used to describe the permissible limitations on those principles. In 
reality, therefore, it is a complicated task to determine the precise extent to which Alemo-
Herron departs from freedom of contract as a general principle. Some distinctions are, 
however, more evident. First, Alemo-Herron does not explicitly engage with the pre-existing 
case law. Second, the starting point is reversed, with the CJEU no longer taking it as given that 
restrictions on business freedom are prima facie lawful. Third, the CJEU places greater 
emphasis on the effects of restrictions on individual traders. Fourth, the distinction between 
the exercise and the substance of business freedom is collapsed. Finally, the CJEU gives no 
particular weight to the public interest. The combination of these factors shows that the Charter 
has already had an impact on the employment relationship through the reinterpretation of 
employment legislation. But, are there any broader consequences for the EU’s ability to 








IV. The Macro Level: The Charter’s Implications for the 
Regulation of the Employment Relationship 
 
This chapter assesses the role that the Charter has played in the EU’s ability to regulate the 
employment relationship. It starts by asking whether Alemo-Herron can be considered the 
EU’s Lochner moment or whether it simply marks another step in a long line of deregulatory 
jurisprudence prioritising the economic over the social (Section A). Section B further considers 
just how systemic this prioritisation may be. Is freedom of contract a cornerstone of European 
integration, deeply embedded in the Treaty? How has Alemo-Herron been treated in 
subsequent cases and are there any in-built mechanisms within the Charter itself that might 
resist the force of article 16? Failing that, Section C concludes by exploring one of the 
alternative regulatory techniques that the EU might deploy to avoid the reach of article 16 
altogether. 
 
A. The EU’s (second, third) Lochner Moment or Much Ado about 
Nothing? 
 
What is the significance of Alemo-Herron for EU labour law? Can the case be said to be the 
EU’s Lochner moment or has that (dis)honour already been taken by the much-maligned 
Viking and Laval line of case law? On the other hand, has the potential impact of Alemo-Herron 
simply been overstated? Has the CJEU already come to regret its expansive approach to 
contractual autonomy as a fundamental right and even if it were to maintain it, are there in-
built safeguards in EU employment legislation and the Charter? If so, what does this tell us 
about the Charter’s potential impact in the employment field?  
It had long been thought the EU had very little to learn from Lochner. As one commentator 
put it ‘[i]n the perspective of a typical European jurist, Lochner would likely be dismissed as 
old news, bad news, and news that does not belong on the old Continent’.1 The same 
commentator noted that the US Supreme Court’s (USSC) ‘formalist protection of individual 
economic freedom may appear impossibly distant from the “social” core of current European 
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constitutionalism, and therefore ultimately uninteresting’.2 This view is no longer tenable in 
the wake of Alemo-Herron. To what extent, then, can Alemo-Herron be said to reflect the 
earlier Lochner jurisprudence?  
 
1. Echoes of Lochner in EU labour law  
 
In the Lochner case, the USSC declared that a New York state law limiting working hours for 
bakers was incompatible with the US Constitution, notably the substantive due process clause 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Lochner, the owner of a bakery who had permitted 
his workers to work beyond the 60-hour weekly limit argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
contains freedom of contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process.3 In 
this case, the USSC ‘developed a medley of juridical doctrines that effectively insulated the 
marketplace from a broad swath of governmental regulations and from collective action by 
laborers’.4  
The majority, led by Justice Peckham accepted that the state retained certain ‘police powers’ 
which enabled it to legislate in areas such as health and safety and ‘to that end, states had the 
power to prevent individuals entering into certain types of contract’.5 At the same time, the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the deprivation by the state of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. Justice Peckham saw this clause as protecting freedom of contract 
by ‘imposing substantive restrictions on the police power of the states, compelling the Court 
to question whether there had been a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police 
power, as opposed to an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the 
individual’s right to personal or contractual liberty’.6  
The majority argued that the state should not have the power to protect individuals from their 
own poor decisions. Justice Peckham accepted that both parties enjoyed freedom of contract, 
noting that:  
[o]f course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one 
has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor (…) The question of whether 
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this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There 
is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free 
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of baker.7  
Particularly egregious for the majority, was that the statute did not permit employees to work 
above the threshold (as opposed to merely prohibiting compulsion). It was a mandatory 
provision, with no account taken of potential emergency situations. The USSC thought that 
contractual autonomy could not be interfered with through legislation except to the extent that 
the beneficiaries were incapable of active market participation.8  
The minority, led by Justice Harlan agreed that freedom of contract certainly existed, but that 
it had to be subordinate to the police power: 
I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within 
certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the 
general welfare, or to guard the public health, the public morals or the public safety.9 
It is scant comfort to exploited employees that their freedom to enter a contract to ‘sell’ their 
labour is being upheld.  Both the USSC and its European equivalent failed to consider the 
weaker bargaining position of the employee, perhaps forgivable for the early twentieth century 
USSC, but certainly not for the modern CJEU. Just as in Alemo-Herron, the USSC accepted 
that neither the interest claimed by the state/employees nor that of the employer was absolute. 
Nevertheless, both courts went on to undermine the state’s regulatory authority without 
making explicit the rationale behind its balancing exercise if it even undertook such an exercise 
in the first place.  
Unsurprisingly, Lochner is considered one of the most important and controversial USSC 
decisions of the time and would eventually lend its name to the Lochner era, a period of 
jurisprudence-led deregulation ‘spanning from the late 1890s until 1937 in which the Supreme 
Court developed and applied doctrines that insulated the market place from constraints 
imposed by legislatures or collective action’.10 This decision attracted much consternation at 
the time and continues to do so, probably having received ‘more clearly unanimous criticism 
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than any other [decision] of the twentieth century’.11 The decision has further been described 
as sounding the ‘Court’s call to batter against social and economic regulatory legislation’.12  
A key feature of the Lochner-era jurisprudence is that it was nearly 40 years before it began to 
unravel in the wake of the New Deal era. It was only in the 1937 USSC decision in West Coast 
Hotel that the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of contract was finally 
abandoned.13 As Chief Justice Hughes remarked in that case, ‘[w]hat is this freedom? The 
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract (…) freedom of contract is a qualified, not 
an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses 
(…) Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable 
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community’.14 
One redeeming feature of the Lochner decision is the dissent of Justice Holmes who held that 
‘a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism 
(….) or of laissez faire’.15 The reality is, however, that the USSC passed over the first 
opportunity ‘for constitutional confirmation of the modern regulatory state’.16 
1.1. Translating Lochner into European law 
 
 Although the present economic and social changes occurring in Europe pale in comparison to 
those faced by the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, it remains the case that in 
‘resolving a particular controversy a court is required to choose from a plethora of societal 
values those which will guide its policy foundation’.17 It is certainly the case that the CJEU 
has a more wide ranging array of social and economic values from which to draw than the 
USSC had, or continues to have. Indeed, at the time of the Lochner Court, it was a widely held 
view that ‘government regulation of private affairs was deemed a grave offence against 
citizens’.18 The modern EU context is very different, but nevertheless, can echoes of the 
Lochner Court’s laissez-faire policy choices be found in EU law?  
Nicol, writing from a largely constitutional perspective, has described Viking and Laval as 
‘Europe’s Lochner Moment’. But is he right, or has this case law been overtaken by Alemo-
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Herron?19 Of course, what is meant by a Lochner moment is open to many interpretations and 
the precise impact of the decision remains the subject of debate to this day. In any case, it is 
perhaps better to talk of a Lochner process. As we shall see, there is the risk of attributing too 
much weight to a single case.  
Within the context of EU law more generally, authors have ascribed Lochner-like qualities to 
various aspects of internal market jurisprudence. Caruso, for example, sees Lochner in cases 
such as Franzen, a case familiar to internal market lawyers.20 In that case, the CJEU overruled 
a Swedish monopoly on alcohol distribution, despite its intended public protection and human 
health purposes. According to Caruso, ‘[t]his story bears a number of analogies with Lochner. 
State legislation enacted with the aim of protecting citizens (…) was weakened by a supreme 
court’ although not, in this case, ‘in the name of freedom of contract, but due to an equally 
basic faith in the Common Market’.21 It will be explained below how the CJEU’s use of 
business freedom is not and cannot be neutral, given the Union’s commitment to the deepening 
of the internal market.  
Other commentators have expressed similar sentiments that the EU’s free movement rules 
represent Europe’s own version of economic due process. Eliasoph, in particular, remarks that 
‘[w]hile the [CJEU] did not intervene with social legislation in a manner approaching the 
extent of the activism exhibited by the Supreme Court (…) with its Article [34] jurisprudence 
the [CJEU] had ‘placed itself in a pivotal position to influence the pace and direction of 
legislative integration on matters of economic and social regulation’. Furthermore, this 
jurisprudence resembled liberty to contract and substantive due process’.22 This is not to say 
that the CJEU’s foray into regulating regulation has been entirely one-sided. It has been 
suggested that far from encapsulating the CJEU’s inherent neo-liberal tendencies, its 
deregulatory jurisprudence actually betrays the CJEU’s desire to establish Union control over 
national regulation, a theory which ‘is further supported by the [CJEU’s] fairly vigorous 
protection and enforcement of the few social rights provided in the original treaty’ a theme 
which is discussed further below.23  
In addition to the internal market jurisprudence, remnants of the CJEU’s confused approach 
to economic due process can also be found in its use of competition law to prohibit collective 
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action and most notably to invalidate state aid programmes.24 Despite this, in later decisions 
such as Albany,25 the CJEU ‘had for the first time responded to the perceived disequilibrium 
between economic and social policy in the Treaty and, on a fairly weak textual basis, read into 
the Treaty a definite limit to the scope of competition law’.26 The CJEU has also been faced 
with remarkably similar case to Lochner. In Oebel, as in Lochner, a bakery owner was 
prosecuted for failing to comply with a Dutch regulation banning night time work in bakeries. 
In that case, the CJEU held that: 
[i]t cannot be disputed that the prohibition in the bread and confectionary industry on 
working before 4 a.m. in itself constitutes a legitimate element of economic and social 
policy, consistent with the objectives of public interest pursued by the Treaty.27 
This decision was reached at a time when the EU Treaties contained no equivalent to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, apart from the free movement rules, which did not come into play 
here. It is apparent, then, that the Charter’s article 16 would make all the difference, perhaps 
an indictment of a document that was hailed for its granting of at least nominally equal status 
to political, economic and social rights. Indeed, as we shall now see, in subsequent cases in 
the employment context, the CJEU has singularly failed to ensure the protection of social rights 
in the face of competing economic interests. 
What then is meant by the Lochner process in the specific context of EU labour law? The 
process may be described as the development of constitutionally (judicially) imposed 
restrictions on the ability of the state to legislate in the employment context. In order to set the 
scene, however, it is necessary to outline some of the broader contextual similarities between 
Lochner and Viking and Laval while examining the place of Alemo-Herron within this scheme.  
1.2. Tracing the link between Lochner, Viking, Laval and Alemo-Herron 
 
The decisions in Viking and Laval are so well known that they do not need to be rehearsed in 
detail here. In Viking, the CJEU found that a company could invoke the freedom of 
establishment contained in article 49 TFEU against a trade union conducting industrial action.  
A redeeming feature of this case from a labour law perspective is that, as we saw in Chapter 
II, the CJEU explicitly acknowledged for the first time that the right to strike, at least as a 
general principle, was a fundamental right. However, this was not of much benefit to the 
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litigants who were required to show that their restriction of the company’s freedom of 
establishment was in pursuance of a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and was 
proportionate. In other words, the strike action had to be a last resort and could only be taken 
if the aim was to protect jobs.  
In Laval, the CJEU had to determine whether the relevant industrial action was compatible 
with article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide services, read in conjunction with the Posted 
Workers Directive. In that case, the CJEU once again accepted the right to strike as a 
fundamental right but repeated its earlier holding that restrictions on the Treaty freedoms must 
pursue legitimate objectives compatible with the Treaty, be proportionate, suitable to attain the 
objective and be justified by overriding reasons of public interest.  
a. Contextual differences  
 
It is important to point out the different political and institutional contexts between the modern 
EU—a sui generis organisation and the Lochner era US—a nation state, with the CJEU being 
required ‘to display a certain sensitivity towards the national identities of the Member States, 
whereas the Supreme Court can be conceived as helping to forge a national, American 
identity’.28 Having said that, and as we have already seen, the CJEU can hardly be accused of 
harbouring too much sensitivity towards national legal traditions in Alemo-Herron, in which 
it roundly dismissed the long-standing (albeit EU law-derived) English dynamic approach to 
collective agreements.  
Despite the perceived hostility to government regulation in the US at the turn of the last 
century, Nicol remarks that in reality ‘Lochner was decided during the Progressive Era, an 
epoch in American politics during which a large section of the political and intellectual elite 
lost their faith in unbridled private sector power and sought state intervention in the economy 
and state protection of workers. The case’s outcome flew in the face of this powerful and 
mounting national consensus’.29 Viking and Laval, on the other hand, ‘were decided at a time 
when Europe’s political leaders had enthusiastically promoted EU liberalisation legislation 
which complemented the efforts of the [CJEU] to open up national markets, including 
publicly-owned ones’.30 The judgments were also delivered against the backcloth of a very 
substantial body of EU employment legislation, thereby demonstrating that a choice was made 
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to prioritise one over the other. Despite these differences, there are a number of parallels to be 
drawn between the two lines of case law.  
b. Parallels between the decisions  
 
The first of these similarities is the consternation expressed in labour law circles that in Viking 
and Laval (similarly to the USSC’s approach in Lochner), ‘the [CJEU] chose as the starting-
point of its analysis not the right to take collective action—supposedly the fundamental right 
—but rather the employer’s freedom of movement’.31 In this respect, the CJEU: 
[t]reats collective action as merely another obstacle to free movement, utilising its 
normal line of reasoning instead of accepting that the status of collective action as a 
fundamental right compels a less strict approach. Moreover, at an even more basic level 
the [CJEU] opted for an analysis whereby the fundamental right needed to be justified 
in the light of the economic freedom, rather than the economic freedom having to be 
justified in the light of the fundamental right. In electing to examine Viking and Laval 
from this standpoint, the [CJEU] made an ideological choice.32  
Rather than being born purely from ideology, this approach may actually stem from the 
CJEU’s long-standing experience of upholding the EU’s free movement rules against both 
public and private restrictions. The CJEU’s experience with human rights has been more 
mixed, particularly in relation to the Charter.  
There is also nothing in the US Constitution or the EU’s free movement rules which required 
the respective courts to reach the conclusions they did. As mentioned, one redeeming feature 
of Viking and Laval (which is absent from Alemo-Herron) is that ‘the interests of employees 
were seen as a legitimate competing objective whereas in Lochner they were seen as 
impermissible class legislation’.33 In addition, ‘there remains quite enough material in article 
3(3) TEU for the [CJEU] to have arrived at the opposite outcome in Viking-Laval’.34 Although 
it has been suggested that in Viking and Laval, the CJEU did just that, prioritising the economic 
over the social aspects of EU integration, it did so in a more subtle way than in Alemo-Herron, 
which represents a more frontal assault on the ability of the EU to regulate the employment 
relationship.  
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In this respect, it is Alemo-Herron which bears a closer resemblance to the Lochner case, which 
‘cast into doubt virtually any law that regulated market actors’.35 If Viking and Laval did not 
go that far, Alemo-Herron certainly comes close to rendering impermissible any EU 
intervention in the employment relationship. It is suggested therefore, that at least in so far as 
the Lochner doctrine has a chilling effect on the ability of the state to legislate in the 
employment context, it is Alemo-Herron rather than Viking and Laval which bears the closest 
resemblance to the USSC’s approach. 
This is perhaps most evident in the conclusions as to what exactly was wrong with Lochner. 
As Strauss puts it: 
[t]he Lochner-era Court acted defensibly in recognizing freedom of contract but 
indefensibly in exalting it. Freedom of contract (….) is a plausible constitutional right. 
It might merit careful, case-by-case enforcement, undertaken with sensitivity to the 
limitations of the right as well as its value. The Lochner-era Court went far beyond 
that. It treated freedom of contract as a cornerstone of the constitutional order and 
systematically undervalued reasons for limiting or overriding the right.36  
This is precisely the approach adopted by the CJEU in Alemo-Herron. That Alemo-Herron 
bears closer similarities to Lochner is perhaps unsurprising as Viking and Laval represented a 
clash between fundamental social rights and fundamental Treaty freedoms whereas Alemo-
Herron more closely aligns with Lochner’s contest between constitutionally protected rights 
and ordinary employment legislation. Having said that, Alemo-Herron also goes further than 
Viking, Laval and Lochner. This is largely because ‘the mode of reasoning in Viking-Laval—
as in Lochner—did not represent any profound novation’, like Lochner, it conformed to 
established jurisprudence.37 Alemo-Herron, on the other hand, is very different and all the more 
invidious; it marks a profound and unexpected rupture from existing case law on article 16 as 
a fundamental right. In addition, there are striking similarities between the USSC’s discovery 
of a freedom of contract stemming from the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
CJEU’s similar efforts in relation to article 16.  
A further criticism of Lochner, with striking echoes in Alemo-Herron is that the USSC chose 
as the baseline of its analysis ‘the status quo, as reflected in market ordering under the common 
law system’.38 The idea here is that the USSC defined constitutionally protected private rights 
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by reference to the protection the claimant would have received under the common law of 
property and contract.39 What, then, was the baseline in Alemo-Herron? Given the absence of 
a harmonised EU contract law, it remains difficult to discern precisely what default position 
on contractual autonomy the CJEU should adopt. If the CJEU were to take the English 
common law as its lead, we have already seen that the transferability of dynamic clauses in 
collective agreements is entirely consistent with the common law conception of contractual 
autonomy. Sunstein suggests that the baseline should be altered through the prism of a theory 
of justice, to be derived from the ‘animating purpose behind the constitutional commitment to 
property rights’.40 The problem in the present context is that it is far from clear what the 
underlying rationale was for including a freedom to conduct a business in the Charter in the 
first place, especially given its intimate link to the already existing Treaty freedoms, an issue 
fleshed out below. If the Charter is to provide the source of EU values on which the CJEU is 
to develop its baseline, it is currently lacking in guidance.  
Given the above difficulties, it is perhaps more appropriate to await the United States’ Alemo-
Herron moment—a sudden and unexplained rupture from existing constitutional principles to 
introduce (ideologically charged) deregulatory concepts into employment legislation. What 
are the consequences of this rupture for the EU’s ability to regulate the employment 
relationship? 
 
2. Alemo-Herron’s (de)regulatory impact  
 
What, then, has been the impact of Alemo-Herron on the employment relationship? In the 
narrow context of UK labour law, the decision has led to the revision of TUPE, which now 
explicitly incorporates the ‘static’ approach in the legislation.41 Beyond the immediate 
consequences, what is the potential impact of the CJEU’s approach to contractual autonomy 
for the broader ability of the EU to regulate the employment relationship? 
It is perhaps too early to tell, but from the largely negative reaction to Alemo-Herron from 
commentators, it is possible to ascertain some of the potential consequences of this decision 
from a labour law perspective. Weatherill in particular remarks that on occasion ‘a decision of 
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the Court of Justice (…) is so downright odd that it deserves to be locked into a secure 
container, plunged into the icy waters of a deep lake and forgotten about’.42 The CJEU’s 
judgment is certainly problematic on a number of fronts. In the first instance, the CJEU’s 
reasoning is based on the false assumption that the TUD requires an explicit balancing of 
employer and employee interests.43 Indeed, Lord Hope in the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) 
pointed out that ‘[n]o mention was made in the recitals of any need to protect employers in the 
event of a change in employer as against the rights that were to be safeguarded for the 
protection of employees’.44 Rather, it could be said that the very logic behind the TUD is the 
restriction of contractual autonomy in order to protect employees. It is perhaps therefore 
‘ironic that Werhof and Alemo-Herron render the operation of the transfer of undertakings 
legislation potentially less favourable to the transferring employees than that which the 
common law interpretation exemplified by Whent would produce'.45 This demonstrates that 
the approach adopted in Alemo-Herron is fatally to undermine the very purpose of the 
legislation. This hardly bodes well for the EU’s ability to regulate the employment relationship 
into the future.  
It can, however, be countered that the general trend in recent years has been to refocus 
legislative efforts on the need for ‘flexicurity’ in employment contracts.46 Yet, far from 
constituting a continuation of the already suspect question of reinterpreting protective 
legislation in the light of the financial crisis and the need for flexibility, Alemo-Herron rather 
constitutes a distortion of the TUD’s very purpose and a perversion of the language of the text, 
which after all provides at recital 3 that ‘[i]t is necessary to provide for the protection of 
employees in the event of a change of employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are 
safeguarded’.47 What, then, will be the impact of this distortion on EU employment law more 
generally? 
The answer may, of course, be not very much of an impact at all. We saw in Chapter III that in 
judgments of the CJEU immediately following Alemo-Herron, in cases also involving the 
continuation of the terms of collective agreements, has been careful to avoid restating the 
strong concept of contractual autonomy contained therein. In other cases, article 16 seems to 
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have been recharged once again by tying it explicitly to the freedom of establishment, 
considered in the next section.  
Even if we can navigate the myriad contradictions in the case law, is it still the case that Alemo-
Herron is as bad as some employment lawyers thought it was? Prassl has recently argued that 
it is not—a remarkable assertion from one of the harshest critics of the CJEU’s judgment.48 
He starts by accepting that article 16 will in future be easily engaged (although, as we have 
seen, it was not invoked in the Österreichischer case), given that ‘nearly all of employment 
law can be seen as an interference with employer’s freedom (…) with the conceptual apparatus 
of fundamental rights protection thus providing the basis for challenges to employment 
legislation’.49 Taking a step back, Prassl now views the decision as not requiring ‘the Union to 
recognise business freedom in the face of employment rights’ and in any case ‘constitutional 
protection of economic rights (…) has always seen such freedoms as operating in tandem with 
social rights’.50 Following Everson and Gonçalves, he distinguishes between two aspects of 
contractual autonomy in EU law—autonomy as an overarching constitutional concept and 
autonomy as a substantive individual right. The former is considered highly unlikely to ‘form 
the basis for challenging the role of employment law within the Union’s legal order’ largely 
because employment law is by now an accepted prerequisite to the exploitation of labour as a 
commodity.51  
It is, with respect, suggested that the widespread (although not universal) agreement that a 
regulated labour force is necessary for a functioning market says nothing of the level of 
employee protection which may be more or less restrictive of business freedoms. This goes to 
the existence of employment legislation, not the level of protection it must entail. The potential 
impact of article 16 as a constitutional principle for the employment context should not be so 
readily discounted. In any case, the focus of the present thesis is on freedom of contract as an 
individual fundamental right, which Leczykiewicz has argued may provide a new way for 
private parties to have ‘a more concrete and entrenched mechanism of restricting regulatory 
effects of national and EU law’.52 Again, and surprisingly Prassl rejects this, remarking that 
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‘this position is (…) not tenable in the light of the current state of Union law as set out in the 
Treaties, secondary legislation, and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice’.53  
To explain this about-turn, Prassl looks to the text of the Charter itself which provides at article 
52 for the potential limitation of the rights contained therein. Article 16 itself further provides 
for the limitation of that right in accordance with EU law and national law and practices. For 
Prassl, ‘these multi-pronged qualifications, drawing on provisions of the Union legal order as 
well as the ‘laws and practices’ of the 28 Member States, the formulation of Article 16 CFR 
therefore suggests that it should be of little concern when used as the basis for an individual’s 
challenge against Union measures.’54 As a counter to this, it could be remarked that all of these 
textual pre-requisites existed before the CJEU’s decision in Alemo-Herron and yet were of no 
avail to the employee’s resistance of contractual autonomy in that case. In addition, the same 
arguments could be used to further counter the development of the competing Employment 
Rights found in the Charter.  
The text of the Charter is not the only hurdle to be overcome by litigants seeking to rely on 
their article 16 rights. The CJEU itself has placed a number of barriers in the path of litigants, 
notably the core content test. Under this approach, interference with freedom of contract is 
permissible to the extent that it does not undermine the core content of the right. This might at 
first sight represent a significant obstacle to reliance on article 16. Even if a piece of 
employment legislation engages article 16, it is likely to have been carefully drafted to assess 
competing interests. In its case law on freedom of contract as a general principle, and in its 
early jurisprudence on article 16, the CJEU adopted this deferential approach to the will of the 
legislature. EU legislation was only rarely found to constitute a negation of the core content of 
business freedom. For Prassl, this test ‘is likely to constitute the most important hurdle to the 
success of any action brought to vindicate an individual’s economic freedoms under Article 
16 CFR, especially once it is applied in combination with the Court’s proportionality scrutiny 
against a right’s social function’.55  
Once again, however, it is difficult to square this with the decision in Alemo-Herron. In that 
case, the CJEU found that what had been considered no more than an ordinary application of 
the common law freedom of contract did, in fact, violate the very core of contractual autonomy 
as a fundamental right. Finally, and as examined below, competing fundamental social rights 
might provide a legitimate and potentially powerful counterweight to article 16. As competing 
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fundamental rights considerations are absent from the CJEU’s decision in Alemo-Herron, this 
aspect provides perhaps the most compelling obstacle standing in the way of Alemo-Herron’s 
deregulatory thrust. Had Alemo-Herron involved a clash between two competing fundamental 
rights, one social and one economic, would the outcome have been any different, or has Viking 
and Laval already undermined any such hope?  
Having outlined the hurdles standing in the way of a litigant seeking to rely on article 16, 
Prassl then examines three pieces of EU employment legislation for their compatibility with 
the provision. The three Directives examined, the TUD, the Collective Redundancies Directive 
(CRD) and the Working Time Directive (WTD) were found to trigger the application of article 
16. On the other hand, the provisions of all three were found either to fall squarely within the 
definition of permissible restrictions in article 52(1) of the Charter, did not affect the core 
content of the contractual autonomy principle or were supported by competing fundamental 
social rights contained in the Charter. Therefore, and given the current understanding and 
application of the freedom to conduct a business, ‘it is likely that Alemo-Herron will instead 
be consigned to the bottom of Weatherill’s icy lake’.56 I would argue that this is simply to 
brush aside the CJEU’s judgment in Alemo-Herron, relegating it to the position of an anomaly, 
an outlier and a break with existing case law that those in favour of employee protection might 
prefer. As Prassl concludes, ‘[f]undamental rights are a legitimate review standard in EU law; 
the Court’s peculiar interpretation of Article 16 CFR to justify the abrogation of employee’s 
rights, on the other hand, is not’.57 This may well be true, but the reality is that the CJEU 
adopted this very approach and may do so again. Is it really therefore time to revisit Alemo-
Herron despite its infancy? 
2.1. Reassessing Alemo-Herron 
 
It is worth noting that even Lochner was only viewed with disapproval in the light of the New 
Deal, after which ‘the historical Lochner was transformed into the normative Lochner—that 
is, into this symbol of judges usurping legislative authority by basing decisions on policy 
preferences rather than the law’.58 A similar process has already begun in relation to Viking 
and Laval.  
Drawing on Barnard’s examination of the four phases of academic response to this line of case 
law, Alemo-Herron is still at the first, that is to say ‘the initial reaction: understanding the 
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decisions and framing the debates’.59 We now seem somehow to be jumping to the fourth step 
of ‘responding to subsequent developments and reassessment of the situation’.60 What of steps 
2 and 3, the ‘exploration: deepening and reframing the debate’ and ‘concept and theory 
building’?61 Barnard describes the facts of Viking and Laval as an ‘incendiary cocktail’ but is 
it perhaps the case that Alemo-Herron will go out with a whimper rather than a bang?  
It is by now widely accepted that Viking and Laval may not have had the profound effects on 
EU labour law that they were expected to have.  If we were to focus on academic output alone, 
it could not be doubted that ‘the decisions have been amongst the most high-profile judicial 
developments in EU law during the last decade’.62 When it comes to the concrete impact of 
the decisions on national legal systems, the effects have been more mixed. As Christopher 
Unseld notes in a recent book review of Viking, Laval and Beyond:63  
[i]n every chapter a national rapporteur tries to explain what the consequences (if any!) 
of Viking and Laval in the last seven years were. And according to the authors, the 
results are sobering (…) Most contributors had to admit that neither the national 
legislator nor the national courts had even discussed or cited the cases. The worrisome 
message of this part of the book may therefore be summarized as follows: the national 
legal systems generally did not really react to the supposedly landmark decisions Viking 
and Laval.64  
Academic output relating to Viking and Laval has been noticeably sizeable in the United 
Kingdom which is perhaps understandable considering that the ‘UK’s legal system only 
provides for very limited legal protection of labour – none of it in the form of protection by a 
written constitution – and that British lawyers and judges are better prepared to pay attention 
to case-law’.65 The level of British academic interest in Viking and Laval is certainly 
extraordinary and history is repeating itself with the case of Alemo-Herron.  
The vast majority, and indeed the most critical, of the commentary has been British.66 This is 
not to say that the decision has gone unnoticed in continental Europe. Although much of the 
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literature emphasises the common law peculiarities of the case, it is widely criticised for having 
prioritised economic rights over social rights. The francophone commentary, while accepting 
the decision’s limited impact on continental jurisdictions,67 nonetheless recognises that the 
conflict between freedom of contract and social rights in that case may lead to the national 
protection of collective rights being called into question.68 The commentary recognises the 
negative aspects of the decision, seeing it as representing a worrying interpretation of the 
Charter from an employment protection point of view, given the prioritisation of the 
employer’s economic rights over the social rights of the workers.69 In addition, the unexpected 
and novel use of the Charter to defeat social rights has also been emphasised70 and it has been 
noted that although the CJEU’s reliance on the Charter is nothing new, it is now abundantly 
clear that it may not necessarily represent the source of employee protection that it might have 
been expected to be.71  
Similarly, the German literature emphasises the case’s uniquely English elements, with little 
relevance to the German legislation.72 Again, this is perhaps unsurprising given that under 
German law, collective agreements apply directly without any need for incorporation into the 
contract of employment.73 This being said, as with the French commentary, the novelties of 
the case are recognised. Willemsen and Grau note that the decision is surprising in its granting 
of a particularly high status to contractual autonomy over the collective rights of employees.74 
Interestingly, the same authors point out that the EU-wide relevance of the decision may have 
been greater had the CJEU considered the compatibility with article 16 of article 3 of the 
Directive itself, rather than article 5 of TUPE, given the almost identical wording of the two 
provisions.75 
Perhaps, then, labour law commentators, the present author included, have simply overstated 
the ‘landmark’ nature of Alemo-Herron. Of course, what is meant by a landmark judgment is 
open to various interpretations. It has been noted that there are a number of different ways in 
which the significance of a CJEU judgment can be assessed. First, there is the question of 
whether a topic covered by a judgment is ‘of particular significance and controversy in a 
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specific regulatory domain of EU law, be that due to the development of a novel legal point or 
due to a change in tack in existing approaches’.76 Second, ‘whether the decision has caused 
particular upheaval or controversy in at least some of the Member States’ domestic systems’.77 
Alemo-Herron scores on both counts, albeit to a greater extent in the first category than in the 
second. It is certainly the case that the decision marks a departure from the CJEU’s existing 
approach to the issue of contractual autonomy. In addition, at least as far as English law is 
concerned, the domestic approach to dynamic terms has been uprooted and has already led to 
legislative change. Another vital measure of a judgment’s importance is its value as a source 
of law, that is to say as precedent and ‘understood in this way, an important judgment 
establishes a legal rule or principle that is employed to resolve future issues, thereby 
distinguishing itself from judgments doomed to spend eternity on the ash heap of legal 
history’.78 To what use has Alemo-Herron been put in subsequent cases? 
2.2. Alemo-Herron as ‘precedent’  
 
Alemo-Herron has been mentioned in a number of subsequent judgments of the CJEU or 
opinions of the AGs. Unsurprisingly, many of these references have occurred in the 
employment context. It has already been shown that in Österreichischer, the CJEU relied on 
Alemo-Herron without referring to article 16 of the Charter at all. The AG relied on Alemo-
Herron as precedent79 for the fact that there is a need for a balance between the employer and 
the employee under the TUD, with the case merely being mentioned in a footnote.80 The CJEU 
relied on it in the judgment to the same effect, holding that the need to balance leads to the 
employer having the power to make adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its 
operations.81  
In AGET, AG Wahl held that following Alemo-Herron, even in a case of ‘over implementation’ 
ie going beyond the level of protection stipulated by the Directive, there is a need to weigh up 
the rights of workers and the employer.82 Although the AG was able to distinguish the present 
case from Alemo-Herron in that here, the legislation fell outside the scope of EU law and so 
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there was no need to assess its compatibility with the Charter.83 The CJEU in that case placed 
greater emphasis on the fact that the undertaking must be able to assert its interests effectively 
in a contractual process to which it is party84 and that national legislation cannot undermine 
the essence of contractual autonomy.85 
We have already seen that in Vittoria Graf, AG Bot made extensive use of Alemo-Herron to 
illustrate the principles involved in the transfer of a dynamic clause. In the end, however, he 
did not rely on that judgment, preferring Werhof, which more closely aligned to the facts of 
the case.86 The CJEU was more succinct in its assessment, stipulating that the employer must 
be in a position to make adjustments and that the employer must be able to assert its interests 
in a contractual process.87 
It can be seen that, overall, there are remarkably few cases in the employment context 
mentioning Alemo-Herron and even those are confined to either the collective redundancies 
context or the transfer of dynamic clauses. It can also be noted that, as we saw in Chapter III, 
there are more references to article 16 in the employment context than there are to Alemo-
Herron, perhaps surprising given that the opposite was expected following the decision of the 
CJEU in the above-discussed Austrian case. It is also difficult to escape the conclusion that 
given the contexts in which Alemo-Herron has had an influence, that it is the collective element 
of employment regulation that seems to conflict with article 16. Outside the employment 
context, Alemo-Herron has largely been relied on to define the scope of article 16.88 It has also 
been cited as authority for the fact that the Charter acts as a standard of review of secondary 
legislation even in cases between individuals.89 
Whether Alemo-Herron is indeed destined for the ash heap (or the icy lake) remains to be 
played out. It is abundantly clear that the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
has not been without consequences for contractual autonomy in the employment sphere. The 
CJEU has been remarkably inconsistent in its use of the Charter in the employment context. 
In some cases, the CJEU is using the Charter to ensure the full effectiveness of worker-
protective legislation, while in others it is decrying such legislation for limiting contractual 
autonomy. It is perhaps a symptom of the complexity and political sensitivity of this area that 
the CJEU had yet to adopt a consistent position on the concept of contractual freedom itself. 
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It is not unreasonable to expect this inconsistency to continue into the future. In Alemo-Herron, 
the CJEU’s deliberate decision to opt for the German autonomy model over the English market 
facilitative model was clearly determinative of the outcome of the case.  
Undoubtedly, the approach the CJEU is adopting is to be welcomed from the perspective of 
employers. Labour lawyers on the other hand should be worried indeed. The best-case scenario 
may be that the CJEU will confine this expansive approach to the limited context of the transfer 
of undertakings, while preserving its employee-protective reading of legislation in other 
contexts.  
The worst-case scenario paints a bleak picture for the future of EU regulation in both the 
employment context and beyond. Article 16 can now be seen as having the potential to 
undermine the existing balances that have been achieved in EU employment legislation. It is 
clear from reaction to Alemo-Herron that this deregulatory potential of article 16 was largely 
underestimated and perhaps continues to be so. A positive consequence of the controversy 
surrounding this judgment is that it will once again provoke a debate as to the appropriate 
balance to be achieved between the social and economic aspects of EU integration. This also 
makes the CJEU extremely wary of citing such controversial judgments again, as was clear 
following Viking and Laval. It is to be hoped that when the EU does come to develop its own 
concept of contractual autonomy that it will use the Charter to its fullest extent, embracing not 
just an expansive notion of article 16, but rather infusing its approach, as it has done in the 
past, with the plethora of social provisions at its disposal. A lingering question is just how 
systemic is the prioritisation of business freedom and contractual autonomy in the EU legal 
order?  
 
B. The Systemic Prioritisation of Business Freedom?   
 
Following Alemo-Herron, the CJEU has been inconsistent in its treatment of both that case 
and article 16. In some cases, it refers to both, in others to one but not the other and in others 
still to neither. One of the most controversial judgments handed down in the wake of Alemo-
Herron was that in AGET in which the CJEU linked article 16 to the freedom of establishment 
found in the Treaty. In that case, the CJEU, in fact, treated the two provisions as coterminous. 
Does that also mean that the CJEU’s pre-existing jurisprudence on the freedom of 
establishment now also underlines article 16 of the Charter and if so, what does this mean for 
employment regulation? Beyond that, we must also address the issue of just how embedded in 
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the EU’s constitutional and institutional structure business freedom and contractual autonomy 
more specifically actually are. The next step is to analyse some of the post-Alemo-Herron case 
law on article 16, but outside the employment context, to see what lessons we can draw from 
there. Finally, the potential internal restrictions on contractual autonomy to be found within 
the Charter itself will be explored.  
 
1. Contractual autonomy as a foundational pillar of the EU 
 
Basedow argues that ‘the principle of contractual freedom has, since the nineteenth century, 
developed into a foundational tenet in regard to the regulation of economic activity within all 
European states’, but how true is this of the EU itself?90 Three potential roles for contractual 
autonomy within the EU legal order have been posited. In the first instance, the freedom to 
conduct a business can be seen as having an existential function for the individual European, 
as laid down in Nold. Second, it may be seen as a subjective right guaranteeing the ‘unrestricted 
entrepreneurial spirit of the individual European’. Finally, it can be understood as ‘a principle 
forming a part of a far wider European Union commitment to a specific form of social-
economic organisation’.91 Freedom of contract as an individual fundamental right has already 
been considered in Chapter III. The question to be addressed here is just how widespread is 
the rhetoric that freedom of contract is in fact an organisational principle underpinning 
European integration? 
For Everson and Gonçalves, the willingness of the CJEU to develop the right to an occupation 
and to property and ‘also to extrapolate a freedom of business from them, reveals its broader 
aspiration to institutionalise an internationalised Economic Constitution’.92 The European 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) suggests a less ambitious role for article 16: ‘[t]he essence 
of the freedom to conduct a business is to enable individual aspirations to flourish, and to 
promote entrepreneurship and innovation, which in turn is indispensable for sustainable social 
and economic development’.93 The emphasis here is squarely on the benefits that economic 
freedom grants to the individual, with the broader societal consequences merely stemming 
from this. In any event, if it is to be argued that article 16 is somehow linked to a wider notion 
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of the EU’s economic constitution, it tells us nothing about the form that this constitution 
should take.  
Herresthal suggests that the theory of ordoliberalism underpins the EU’s economic 
constitution, ‘with the fundamental aim of the Union being to extend market competition and 
freedom of contract across the borders of the Member States within the internal market. The 
principle of freedom of contract is one of the most important structural issues in a liberal 
market order’.94 He further comments that the free movement rules require free choice, which 
in turn calls for contractual autonomy.95 Others such as Rutgers disagree, noting instead that 
there is no evidence supporting ordoliberalism as the underpinning of the EU economic order. 
It cannot be concluded from the Treaty that the EU is a ‘private law society nor that the 
fundamental freedoms guarantee freedom of contract’.96 The Treaty freedoms have one aim 
and that is to open up national markets. Obstacles to the creation of that open market must be 
set aside unless justified.97 Once again, this tells us nothing of the extent of contractual 
autonomy in EU law. How does this freedom of contract as an organisational principle 
expressed via the conduit of the Treaty feed back into the individual right to business freedom 
and what are the consequences for employment regulation?  
1.1. Making the link between article 16 and the Treaty freedoms  
 
If we look again at the judgment of the CJEU in AGET it will be recalled that the CJEU found 
that the Greek legislation requiring prior authorisation for collective redundancies constituted 
‘a significant interference in certain freedoms which economic operators generally enjoy’.98 
Here, that right was to effect collective redundancies which was ‘a fundamental decision in 
the life of an undertaking’.99 The CJEU, adopting a standard freedom of establishment 
approach, found that this legislation constituted a restriction on article 49 TFEU in that it was 
likely ‘to render access to the Greek market less attractive and, following access to that market, 
to reduce considerably, or even eliminate, the ability of economic operators from other 
Member States who have chosen to set up in a new market to adjust subsequently’.100  
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This approach is particularly interesting in that it reflects the language of Alemo-Herron, where 
the CJEU found that the dynamic approach excessively interfered with the employer’s room 
for manoeuvre to make adjustments. It can also be seen that in both cases, the CJEU is not 
susceptible to the argument that the employers entered the market or accepted the transfer 
knowing about the pre-existing restrictions on their contractual autonomy (dynamic clause and 
requirement of approval for collective redundancies). The AG was more explicit in making a 
direct connection between article 16 and the Treaty, finding that ‘the restriction on the freedom 
of establishment (…) also (…) amounts to a restriction on the exercise of freedom to conduct 
a business’.101  
The freedom of establishment is found in article 49 TFEU, which provides that ‘restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State shall be prohibited (…) Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take 
up and pursue activities as self-employed persons’. This freedom enables persons to set up a 
primary or secondary establishment in another Member State. Although the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality forms the core of this freedom, in more recent 
years, the CJEU has moved towards a market access or restrictions approach, which more 
closely aligns to the concept of business freedom found in article 16 of the Charter. 
In Gebhard, the CJEU held that ‘national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms’ is very broad, and extends the freedom beyond directly or 
indirectly discriminatory measures’.102 Under this ‘restrictions’ approach, the CJEU has held 
that a broad range of state measures are capable of infringing access to the market of another 
Member State. Just like article 16, then, article 49 is easily engaged. However, the free 
movement provisions are also subject to a number of derogations and justifications. It has long 
been held and was reaffirmed in AGET that derogations based on economic purposes will not 
be accepted. It is, in fact, in the context of derogations that the connection between article 16 
and article 49 is most clearly felt in the AGET judgment.  
Making the link between traditional Treaty derogations and article 16, the CJEU noted that 
any justification for restricting freedom of establishment must also comply with the Charter. 
The first thing to note is that any derogation from the fundamental Treaty freedoms must, by 
definition, be interpreted restrictively. This would appear to put social considerations on the 
back foot from the very outset. Having said that, the CJEU has often been open to arguments 
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based on the protection of workers, even developing a specific worker protection derogation 
from the Treaty freedoms. Barnard has sought to draw parallels between the worker protection 
derogation/justification and that applied to consumers. She notes that some have argued that 
the CJEU should in fact interpret the freedoms restrictively so that consumers (workers) are 
granted a higher level of protection.103 This paternalistic approach would, however, advance 
significantly into the contractual autonomy of market operators leading to less competition and 
a reduction in the welfare of consumers (workers). If the CJEU were to prioritise worker 
protection, it would be accepting that the state’s paternalistic interests take precedence over 
the single market. If the reverse were true, the CJEU would be prioritising the market and 
thereby the welfare of workers.104  
On a quantitative reading of the case law, she notes that the CJEU does indeed prioritise the 
movement of workers. If read from a qualitative perspective, however, a more nuanced picture 
emerges. Where there is a genuine concern for the protection of workers at national level, ‘the 
Court will uphold the worker protection justification or may do so in the future if the rules are 
modified in some way’.105  The CJEU has long recognised worker protection as a legitimate 
derogation allowing Member States to justify national laws providing substantive protection 
to the weaker party so long as the derogation respected the limits of EU law and did not render 
the economic freedom illusory.106 Generally speaking, the CJEU is reluctant to allow Member 
States to invoke protective arguments but a distinction is emerging between those cases that 
involve traditional labour law disputes between workers and employers seeking to rely on 
economic freedoms and those disputes involving posted workers.107 
In the cases which have dealt with worker protection in the goods context, the CJEU has in 
fact favoured worker protection over worker welfare. For example, we have already looked at 
Oebel in which the CJEU found that restrictions on night working were compatible with article 
34 TFEU. By contrast, in the context of the other freedoms, the CJEU has been more hesitant, 
finding that the worker protection justification is not made out. Thus, the case law on worker 
protection is somewhat ambiguous from an employee protection point of view. In some cases, 
the CJEU has shown itself to be very sympathetic to arguments based on worker protection. 
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In others, the Member State simply fails to make its case. What this does show is that the link 
between article 16 and article 49 need not be a disaster from a labour law perspective.  
Leczykiewicz goes further, suggesting that ‘EU free movement law itself has a social 
dimension, which should be taken into account when “social rights” are being invoked against 
internal market freedoms’.108 For her, the free movement provisions, guaranteeing as they do, 
the right of workers to benefit from employment opportunities anywhere in the Union, 
represent a social right. This argument seems to somewhat conflate worker welfare and worker 
protection and ignores that fact that any social dimension to the freedom of movement will of 
necessity be subject (if not subordinate) to the economic rationale inherent in the Treaty 
provisions. Any such economic rationale does not, however, lead to the conclusion that free 
movement law somehow embodies a principle of contractual autonomy. On the other hand, it 
is true that ‘debates about the notion of a restriction on freedom will have essentially the same 
form within discussion of freedom of movement and freedom of contract’.109 It may be that 
debates surrounding the true purpose of the economic freedoms may now arise in the context 
of article 16. These debates arose in particular in the context of the emerging market access 
approach to the Treaty freedoms.  
In relation to article 34 TFEU on the free movement of goods, the question was essentially 
how far that provision reached into the sphere of Member State regulatory autonomy. In 
Hünermund, AG Tesauro offered two alternative rationales underpinning article 34.110 On the 
one hand, the provision may be intended to liberalise inter-state trade, in which case national 
measures that do not hinder trade are not caught. On the other, it may be to encourage the 
unhindered pursuit of commerce in the individual Member State in which case article 34 
should apply.  
For Davies, the freedom of movement is not to be conceived as protecting autonomy as such. 
Rather, it is a freedom to choose from what the internal market has to offer, but not to choose 
what is offered.111 Freeland and Prassl set out three models to govern the relationship between 
EU internal market law and domestic employment law. The first is the ‘exclusion type’, 
whereby EU economic law is excluded from the employment relationship. The second model 
is the ‘reconciliation type’ under which employment law and market law work in tandem. The 
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third and final model is the ‘supersession type’ by which EU internal market law overrides or 
supersedes labour law’s role in regulating the employment relationship.112 The previous case 
law of the CJEU has shown much greater sensitivity to the need to govern the relationship 
between economic and social considerations. In cases such as Schmidberger,113 the CJEU has 
demonstrated that where the case is more removed from commercial considerations (in that 
case, the right to protest), ‘the more generous the Court is as regards the available scope for 
justification and also the breadth of the margin of appreciation’.114 Which approach is borne 
out by the case law on article 16 outside the employment context since the decision in Alemo-
Herron?  
1.2. The treatment of article 16 in the commercial context 
 
It is useful to contrast the CJEU’s use of article 16 in the employment context with its impact 
on the commercial sphere, given that ostensibly social considerations may be absent there. In 
Starnet, for example, the question was whether the internal market freedoms or article 16 
precluded Italian legislation governing the betting and gaming sector.115 AG Wahl considered 
that the licensing requirements were not incompatible with the Treaty and therefore no separate 
examination of article 16 was necessary. As the AG put it, ‘an examination of the restrictive 
effects of national legislation on the provision of gaming services from the point of view of, 
for example, Article 56 TFEU covers also possible limitations on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms provided in Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter’.116  
Another case in the commercial context is Lidl.117 This case concerned the validity of EU rules 
establishing labelling obligations for fresh poultrymeat. The legislation required that at retail 
level, fresh poultry must bear an indication of the total price and price per weight unit either 
on the packaging or on the labelling. The question was whether these rules were compatible 
with articles 15 and 16 of the Charter. AG Bobek decided to consider article 16 only. He started 
by noting that both article 15 and 16 are very closely connected but that ‘the Court used 
different formulations to refer, in their quality as general principles (…) to the freedom to 
freely choose and practice one’s trade or profession; the freedom to pursue an occupation; the 
right to carry on one’s trade or profession; or the freedom to pursue an economic activity’.118 
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We have also already noted in Chapter III that the CJEU has acknowledged that the freedom 
to conduct a business coincides with the freedom to pursue an occupation.119  
Articles 15–17 of the Charter have often been invoked together, with AG Bobek noting that 
they can all be said to protect the economic interests of the individual.120 In Lidl, the rules 
governing labelling fell squarely within article 16 given that it relates to the conduct of an 
already chosen business. The labelling requirements did not affect the essence of the freedom. 
The CJEU, adopting a slightly different approach, found that the measure was liable to hinder 
freedom to conduct a business since it ‘constrains its addressee in a manner which restricts the 
free use of the resources at his disposal because it obliges him to take measures which may 
represent a significant cost for him and have a considerable impact on the organisation of his 
activities’.121 Nevertheless, the measure was a justified public intervention and was 
proportionate. 
In a line of cases concerning the regulation of tobacco products, the treatment of article 16 has 
been somewhat fleeting. In Pillbox, AG Kokott found that advertising restrictions 
‘undoubtedly’ results in an interference with freedom to conduct a business but that this 
freedom is subject to a broad range of interventions.122 In Phillip Morris, AG Kokott also held 
that freedom to conduct a business can be subject to a broad range of public interventions. She 
contrasted this was other fundamental rights, notably the freedom of expression, holding that 
‘in view of the foundational role played by that fundamental right in a democratic society, as 
it enjoys with regard to interferences with the freedom to conduct a business, for example’.123 
It is certainly difficult to envisage a continental internal market without some level of 
commitment to contractual and business freedom. The link between article 16 and the Treaty 
freedoms should not, therefore, be surprising. The FRA has suggested that article 16 merely 
‘adds’ to the Treaty freedoms by ‘providing for an “enhanced” protection for business to 
conduct their affairs’, enhanced in the sense of going beyond the need for a cross border 
scenario.124 It is tracing the outer limits of this freedom that is difficult and controversial. It is 
for this very reason that the EU has saw fit to embark on a project (however tentative) of 
                                                          
119 Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland 
120 AG opinion in Case C-134/15 Lidl para 21.  
121 Case C-134/15 Lidl para 29.  
122 AG opinion in Case C-477/14 Pillbox para 189.  
123 AG opinion in Case C-547/14 Philip Morris 239; AG Kokott in Case C-358/14 Poland. 
124 European Agency for Fundamental Rights (n 93) 12.  
161 
 
harmonising private law at Union level. This is largely an admission of the fact that the scope 
of contractual freedom cannot be ascertained by looking to the four freedoms alone.125  
1.3. Harmonising contractual autonomy and its restrictions  
 
The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) for a harmonised EU contract law describes 
contractual autonomy as no more than a ‘starting point’.126 Article II-1:102(1) provides that 
‘[p]arties are free to make a contract or other juridical act and to determine its contents, subject 
to any applicable mandatory rules’. Similarly, Article 0:101 of the Principes Directeurs 
provides that ‘[e]ach party is free to contract and to choose who will be the other party. The 
parties are free to determine the content of the contract and the rules of form which apply to 
it. Freedom of contract operates subject to compliance with mandatory rules’.  
It can be seen here that, at an EU level, the principle of contractual autonomy embraces the 
freedom to enter a contract, the freedom to select a contractual partner and the freedom of 
classification and content.127 This rather innocuous make up of contractual autonomy is far 
removed from the expansive notion contained in cases such as Alemo-Herron. In addition, the 
DCFR itself recognises a number of permissible limitations on the contractual autonomy 
principle. First, third party contracting is not permitted. Second, contracts which are harmful 
to third persons and society in general may be invalidated, for example, if it is illegal or 
contrary to public policy. Third, it may not be just to enforce a contract when one of the parties 
is in a comparatively weak bargaining position or where consent is defective, for example, in 
cases of mistake or fraud. This ensures that ‘contractual freedom is genuine freedom’.128 
Fourth, the freedom to choose a contractual partner is curtailed where this freedom would lead 
to discrimination. Fifth, parties will not always be permitted to withhold information at the 
pre-contractual stage. Sixth, there is a need to ensure party information as to the terms of the 
contract, for example where the terms are not individually negotiated or accessible to one party. 
Finally, and most importantly in the employment context, the DCFR recognises that ‘take it or 
leave it contracts’ are increasingly prevalent and that the law must therefore address inequality 
of bargaining power.129 Having said all this, the DCFR concludes that ‘the interference with 
freedom of contract should be the minimum that will solve the problem (…) it must be asked 
whether it is necessary to make a particular term mandatory or whether a flexible test such as 
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“fairness” would suffice to protect the weaker party’.130 Despite this, the emphasis in the 
DCRF, the case law and the literature has been on the restrictive nature of freedom of contract 
in EU law rather than its expansive or pervasive character.  
Marella has sought to identity some patterns in the restriction of autonomy at EU level. She 
sets out three broad models, the paternalistic, the social and the perfectionist models. Under 
the paternalistic approach, the state is entitled to interfere with contractual freedom as long as 
this intervention is authorised by the law and is subject to strict limits.131 This model is 
reflected in the case law of the CJEU on freedom of contract as a general principle. The idea 
underlying this model is that individuals are unable, in certain circumstances, to identify their 
own preferences. The state therefore intervenes to give effect to the true desires of the parties. 
The second model is the social model. This model seeks to control the formation of contracts 
where weak parties face strong parties. Under this approach, contractual autonomy is seen as 
a source of social injustice.132 Therefore, parties are considered unable to identify their own 
preferences. Finally, the perfectionist model is a more stringent form of paternalism, which 
views the party as having the wrong set of preferences.133 This trichotomy is evidently 
incomplete and ignores other reasons for impeding contractual freedom such as the removal 
of market distortions and externalities (such as those dealt with in the DCFR) or indeed to 
encourage respect for fundamental rights. The absence of protection for autonomy in EU 
primary law has in fact been lamented by a number of private law scholars. The limited and 
unsubstantiated nature of contractual autonomy in Union law has led commentators such as 
Herresthal to call for harmonisation.134 But, as Marella has noted, any attempt at harmonising 
contract law in Europe would likely adopt both a common core and minimum common factor 
approach, leading to reductionism and thereby ‘an extremely narrow notion of freedom of 
contract’.135  
1.4. The dual vision of contractual autonomy  
 
A recurring theme in the literature on business freedom is the notion that contractual autonomy 
has a dual purpose or that a dual vision underlines the freedom. It has already been noted that 
article 16 may be seen as having either an individual rights characteristic or a broader role in 
building an economic constitution. Similarly, Whittaker has pointed to the fact that freedom of 
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contract can be viewed either as an overarching economic principle underpinning all markets, 
the ‘market vision’ or it can be seen as a moral principle, based on the will of individuals, the 
“voluntarist” vision of contractual autonomy.136 Both visions can be found in EU law with the 
fundamental freedoms representing the market vision but with EU legislation—notably in the 
consumer context—being concerned with the consent of the contracting parties.137 In most 
instances, the outcome in an individual case will not depend on which of these visions prevails. 
Sometimes, however, focusing on the quality of consent or the will of the individual may lead 
to private transactions being impeded rather than facilitated.138  
If we look again at Alemo-Herron, it could be argued that the transferee employer had 
consented to the transfer and under the existing terms and conditions which should have 
included the dynamic clause. For the CJEU, however, it seems that this consent was defective 
because the new employer was not capable of taking part in the negotiating process. Here, it 
appears that the ‘will’ and ‘market forming’ visions of contractual autonomy are indeed 
coinciding. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the CJEU was concerned not to impede 
or discourage the acquiring of undertakings—particularly in the context of privatisation. This 
is perhaps unsurprising when we consider that the very rationale for the adoption of the TUD 
was to facilitate mergers and acquisitions—although as already mentioned, this should not be 
equated with the ‘protection’ of the employer.  
This confused nature of contractual autonomy at an EU level should come as no surprise given 
that business freedom is not typically found in international rights instruments. When it came 
to developing business freedom in Union law, the CJEU therefore had to turn to the medley of 
constitutional traditions of the Member States. First, it should be noted that only one Member 
State, Cyprus grants a specific constitutional protection to the notion of contractual autonomy 
as opposed to a wider commitment to business freedom.139 Looking beyond constitutional 
protection, different Member States adopt different approaches to conceiving the protection of 
contractual autonomy. As Micklitz puts it, [w]hat if this common assumption is no more than 
a rather superficial “gentleman’s agreement”, which allows us to communicate whilst 
maintaining our own preconceptions’.140  
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English contract law has been described as being underpinned by contractual autonomy, with 
the law being used as a tool to promote free commerce. Under this model, freedom of contract 
‘means first and foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic 
transactions without any risk of statutory interferences’.141 Such interference is only permitted 
to the extent that it solves concrete concerns. English law may therefore be described as liberal 
and pragmatic.142 By way of contrast, French law sees contractual autonomy as not merely a 
tool to promote individual economic benefit. Rather, ‘the commitment to a contract is the 
product of a reasonable decision (…) a higher reason that is deeper than the individual 
transaction’.143 This approach, which can be described as rational and political, derives from 
the French revolution, during which contractual autonomy and liberty more generally were 
seen as tools for the political empowerment of the bourgeoisie. German law is similar to 
English law (liberal) and to French law (political), but adopts a much stronger commitment to 
the social (paternalistic).144 For Micklitz, it is not possible to reduce the EU approach to 
contractual autonomy as a sum of the component Member State approaches. Rather, 
contractual autonomy in EU law is ‘bound to trans-border business and European economic 
integration’ (functional and instrumental).145 This is a similar approach to that adopted during 
the development of the general principles of EU law discussed above.  
As such, there lies an inherent contradiction in the protection of business freedom at Union 
level. EU law is simultaneously protective of contractual autonomy (enables and facilitates 
cross-border transactions) while restricting that very autonomy through the enactment of 
protective legislation. This apparent contradiction falls away if we abandon a formalistic view 
of contractual autonomy. A more substantive view envisages intervention to ensure that the 
weaker party to the contract may enjoy real contractual autonomy in substance.146 To achieve 
this, it will be necessary to end the conception of legislative intervention as an ‘exception’ or 
limitation to contractual autonomy.147 Yet, this is precisely the approach adopted by the CJEU 
in cases such as Alemo-Herron. Business freedom is conceived as the ‘right’ to be protected, 
with any regulation of that right requiring justification. This tension has emerged time and 
again, appearing most recently in the headscarf cases, discussed above, where AG Sharpston 
adopts a more traditional human rights approach, prioritising religious freedom over 
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competing economic interests whereas AG Kokott takes the opposite approach which aligns 
more closely with Alemo-Herron. Having looked at the nature of contractual autonomy in EU 
law, is there any Employment Right contained in the Charter that is commensurate with article 
16 and that may act as a counterweight?  
 
2. Internal counterweights to contractual autonomy as a fundamental right  
 
It was noted in Chapter III that the CJEU has shown a preference for relying on other Charter 
provisions in order to counter-balance economic rights. It has also been determined, however, 
that the Employment Rights found in the Solidarity Title have been particularly weak when 
compared with article 16. Faced with a clash between contractual autonomy and a competing 
Employment Right, it is not, at present, difficult to discern which would prevail. In which case, 
where might we turn to search for a counterweight to article 16 that is internal to the Charter 
itself? One potential avenue meriting further exploration is article 15 which governs the right 
to work. Article 15(1), in particular, provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to engage in work 
and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation’. The language used here is much more 
robust and rights-oriented than that found in either article 16 or many of the Charter’s 
Employment Rights. It is for this reason and also for its inclusion in the Freedom Title (the 
same Title as article 16), that the right to work might be thought to be particularly apt to 
counterbalance business freedom as a fundamental right.  
However, the first major difficulty standing in the way of reliance on article 15 is that there is 
no consensus on the nature of the right to work. For some authors such as Collins, the right to 
work is just that – a right and one which is destined to provide for human self-realisation (as 
opposed to the self-respect suggested by other commentators).148 For Bogg, on the other hand, 
the right to work is best conceptualised not as a right at all, but rather as a series of duties 
placed on the state (or employers) which may in fact run in parallel with the right to work.149 
This particular view is also apt for confusion with the idea of a correlative duty to work.150  
Beyond the nature of the right, there is also scant agreement as to the precise content that this 
right should be composed of. Is it aimed at achieving full employment and should, therefore, 
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guarantee the right of any individual to a job? Is it about a right not only to work, but to decent 
work? Is it about something broader still, being ‘more than freedom from coercion or freedom 
of occupation [entailing] a more positive dimension—the right to have work (…) and rights in 
work or at work’.151 Hepple further points to three possible rights falling within the sphere of 
the right to work, namely the right to be engaged; the right to be given work once engaged and 
the right to be reinstated after unjustified dismissal.152 Article 15, if we are to go by the 
Explanations, is quite firmly rooted in the freedom to choose an economic activity found in 
article 1(2) of the ESC.  
On any of these accounts, it is not at all apparent what relevance article 15 might have in the 
precise context of Alemo-Herron. The CJEU has, after all, made it clear that the intention of 
the TUD was not to create any new EU right such as the right to continued employment in a 
particular job. Where article 15 may become relevant is if we can somehow conceptualise it 
as a freedom of contract for employees which may then be used to counterbalance article 16. 
First, we need to reconsider the relationship between articles 15 and 16.  
2.1. Relationship between articles 15 and 16 of the Charter 
 
Both the freedom to conduct a business and the right to work/freedom to choose an occupation 
have been intertwined since the earliest human rights case law of the CJEU, with the right to 
choose and practice freely a profession being guaranteed in the context of business freedom. 
In those cases, not only where the two rights recognised, but they were also subject to the same 
conditionality and limitations. However, as Ashiagbor points out, in those early cases, the right 
now found in article 15 was, in fact, used to challenge EU legislative action ie it was used in 
much the same way as article 16 is being used today.153 
The conceptualisation of the right to work as a freedom of contract for employees is not a new 
idea. In fact, the right to work has been said to be ‘synonymous with unfettered freedom of 
contract, namely freedom from the sort of state interference which empowers trade unions to 
regulate terms and conditions jointly with employers’.154 In other words, the right to work has 
been conceived as the freedom for individual employees to continue in work despite strike 
action ie it is a tool for the individual to resist the action of ‘powerful’ unions.155 In this respect, 
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a potential link between article 15 and the fundamental Treaty freedoms can be discerned (a 
link also made above between article 16 and the Treaty). It will be recalled that Leczykiewicz 
thought that cases such as Viking and Laval, far from undermining social rights, actually 
embrace them to the extent that workers have a social interest in benefiting from their free 
movement rights. In order to achieve this, the powerful force of strong trade unions must be 
resisted. It would not be a stretch to say that article 15 and the right to work could become a 
tool for workers to resist the power of entities other than trade unions, for example the state or 
employers with particularly strong bargaining power.  
The main obstacle lying in the way of such an approach is the disparate nature of the right to 
work. First, it is drafted in vague terms but as we have seen, this has been no obstacle to 
reliance on article 16. Second, and more problematic, is the fact that the right is a composite 
right made up of ‘multiple layers and more particular rights that are intertwined and 
inseparable’.156 For Mundlak, the freedom or liberty element of the right to work is in fact the 
‘least objectionable dimension of the right’ and ‘if a constitution stops here in defining the 
dimensions of this right, it is actually rejecting recognition of the right to work in its broader 
sense’.157  
A further problem is that the right to work can be seen as little more than an embodiment of or 
perhaps more accurately, an underpinning for, other social rights in the Charter such as the 
right to fair and just working conditions or the right not to be unfairly dismissed. As Collins 
tells us, if those rights ‘could all be derived from other, more fundamental rights, there would 
be little need to emphasise a further, independent right to work’.158 Undoubtedly most social 
rights can in some way be connected with the right to work. The problem arises, however, if 
we are to make the leap from this connection to saying that the right to work is the normative 
underpinning of these social rights.159 If this were indeed the case, the weakness of the 
Employment Rights in the Charter would not bode well for the ability of article 15 to act as a 
counterweight to article 16.  
It can be seen, then, that not only is the nature of the right to work vague and imprecise, but 
that its relationship to article 16 is also far from clear. Is article 15 in some way synonymous 
with article 16 in that it provides workers with a right to autonomy and the freedom to choose 
an occupation or is it more appropriately viewed as opposing the employer’s freedom to 
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conduct a business? As Collins puts it, ‘it is claimed that EU law confers a right on a worker 
that is inspired by Article 15, an employer can almost certainly match that claim by the 
competing argument that enforcement of the proposed interpretation of EU law would 
disproportionately interfere with the employer’s freedom to conduct a business’.160  
If we turn again to the case law of the CJEU, we can see that, to date, it is the former 
interpretation that has come to the fore. In other words, article 15 and article 16 are treated as 
coterminous. AG Bobek has been particularly extensive in his analysis of the relationship 
between the provisions. For example, in Fries, the applicant pilot was dismissed when he 
reached the age of 65 as required by EU law.161 This was despite the fact that his existing 
contract would not expire for a further two months as the statutory pension age was reached at 
65 years and two months. For the AG, article 15 ‘enhances personal autonomy and self-
realisation, with human dignity serving as its foundation’.162 Due to the restrictive scope of the 
age limitation, it could not be said to adversely affect the very essence of the right to pursue a 
freely chosen occupation. Rather ‘[i]t affects the possibility to pursue a professional career in 
a certain sector with regard to a particular activity, at a limited stage: it operates in the later 
years of a professional career, which are close to, even if they do not coincide with, 
retirement’.163  
The Lidl case has already been dealt with in some detail.164 It will be recalled that the applicant 
alleged that poultry labelling requirements infringed both article 15 and article 16. For AG 
Bobek, both rights are connected, as is made clear by the CJEU’s case law on the general 
principles. Nevertheless, ‘the fact that the Charter today contains two separate provisions 
suggests that there ought to be some differentiation’.165 The AG starts by looking at the 
wording of the two provisions and highlights that article 16, unlike article 15 is subject to 
Union law, national laws and practices. This meant that ‘Article 16 allows for a broader margin 
of appreciation when it comes to regulation that might interfere with the freedom to conduct a 
business’.166 From the case law on the general principle it was also clear that the freedom to 
conduct a business may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public 
authorities which may limit the exercise of economic activity in the public interest.167 This led 
the AG to conclude that there is no doubt that in terms of permissible limitations, ‘Article 16 
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(…) allows for a greater degree of State intervention than Article 15’.168 This statement seems 
to overlook the fact that the freedom to choose an occupation was equally restricted in the case 
law of the CJEU on the general principle.  
Turning to the precise nature of the relationship between the two rights, the AG finds that both 
protect individual autonomy in the closely related professional and business fields and that 
both are linked to the performance of economic activity.169 The differences are that article 15 
is focused on the element of choice and personal autonomy, with the link to work emphasising 
a more relevant impact on natural persons and employment relationships.170 Article 16 on the 
other hand focuses on entrepreneurial activity such as the freedom of contract.171  
There may be overlap between the two, but the relationship can be summarised as follows 
‘Article 15(1) (…) is more likely to be applicable if the situation at hand concerns natural 
persons and issues such as access to work and choice of occupation. Conversely, Article 16 
(…) is more relevant for legal persons and the way an already established business, or an 
already chosen occupation, is being carried out and regulated’.172 The question is what 
precisely is the effect of this interrelationship for the ability of article 15 to act as a 
counterweight to the freedom to conduct a business? King, for example, asks whether Lochner 
might have been decided similarly on grounds of the employee’s right to work.173 It is certainly 
true that in Lochner, the Chief Justice emphasised that both the employer and the employee 
had the freedom to buy and sell labour. Would article 15 have made any difference had it been 
raised in Alemo-Herron?  
2.2. Raising article 15 in Alemo-Herron  
 
The first major hurdle to relying on article 15 is that as we can see, the CJEU has treated that 
provision and article 16 as essentially one and the same. If it were to be raised, however, which 
of its myriad component parts could have made a difference? If we start with the right to work 
as a right to continued employment, it could be argued that the very purpose of the TUD is to 
ensure that the entire workforce is transferred from the old employer to the new, with minimal 
exceptions, including the possibility of dismissals for economic, technical or organisational 
reasons (ETOR). But this is achieved via the Directive itself, with no reference to the right to 
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work. As Wynn-Evans notes, ‘[t]he mischiefs which TUPE seeks to address are therefore that 
at common law, as a consequence of the transfer of a business (…) an affected employee: is 
left with no entitlement to continue employment in the business in which he or she was 
employed (…) has no right to be employed on his or her previous contractual terms (…) has 
no entitlement to any information (…) or consultation’.174 Article 3 TUD addresses these 
concerns with one commentator describing the TUD/TUPE as forming ‘a quasi labour 
aristocracy as far as the protection of the courts is concerned’.175  
The rights granted by the TUD/TUPE do appear extensive on their face. Unless one of the 
exceptions applies, the transfer is liable to the employees ‘for everything the transferor has 
done’ ‘under or in relation to the relevant contract’ for example failure to pay wages or even 
discriminatory conduct.176 It is not difficult to tie these elements into the right to work in the 
sense that, were the employee treated less favourably upon the transfer, he would be less likely 
to consent to it. In any event, however, the ennobled status granted by the TUD is limited in 
time. Following Alemo-Herron, it is clear that collectively agreed terms only transfer if they 
were in force at the time of the transfer. Although it must be admitted that the TUD itself 
foresees the possibility of restricting the applicability of collectively agreed terms to one-year 
post transfer. What difference would it make to classify transfer rights as fundamental human 
rights in the guise of article 15?  
First, it cannot be doubted that granting fundamental rights status to a particular provision must 
lend increased normative weight to that provision. If it can be used to assess the validity of 
ordinary employment legislation, then it is by definition elevated above that legislation despite 
the limitations exposed in Chapter II. It is suggested that the limitation of TUPE rights in time 
might be a prime candidate for obsolescence in the face of a competing fundamental right. 
If we look back to the approach adopted by the CJEU in Test-Achats we can see that in that 
case, limitation clauses contained in the legislation were no match for the equality principle 
expressed as a fundamental human right in the Charter. In Alemo-Herron, it might have been 
argued that the term ‘on the date of the transfer’ should have been more purposively construed 
to read ‘in connection with the transfer’ or, as happened in Test-Achats, could have been 
overridden entirely given its incompatibility with the Charter. The same is true of the possible 
restriction of collectively agreed terms to one-year post-transfer. So, this is the right to work 
in the sense of continued employment.  
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A second potential way to rely on article 15 is to tie it to the notion of fair and just conditions 
of employment or ‘decent work’, perhaps in conjunction with article 31(2) of the Charter. 
Could it have been argued in Alemo-Herron that being paid less than their public sector 
counterparts, despite having previously been treated the same is in some way degrading?  
Perhaps the most promising avenue is, in fact, the aspect of article 15 that has been most 
prevalent in the case law on the general principle, ie the freedom to choose an occupation. It 
was seen above that the CJEU often treats this aspect of the right to work as essentially 
synonymous with article 16, thereby ignoring the former. In Lochner, the majority viewed the 
legislation as interfering with the worker’s right to sell his labour and this was essentially the 
view of the English courts prior to Alemo-Herron although not quite couched in the language 
of ‘selling’. 
In Whent, for example, Judge Hicks held that ‘there is simply no reason why parties should 
not, if they choose, agree that matters such as remuneration be fixed by processes in which 
they do not themselves participate. The tribunal (…) accepts that that is true of some employers 
who are not local authorities. It must, on the agreed facts set out near the beginning of this 
judgment, equally be true of non-union employees’.177 In other words, both parties, exercising 
their freedom of contract agreed that remuneration would be set externally. In denying the 
rights of the employees who in good faith agreed to be so bound, the CJEU in Alemo-Herron 
was interfering with their freedom of contract and thereby their right to work viewed as an 
expression of autonomy or freedom. In this respect, it can be seen that the English dynamic 
approach is more respectful of party autonomy as a whole than that adopted by the CJEU in 
Alemo-Herron. Nevertheless, this may not be enough. It is certainly difficult to see how article 
15 in isolation might be an effective counterweight to article 16 as currently constituted. In 
addition, confining the right to work in article 15 to merely a right to pursue an occupation is 
to miss the core of the right.178  
An alternative approach might be to rely on article 15 in conjunction with another Charter 
provision. Article 31(2) has already been mentioned, but other Charter provisions such as 
article 30 on the right not to be unfairly dismissed might equally have a bearing on the outcome 
of cases such as Alemo-Herron. There are also dangers involved in meeting article 16 on its 
own terms, accepting that autonomy is an overriding principle to be valued in the employment 
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context, with the only question being whether it is the autonomy of the employer or the worker 
that prevails on the day.  
 
2.3. Lessons from the right to property  
 
In any discussion of the influence of the Charter on the employment relation, it is useful to 
take a step back to consider the Charter’s role in the wider framework of EU law. Outside of 
the employment context, article 17 on the right to property, which may also be linked to article 
16 has had a growing influence in EU law. In Ledra, the claimants sought compensation 
following the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) reached with Cyprus during the 
financial crisis, the terms of which led to a reduction in the value of certain bank deposits.179 
One of the main arguments put forward was that the bail-in constituted a breach of the right to 
property found in article 17. The CJEU noted that the right to property is not absolute, but may 
be subject to restrictions in the general interest, of which the stability of the banking system 
was a clear example.180 In another case, Florescu, the CJEU had to determine whether the 
MoU with Romania was subject to review in light of the Charter.181 Again, the CJEU found 
that article 17 does not preclude legislation making changes to the calculation of pension rate 
for public sector workers. Both cases are illustrative of how cases involving article 16 should 
develop in the future. The right is found to exist but it is subject to legitimate restrictions in 
the public interest. The proportionality doctrine is then applied (in a light touch manner) to 
determine the permissible extent of that interference. The contrast between these cases and 
those on article 16, which appears to act as a trump card is striking.  
Given the above difficulties in assessing the relationship between various of the Charter’s 
economic provisions, perhaps it is time to look beyond the Charter to new methods of 
regulating the employment relationship that can avoid the reach of article 16 in the first place. 
One such technique can be found in nudge theory.  
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C. Or Much Ado about Nudging?  
 
Having looked at some of the broader implications of granting fundamental rights status to 
contractual autonomy, is there any way in which the reach of article 16 can be curtailed or 
even avoided through the use of novel regulatory techniques? This section explores one such 
alternative to traditional command and control regulation, namely Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge 
theory and its underexplored use in the employment context. There are, of course, other forms 
of alternative regulation, notably the Open Method of Co-ordination. I have decided to focus 
on nudge theory due to its explicit connection to autonomy principles. In other words, it is 
perhaps the form of regulation that is most likely to comply with article 16. The UK 
Government’s Behavioural Insights Team (Nudge Unit) has also already committed itself to a 
behavioural analysis of the law in order to explore cheaper and more effective ways of 
influencing behaviour.182 So far, the employment context has been off their radar. This must 
surely change post-Brexit, when swathes of existing UK employment legislation may be 
revised if not replaced. It is also far from assured that the EU will continue to regulate the 
employment relationship in the same manner it has done until now. Not only has the Union 
committed itself to securing greater flexibility in the employment relationship, but it is also 
seeking to ensure first ‘better’ and then ‘smarter’ regulation.183  
In order to apply nudge theory to employment law, it would be necessary to determine whether 
that legislation (or part of it) is indeed governing an aspect of human ‘behaviour’. Such an 
endeavour is beyond the scope of this thesis. For now, we can be satisfied that a behavioural 
element exists where the purpose of the legislation is to change human behaviour or where 
behavioural responses might hinder the purpose of legislation.184 The question to be addressed 
here is whether alternatives to command and control regulation, such as nudging techniques 
are really capable of escaping the reach of article 16. Furthermore, if there are human rights 
implications to the employment relationship, as this thesis argues there are, are nudges really 
an appropriate tool for regulating such a relationship? Finally, far from avoiding the reach of 
article 16, might nudges eventually embrace it? Before addressing these questions, it is 
necessary to come to a satisfactory definition of a ‘nudge’. 
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1. What's in a nudge?  
 
The appropriate nomenclature to apply to the growing field of behavioural regulation has 
proven controversial. It is suggested that the most appropriate umbrella term for this field is 
‘behavioural law and economics’, of which nudging is one example. Behavioural law and 
economics can be conceived as having two major attributes, one (social) scientific and one 
political. From a ‘scientific’ perspective, behavioural economics allow for the ‘proper 
appreciation of the actual cognitive frameworks, information-processing heuristics, and likely 
motivations of choice-making individuals’ in the design of legislation and other forms of 
regulatory intervention.185 Behavioural law and economics is closely related to another 
concept known as ‘new governance’. The two begin from different starting points, however. 
New governance scholars begin by emphasising the limits of traditional regulatory tools while 
advocates of behavioural regulation begin with the limitations of individual choice.186 New 
governance focuses on the role of the regulatees such as enterprises in the regulatory process. 
Where behavioural regulation seeks to overcome and harness individual human behaviour, 
new governance prioritises organisational cultures. In this respect, it may be difficult to 
distinguish behavioural law and economics from other forms of empirically-informed 
regulatory techniques. Where the difference does emerge is when we consider the political 
backdrop to the development of behavioural regulatory techniques.  
From this political point of view, nudge ‘offers the promise of (…) consensus—built around 
minimalist forms of government action that preserve freedom of choice [and] cuts through 
today’s hyperbolized, partisan conflicts and offers a tantalizing third way between 
conventional ideologies’.187 Although government intervention in the employment 
relationship is not quite as contested in Europe as it is in the United States, there is no doubt 
that David Cameron’s introduction of the BIT was essentially a political tool designed to 
encourage lighter touch (de)regulation, perhaps with the gloss of being behaviourally informed 
or ‘scientific’ rather than purely ideological. It is at this point that the tensions between the two 
aspects of behavioural regulation become obvious; a regulatory technique cannot be purely 
scientific if it has also to serve political or ideological ends.  
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Nudges, although a subset of behavioural law and economics, have to some extent become 
shorthand for it and can be defined as ‘any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives’.188 It is often presented as a cheaper and more efficient alternative to 
legislation but it can also be used in combination with traditional regulatory techniques, so the 
two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.189  
Nudges are essentially interventions by the State or private actors that steer people in particular 
directions.190 They seek to overcome human inaction by making choices easier, and this is a 
key point; nudges must preserve choice, or they are not nudges at all, but rather traditional 
mandatory regulation. The idea is that nudges should be used to steer us in a direction that will 
promote our welfare, as judged by ourselves. It is often easier to define a nudge by pointing 
out what it is not. Nudges must not entail significant material incentives.191 For that reason, 
subsidies are not nudges, taxes are not nudges, nor are fines or incarceration.192 
Nudges can work for a variety of reasons, whether that be by providing information to 
otherwise uninformed parties, by making it easier to make a decision or by seeking to 
overcome the human instinct for inertia.193 All regulatory systems, including the common law, 
must nudge in some way, even if traditionally, such regulatory techniques have not been 
dressed in the language of nudging. As Sunstein puts it, ‘[a]ny government, even one that is or 
purports to be firmly committed to laissez-faire, has to establish a set of prohibitions and 
permissions’.194 The difficulty with this broad conception of nudge theory is, as explored 
below, it may eventually collapse into standard command and control regulation. Before 
considering some such limitations of the theory in the employment context, it is first necessary 
to consider further the relationship between nudging and autonomy.  
 
2. Nudging and autonomy  
 
The starting point of nudge theory is that humans err when making choices, whether through 
biases, misconceptions, environmental factors or how information is presented. In other words, 
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there has been a failure of individual choice that nudging seeks either to overcome or indeed 
to exploit. Despite this, proponents of nudge theory continue to insist that nudges must ‘be 
choice-preserving, by always enabling the addressee to opt out’.195 Sunstein and Thaler have 
described nudging as ‘libertarian paternalism’. It is libertarian in the sense of preserving free 
choice through the ability to opt out from the nudge and it is paternalistic in that it seeks to 
enhance welfare even when third-party effects are absent.196 This is a contradiction in terms as 
‘[l]ibertarians embrace freedom of choice, and so they deplore paternalism. Paternalists are 
thought to be sceptical of unfettered freedom of choice and so they deplore libertarianism’.197 
In other words, a nudge, for example a default, will always have to be chosen and because 
individuals due to their own lack of stable or well-defined preferences or due to the manner in 
which the default is presented to them are unlikely to deviate from that default. It is therefore 
better to set the default to be welfare-enhancing. As long as an opt out is available, allowing 
choosers to opt for the ‘non-sensible course of action’ there should be no concerns from a 
libertarian point of view.  
For some commentators, libertarian paternalism is simply an oxymoron, with the paternalistic 
elements of nudge theory undercutting the ‘key libertarian assumption that individuals are the 
best judges and protectors of their own welfare’.198 Even if nudges are considered inevitable, 
not all forms of nudge will face the same objections from an autonomy point of view. Rather, 
we may distinguish between various ‘degrees’ of nudging. This is a different question to that 
of the ‘type’ of nudge/nudging tool to select, explored further below.199  
First degree nudges are the most respectful of autonomy in that they merely enhance individual 
reflection eg the provision of information or reminders.200 Second degree nudges exploit 
human behavioural limitations so as to ‘bias’ a decision in the direction chosen by the regulator. 
Such nudges are identifiable if the chooser reflects on the matter ie the chooser will know that 
he has been nudged.201 Finally, third degree nudges are highly intrusive, consisting of the 
manipulation of human behaviour, for example through framing devices (the manner in which 
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information is presented). The chooser does not know and cannot know that he has been 
nudged. 202  
There is a clear tension between nudging and individual autonomy but before we even get to 
that point, the tensions between the scientific and political on the one hand, and between 
libertarianism and paternalism on the other, may in fact undermine the very rationale for 
nudging. As Bubb and Pildes put it, ‘it would be surprising if the main policy implication of 
the mounting evidence documenting the failure of individual choice was a turn towards 
regulatory instruments that preserve individual choice’.203 As such, individual autonomy is at 
once being presented as the cause and the cure of regulatory failings.  
Using nudges to embrace autonomy principle has two additional downsides. First, nudges can 
be ‘slippery’, that is, easy to opt out of, thereby undermining their effectiveness and potentially 
necessitating remedial legislation. Second, nudges can be used by private actors, including 
employers to influence the behaviour of their workers. In such a situation, ‘regulation needs 
to become behaviourally informed not to “nudge” citizens but to offer a “counter-nudging” 
force against the exploitative use of behavioural insights by market actors’.204 In both 
situations, nudging actually necessitates the introduction of legislation, thereby defeating the 
very purpose of using nudging techniques in the first place ie to protect autonomy while 
ensuring regulatory outcomes.  
In addition, as Amir and Lobel have pointed out, tying nudge theory to the concept of 
libertarianism has the effect of selling ‘short some of the best attributes of regulation through 
choice architectures’.205 In this respect, proponents of nudge often fail to take the implications 
of their theory to its logical conclusion. In some situations, the identification of behavioural 
deficiencies may highlight the need for traditional regulatory intervention and yet nudge 
proponents tend to ‘focus instead on light-touch regulatory tools that preserve wide scope for 
choice’.206 In general, it can be seen that nudge techniques seek to preserve choice and, in that 
sense, appear to be respectful of individual autonomy. This belies the fact, however, that there 
are various types of nudges that may be more or less respectful of autonomy.  
One example of a nudging technique with a potential for application to the employment 
relationship is the default rule. We now turn to setting out the relationship between default 
                                                          
202 ibid 836.  
203 Bubb and Pildes (n 185) 1595. 
204Alemanno and Sibony (n 195) 3.  
205 Amir and Lobel (n 186) 2117.  
206 Bubb and Pildes (n 185) 1596. 
178 
 
forms of regulation and contractual autonomy (including article 16 of the Charter) before 
considering the implications for the employment relationship.  
 
3. Default forms of regulation  
 
Defaults are familiar to all lawyers and may appear a prime candidate to act as a tool for the 
introduction of behavioural insights into the regulation of the employment relationship. As 
Alemanno and Sibony put it, [d]efault rules are a tool of choice in the behavioural toolbox. By 
operationalising the power of inertia and procrastination, they induce individuals towards a 
pre-determined choice. Defaults, as such, are not foreign to lawyers’.207 This familiarity might 
also increase the receptivity of employment law to other, less traditional forms of nudging. On 
the other hand, this same familiarity begs the question of how defaults can even be considered 
as a new form of regulation in the first place. Defaults have long been used in the employment 
context, but the introduction of behavioural insights into the design of defaults has the potential 
to lead to more effective outcomes. Defaults are also intimately linked to the notions of 
‘choice’ and ‘consent’, both key components of the CJEU’s objection to the dynamic 
interpretation of the TUD in Alemo-Herron. What, then, is a default rule?  
3.1. Defining a default  
 
A default rule ‘specifies the outcome in a given situation if people make no choice at all’.208 
Defaults are more or less effective as a regulatory device depending on both the capacity and 
the intentions of the individual being nudged. The first element, ‘capacity’ refers to the ability 
of the chooser to gain, receive, absorb and act on information. The second element, ‘intention’ 
asks whether the target chooser has the same objectives as the nudger. 209 A default is effective 
for those described as well-intentioned and high capacity; well-intentioned and low capacity; 
ill-intentioned and low capacity, but not those who are ill-intentioned and have high capacity. 
In other words, ‘[h]igh capacity individuals who are not well-intentioned and not inclined to 
act in accordance with a message will be quite able to adjust their behaviour so as to reject that 
message’.210 Again, however, it is not the intention of this thesis to examine the effectiveness 
of defaults as such, but rather to explore how they relate to autonomy principles.  
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Defaults interact with behavioural insights in three ways. First, defaults can be used to exploit 
human inertia, ie our unwillingness to choose. In this sense, defaults can be used to achieve a 
regulatory aim—although as we have already seen, in order to be a ‘nudge’, defaults would 
have to increase welfare as judged by the individual being nudged. Second, defaults can be 
considered as creating an implicit endorsement over the choice set out therein. In other words, 
choosers consider that the default has been chosen by the legislator (or the employer) for a 
(good) reason. Finally, there is the ‘endowment effect’ ie choosers prefer not to have something 
taken away from them, even if there is a chance that what they might receive instead would be 
more valuable to them. This is also closely related to the notion that ‘where the potential gains 
or losses of making a choice are unclear, accepting the default (…) costs nothing in time and 
effort’.211 As we shall see, these three elements have serious implications for the compatibility 
of default nudges with contractual autonomy.  
 
4. Compatibility with autonomy principles  
 
First of all, it should be noted that despite their very rationale being to introduce regulatory 
techniques that are compatible with individual choice, nudges are in fact largely ‘covert’. If 
they were not, then they may not have the same ability to influence behaviour. Because of this, 
nudging techniques may be less ‘identifiable’ than traditional regulation and may therefore be 
less susceptible to legal challenge. In addition, ‘nudging is usually a strategy where end-users 
have neither participated nor shared’.212 This may be a fatal flaw to the introduction of nudging 
to the employment relationship. In Alemo-Herron, the CJEU emphasised the employer’s 
‘participation’ in the collective bargaining process as being a crucial element of consent. It is 
certainly true, however, that default rules may be more susceptible to identification than other 
forms of nudge such as debiasing or framing. Even if a default is easily identifiable it is not at 
all clear that it is choice-preserving even in the presence of an opt out.  
Opt outs pose a major problem. If defaults are to be compatible with autonomy, at least in a 
libertarian sense, then they must be easy to opt out of, but this has the effect of undermining 
the very purpose of introducing the default in the first place. Indeed, ‘those who opt-out are 
not consistently the ones who are better off outside of the default’.213 Nevertheless, it has 
already been noted that behavioural insights themselves tell us that opt outs are in fact likely 
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to be ‘sticky’ ie they exploit the power of human inertia, the status quo bias and the endowment 
effect.214 This means that in many cases the opt out only exists in theory or that it formally 
exists while functioning as a mandate in terms of the welfare consequences the default 
produces.215  
For some commentators, maximising welfare should never be the aim of default in the first 
place, but rather the least objectionable form of default-rule paternalism from a libertarian 
perspective requires that the default rule be set to enhance liberty rather than welfare’.216 We 
have already seen, however, that not all nudges are equally paternalistic and the same is true 
of default rules.217 Mitchell gives the employment-at-will doctrine in the US as an example of 
a default that is compatible with individual autonomy. He comments that ‘[o]n the one hand, 
it maximizes the liberty of irrational individuals by preventing them from entering mindlessly 
into binding employment arrangements. On the other hand, since it can be overridden, rational 
individuals may contract around that at-will default to enter into more permanent employment 
arrangements’.218  
It is clear, then, that default forms of regulation enjoy a complex relationship with autonomy 
principles. The question is whether such defaults can withstand scrutiny in light of the Charter?  
 
5. Human rights scrutiny  
 
First of all, it is uncontroversial that regulation, of whatever form, can only be reviewed in 
light of the Charter if it falls within the scope of EU law. As far as I am aware, there are no 
examples of a Member State designing legislation implementing EU employment law under 
the guidance of behavioural insights. In any case, it is unlikely that the Commission would 
consider such a measure to be adequate implementation. As already mentioned, default rules 
are not alien to employment law, but even these have not been couched in the language of 
nudging or behavioural regulation, which is understandable given their relatively recent 
development. 
In EU employment law, one of the first defaults that has been used is the 48-hour working 
week found in article 6 of the WTD. This is a particularly interesting example given the close 
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connection between the Directive and human rights principles discussed in chapter II. Article 
22(1) of the Directive allows Member States to derogate from article 6 subject to certain 
conditions. The default rule is that workers enjoy the right to a working week of no more than 
48 hours’ duration, calculated over an appropriate reference period. This particular default rule 
is unusual in a number of respects.  
First, the Member State in question must have provided for the default in its implementing 
legislation. Second, one of the conditions for the application of the opt out from the 48-hour 
working week is obtaining the consent of the employee. In Pfeiffer, the CJEU held that: 
[i]f a worker (…) is encouraged to relinquish a social right which has been directly 
conferred on him by the directive, he must do so freely and with full knowledge of the 
facts. Those requirements are all the more important given that the worker must be 
regarded as the weaker party to the employment contract and it is therefore necessary 
to prevent the employer being in a position to disregard the intentions of the [worker] 
to impose (…) a restriction of his rights without him having expressly given his 
consent.219  
In this respect, the objection that nudges are elusive falls away and there is a double barrier to 
the erosion of the employee-protective default ie Member State action and the consent of the 
employee. Third, the ease with which the opt out can be exercised should be enough to 
demonstrate its compatibility with contractual autonomy. Despite the conditionality of the opt 
out, it is exercised widely in practice, particularly in the United Kingdom which had negotiated 
the derogation from the Directive in the first place.220 Usually, however, defaults will not be 
so easy to opt out of. This is largely because, the exercise of this option both ‘assumes a level 
of competence, rationality and volitional control that contradicts the underpinning assumptions 
of behavioural economics’ and ‘understates the extent to which opt-outs discriminate against 
parties who are less able to exercise them’.221 The working time default is designed to ensure 
compliance with the law (or at the very least, the aims of the legislation) but it is not difficult 
to imagine a default with a less noble purpose. In such a scenario, the default may become a 
mandate, preventing employees from opting out. 222 Is it the case that defaults as a regulatory 
technique would withstand scrutiny under article 16?  
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As already noted, certain commentators have overstated the importance of contractual 
autonomy and the notion of freedom as a cornerstone of the European project. This 
misconception has continued in debates surrounding the desirability of behavioural regulatory 
techniques. Van Aaken has been particularly sceptical about the compatibility of nudging with 
the notion of freedom. On the status of ‘freedom’ in EU law she remarks that ‘[a]rticle 2 [TEU] 
names freedom as a right to be protected directly after human dignity and thereby stresses its 
importance. Freedom is interpreted as a political and historical notion, as a principle on which 
the unification of Europe rests (…) It also follows that the individual has priority over the 
collective’.223 The first claim is somewhat tenuous; the latter has no basis in EU law at all. 
What this serves to highlight though is that from the outset, the relationship between nudge 
theory and the value of autonomy has been delicate. Indeed, authors such as van Aaken have 
suggested that far from embracing autonomy, the success of a nudge is actually measured 
against the notion of ‘effectiveness’.224 This belies the fact, however, that the classic ethical 
debate surrounding nudges starts with a principled defence of normative individualism’.225 In 
other words, the very essence of nudge theory is the promotion of individualism and autonomy. 
This is the core contradiction within nudge theory, that in seeking to remove ideology from 
the debate, it tries to be all things to all people ie simultaneously preserving and yet regulating 
autonomy.  
Perhaps this contradiction can be overcome by abandoning the formalistic notion of freedom 
as being the ‘freedom of choice’.  A richer understanding of freedom is possible, ie freedom 
as the respect for individual autonomy.226 To make truly autonomous choices, those choices 
must be informed, and many nudge techniques are intended to debias human behaviour to 
make choices truly informed. As Sunstein remarks, ‘[i]f people have to make choices 
everywhere, their autonomy is reduced, if only because they cannot focus on those activities 
that seem to them most worthy of their attention’.227 Going further, it can be argued that ‘[i]f 
we believe in freedom of choice on the ground that people are uniquely situated to know what 
is best for them, then that very argument should support respect for people when they freely 
choose not to choose’.228 In other words, defaults and nudges take complex decisions out of 
the hands of choosers, enabling them to focus on what really matters to them.  
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Seeking to steer choosers in a particular direction is not the only function of the default rule. 
Rather, their more traditional function has been to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. In other 
words, ‘they govern unless the parties contract around them’ and to that extent they differ from 
immutable rules considered in the next chapter which ‘govern even if the parties attempt to 
contract around them’.229  
Academic commentators have tended to advocate defaults that reflect the position that the 
parties to the contract would have chosen had they been given the option, thus preserving their 
contractual autonomy. Ayres and Gertner questioned whether this was the appropriate 
standard, suggesting that ‘efficient defaults would take a variety of forms that at times would 
diverge from the “what the parties would have contracted for” principle’.230 This new form of 
default is the penalty default which are designed ‘to give at least one party to the contract an 
incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract 
provision they prefer’.231 The idea is that it is cheaper and more efficient for the parties to 
decide what they want rather than having a court second-guess their intentions after the fact.232 
In this way, penalty defaults are information-inducing; they provide the individual with 
sufficient information to make their own decisions.  
Of course, in the employment context, defaults are often less to do with filling in the gaps in 
incomplete contracts and more to do with protecting the weaker party—usually the employee. 
Gaps in employment contracts are more usually filled by implied terms, whether in fact or at 
common law which may or may not be a default. The distinction between default terms and 
immutable terms is fleshed out more fully when we come to consider common law social rights 
in the following chapters. For now, it suffices to note that if default rules do not give way to 
the manifested assent of the parties to the contract then it ‘cannot properly be called a default 
rule’.233 
It would seem that as long as the principle of consent is respected, then default rules may be 
compatible with contractual autonomy. This is even more so if we adopt the trichotomy 
proposed by Barnett. He suggests that the gap filling function of default rules seems to 
undermine the neat distinction between terms that have been assented to and those that are 
imposed by law. Rather, a more appropriate trichotomy can be put forward (1) terms that have 
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been assented to by the parties; (2) terms imposed by law (considered in the next chapter) and 
(3) a new category of terms that are supplied by law but nonetheless reflect the consent of the 
parties.234 In other words, by entering a contract in the first place, the parties are assenting to 
be bound by the background rules that the courts and legislature have imposed on the 
contracting process. Viewed in this way, the dynamic interpretation of collective agreements 
could have been found to be compatible with article 16 in Alemo-Herron.  
In addition, far from interfering with the autonomy of the parties, such an approach views gap-
filling defaults as completing lacunae left in the manifested consent of the parties. As Barnett 
puts it, ‘the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement 
of any default rules’.235 Not only that, but consent to be bound can also extend to the selection 
of a particular default rule eg one that reflects common sense or indeed in the employment 
context, a default that seeks to protect the weaker party. 
In order to maintain its status as a default rule (as opposed to an immutable rule), two 
conditions would have to be met. First, indirect consent to a particular default cannot stem 
from the overall agreement to be bound by a contract if the parties have no reason to be aware 
of the default. Second, consent cannot be inferred if contracting around the rule is too costly.236 
The penalty default may run contrary to this consent principle in that, by its very definition, it 
is designed to leave at least one of the parties in a worse position for their failure to provide 
information. An additional difficulty with penalty defaults is that they can lead to unintended 
consequences such as inefficient decision-making.237 Although, it could also be said that more 
conventional defaults are also essentially penalty defaults in that one party may be ignorant of 
the background contract law rules while the other is not. In such a scenario, a default ‘can 
reduce the instances of subjective disagreements arising between parties who otherwise are 
manifesting mutual consent’.238 In other words, penalty defaults may, in fact, be consistent 
with autonomy in that they ensure true mutual consent between the two parties. 
No doubt there is a need for a more realistic appraisal of what counts as a restriction of 
autonomy. Humans only have a limited capacity to make decisions and therefore, ‘how much 
autonomy is likely to be exercised in a given context should matter when assessing whether 
and how much behavioural intervention restricts autonomy’.239 Traditional default rules, as 
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long as there is an opt out, may be compatible with contractual autonomy as expressed in 
article 16. Whether this is an effective or indeed realistic way in which to regulate the 
employment relationship is, of course, another matter altogether, as illustrated by the frequent 
use of the opt out to the 48-hour working week or the reality that many professionals do not 
exercise their full right to paid annual leave.  
Beyond, the potential complexities associated with squaring default rules with contractual 
autonomy principles, there is the added difficulty that nudging techniques appear to be 
underpinned by a political agenda. Default rules are often endorsed without considering 
whether mandates or other more traditional forms of regulation would more effectively achieve 
the objective pursued. In many cases, therefore, the selection of a default or indeed of an opt 
out may be more of  a ‘political or philosophical precommitment than empirical assessment of 
how to maximize social welfare (…) If opt-outs are actually used (…) we know too little about 
whether the “right” or “wrong” people are the ones fleeing the default’.240 This leads to the 
further concern, that employment lawyers, in particular, should be suspicious, that ‘the shift 
away from traditional regulation is in fact a shift away from regulation and public action to an 
era of devolution and deregulation’.241  
Originally, the term ‘nudge’ was merely intended to act as a contrast to the ‘shoves’ of 
traditional regulation.242 It was not, therefore, intended to act as a conduit for broader political 
and economic philosophies. However, this is to overlook the fact that defaults and other forms 
of nudging cannot operate in a vacuum, but must be selected based on various statutory goals 
and underpinning values. In other words, a choice has to be made by the regulator as to the 
baseline to which human behaviour must be directed. 243 This is where human rights may play 
an increasingly important role. 
 
6. Nudging Human Rights  
 
We have already seen that defaults and nudges may be more or less compatible with autonomy 
principles, including freedom of contract as a fundamental right found in article 16. What of 
other human rights? Is it really appropriate to use these novel regulatory techniques in the 
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employment field, which we have seen can be characterised as having a fundamental rights 
underpinning?  
In the next chapter, we consider the issue of derogability. Clearly, nudging techniques that 
would allow for an opt out from a legislative provision with a human rights underpinning 
would not be compatible with the Charter. Arguably, such an opt out already exists in the form 
of the derogation from the 48-hour working week. Although, as discussed in Chapter II, it is 
unlikely that the drafters of the Charter intended that this provision could be challenged for 
incompatibility with article 31(2).  
Despite the obvious potential of alternative regulatory tools, it is accepted that nudges are 
probably not an appropriate or effective mechanism for the advancement of social rights. 
Moreover, given the need to ensure compatibility with autonomy principles, nudges and 
defaults may in fact continue the erosion of other human rights. Far from avoiding the reach 
of article 16, might nudges also come to be seen as part and parcel of it? Might employers 
argue that their ability to nudge their employees is an expression of their own contractual 
autonomy? Such private nudging would have serious human rights considerations for 
employees whose behaviour may be surreptitiously manipulated by the employer. This private 
nudging may then need to be counter-nudged by the state, which would realistically have to 
take the form of mandatory regulation. It is therefore unclear, ‘whether the growing interest in 
nudging may trigger the enactment of more regulation or whether it should rather be construed 
as the continuation of the deregulatory agenda’.244  
Even were it to come from the legislature, nudging may still have serious human rights 
implications. Thaler and Sunstein themselves recognise that there may be rights-based 
limitations to nudging, using the example of the design of a ballot paper. But, they nevertheless 
equate the importance of rights with government neutrality.245 As we have seen, at least in the 
case of social rights, neutrality is often not enough. Nudging has clear implications for a 
number of human rights such as the freedom of expression, the right to privacy and self-
determination. 246 When designing a nudge, the legislature must start from somewhere. This is 
the baseline. Behavioural regulation must be underpinned by conceptual and philosophical 
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choices. 247 It is suggested that the respect for human rights, including the Charter’s 
Employment Rights, should be at the core of the choice of baseline.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Charter’s article 16 may have far-reaching 
consequences for the EU’s ability to regulate the employment relationship into the future. This 
provided a useful contrast with the Charter’s Employment Rights which may (if used correctly) 
act as a break on the Union’s ability to deregulate the employment relationship.  
The deregulatory potential of article 16 was examined through the lens of the Lochner era 
jurisprudence. Although there were some contextual difficulties in translating Lochner into EU 
law, it was shown that echoes of this case can be seen in the internal market jurisprudence, 
competition law and more recent cases such as Viking, Laval and Alemo-Herron. That those 
cases had similar outcomes to Lochner is surprising given that EU law comes with a rich 
backcloth of employment legislation and the Charter’s Employment Rights (although only 
Alemo-Herron was decided after the Charter had full legal effect). 
It is perhaps too early to tell just how the reach of article 16 as interpreted in Alemo-Herron 
will reach into the employment context. From a rather narrow perspective, its impact on the 
employment relationship can be seen in the undermining of the purpose of employee-
protective legislation and the false presumption of the need to balance employment provisions 
with freedom of contract. Ripples of Alemo-Herron can also be seen in subsequent case law. 
Article 16 is now easily engaged and, in certain cases, the CJEU has continued to restate its 
strong conception of business freedom. Having said that, there are still very few cases in the 
employment context and most of those are confined to the context of the TUD and CRD. It is 
therefore difficult to determine precisely how systemic the prioritisation of business freedom 
in EU law has been or might be in the future. 
In AGET, the CJEU explicitly linked article 16 to the freedom of establishment, and found that 
a restriction on freedom of establishment also amounts to a restriction on freedom of contract. 
The link is further evidenced in the issue of permissible derogations, with any justification on 
the limitation of a Treaty freedom also applying to article 16. Given the existence of clearly 
established worker protection derogations to the Treaty, the link need not be disastrous from 
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an employee protection perspective. In any case, the Treaty freedoms cannot be said to 
necessarily embody any notion of contractual autonomy.  
Tracing the limits of the concept of contractual autonomy in EU law continues to prove 
difficult in the absence of any harmonised definition. There are divergent visions of contractual 
autonomy among the EU Member States and within EU law itself, with its contrasting 
voluntarist and market visions and the varied emphasis on the quality of consent under those 
models. To date, attempts at harmonisation have focused on the restrictive nature of contractual 
autonomy. This makes the expansive and formalistic notion of autonomy found in Alemo-
Herron all the more alarming.  
A more substantive vision of autonomy would recognise that employees, via their right to 
work, also enjoy a degree of autonomy. Although articles 15 and 16 have tended to be 
conflated, raising the right to work combined with an Employment Right in Alemo-Herron 
may have lent greater normative weight to the transferred rights, overcoming the temporal 
issues in that case.  
Attempts to circumvent article 16 through other avenues, namely the development of new 
forms of regulation such as nudging, may not be as respectful of contractual autonomy as they 
first appear or worse still, may become yet another tool of the deregulatory agenda. Nudges 
are covert and are susceptible to avoid legal challenge. The extensive use of opt outs also 
undermines their effectiveness. Judging regulatory techniques against the standard of 
autonomy is also problematic. A more appropriate standard is effectiveness.  
It is clear that the Charter has indeed had an impact on the employment relationship from a 
broader regulatory perspective. Having assessed the broader consequences of the Charter for 
employment regulation, has there been any trickle-down effect to the level of the individual 
employment relationship?  
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V. The Micro Level: The Effect of the Charter on the Individual 
Employment Relationship 
 
This chapter considers how the Charter’s fundamental rights might influence the individual 
employment contract. This question will be addressed by examining the relationship between 
the various sources of employment norms in the UK, ie the contract, common law and 
legislation. Section A looks at the relationship between sources that might loosely be described 
as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the employment contract. The external sources are legislation 
and the common law, while the internal sources are the terms of the contract itself ie express, 
implied, default and mandatory terms. Exploring how human rights concepts might influence 
the hierarchy between these sources will allow us to gauge the impact of the Charter on the 
individual employment relationship.   
 
A. The Charter’s Effect on the Hierarchy of Sources of Labour Norms  
 
To what extent has the granting of legal effect to the Charter disrupted the hierarchy of labour 
law sources in the United Kingdom and what are the consequences for the employment 
relationship? Traditionally, the relationship between EU law and national law has not strictly 
been viewed as hierarchical. Rather, the interaction between the CJEU and domestic courts 
has been seen as one of cooperation rather than confrontation. With the enactment of the 
Charter, a new constitutional dimension has been added.  
Most civil law countries are used to conceiving of the employment relationship as consisting 
of a clear hierarchy of sources. This has not been true of the common law. As Deakin and 
Morris note, it really makes no difference in what order the sources of labour law in the UK 
are discussed and the hierarchy at national level, to the extent that one can be said to exist, is 
capable of evolution or indeed inversion.1 It is useful, then, to bear in mind that there are 
currently a number of confused hierarchies in UK employment law (1) that between EU law 
and domestic law and (2) within domestic law itself. For present purposes, the latter category 
will be further subdivided into an external and internal hierarchy (ie sources deriving from 
within and without the contract of employment). What difference does the classification of the 
                                                          
1 Simon Deakin and Gillian S Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart 2012) 58.  
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rights found in the Charter as fundamental human rights make for these already unstable 
hierarchies and how does this affect the individual employment relationship?  
We have explored in Chapters II and III the relationship between the Charter and social 
legislation at both EU and national level. There, the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the rights found 
in the Charter has quite clearly had an effect on the hierarchy of norms. The granting of 
constitutional human rights status to the Charter enables its use as both a standard of review 
and a tool of interpretation of both EU law and Member State law falling within the scope of 
EU law, although as we have seen, it may not be a particularly strong standard. The question 
to be addressed by this chapter is whether the constitutionalisation of the Charter has had any 
impact on the hierarchy between domestic sources of employment norms.   
The term ‘external’ is intended to invoke the hierarchy of sources of norms that exist outside 
the contract of employment. Our attention here is placed on the relationship between 
employment legislation and the common law. The impact of the Charter on this relationship 
will be assessed. The use of the word external is not intended to suggest that these sources 
have no bearing on the content of the terms of the contract itself. Rather, it is used to emphasise 
that, as mentioned, there are at least two domestic hierarchies that may be disrupted by the 
Charter, namely the relationship between external sources and the relationship between types 
of terms within the employment contract itself. Undoubtedly, the determination of the 
relationship between the former will, of necessity, influence the relationship between the latter. 
There is, therefore, no hard and fast distinction between the two.  
The EU-domestic hierarchy can rather crudely be characterised as follows: (1) The Charter, as 
a constitutional fundamental rights document, sits at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of norms. 
The Charter also embodies other elements of ‘constitutionalised’ EU law, such as the internal 
market freedoms; (2) general EU law comes next as it must comply with the Charter but can 
also be used as a standard against which national law falling within the scope of EU law must 
comply; (3) this is followed by domestic law and it is here, which is the focus of the present 
chapter, that the Charter may be most disruptive for the employment relationship.   
The hierarchy at domestic level has never been clear and may now be in a double state of flux 
due to both the Charter and Brexit (ie the Charter’s absence). Focusing in this chapter on the 
Charter, the question to be addressed is whether the relationship between employment 
legislation and the common law at domestic level is altered in the presence of fundamental 
human rights, including the freedom to conduct a business. We start with the relationship 
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between the common law and social legislation. This will enable us to understand the baseline 
should the Charter be removed, the topic of the next chapter. 
 
1. The external hierarchy  
 
The sources of employment norms that are external to the employment contract include the 
Charter, legislation and the common law. As the relationship between the Charter and 
legislation has already been addressed in earlier chapters, the focus here is on the relationship 
between the common law and social legislation. We begin by setting out the traditional 
relationship before considering the potential role of the Charter.  
1.1. The common law and social legislation 
 
There is no doubt that in many instances, domestic employment legislation (whether or not 
derived from EU law) and the common law enjoy an intimate relationship. We need only think 
of the fact that access to the protection contained in numerous legislative instruments is 
dependent on classification as an ‘employee’ or a ‘worker’, the tests for which rest almost 
entirely on a common law foundation.2 In the words of Kahn Freund, despite legislative 
intervention, the common law employment contract remains ‘the cornerstone of the edifice of 
labour law’.3 Some authors have gone so far as to say that labour law lacks autonomy from the 
common law in that ‘[e]mployment rights may be radically affected by common law 
precedents argued in an entirely different legal context’ which has the effect of linking ‘the 
current system inextricably with the past’.4 
Indeed, the application of common law contractual principles to the employment context has 
often led to harsh results, a point well illustrated by the Tanton case.5 Mr Tanton’s job was to 
collect newspapers and to deliver them at various points around Devon on a fixed run and in a 
particular order as dictated by the ‘employer’. The vehicle he drove was provided by the 
employer. The uniform he wore was stipulated by the employer. His remuneration was fixed 
unilaterally by the employer without any negotiation. It would seem a sensible conclusion that 
Mr Tanton was, in fact, an employee. The Court of Appeal (CoA) did not agree. The Court 
                                                          
2 See Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 5430; Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison v MacDonald & Evans [1952] 1 TLR 
101.  
3 Otto Kahn-Freund in A Flanders and H Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (1954) 
44.  
4 Deakin and Morris (n 1) 57 and 59.  
5 Express and Echo Publications v Ernest Tanton [1999] EWCA Civ 949. 
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was persuaded by one clause in the contract that allowed Mr Tanton to call in a replacement 
at his own cost should he ever be unavailable for work. For the Court, this clause was 
incompatible with the common law test for employment status which required ‘personal 
service’. The contract outweighed the reality that the employer exercised strict control over 
the ‘employee’ driver. As Peter Gibson LJ put it: 
[o]f course, it is important that the [Employment] Tribunal should be alert in this area 
of the law to look at the reality of any obligations. If the obligation is a sham it will 
want to say so. But to concentrate on what actually occurred may not elucidate the full 
terms of the contract. If a term is not enforced that does not justify a conclusion that 
such a term is not part of the agreement. The obligation could be temporarily waived. 
If there is a term that is inherently inconsistent with the existence of a contract of 
employment, what actually happened from time to time may not be decisive, given the 
existence of that term.  
The lower tribunal had, therefore, made the mistake of focusing on what had actually happened 
rather than on what the contract said. This case demonstrates that the common law can be a 
cold house for the protection of social rights in the absence of legislation (whether or not that 
legislation has a Charter underpinning). As we shall see, various attempts have also been made 
to shield employment law from the full rigours of such ordinary contractual principles, largely 
because the state prescribes certain minimum conditions for such contracts to be described as 
‘employment’ contracts at all.6   
Traditionally, the UK courts had viewed the common law contract of employment as having 
primacy, with any legislative intervention being seen as ‘essentially parasitic’ on the contract.7 
That the common law took ‘precedence’ was again evidenced by the fact that common law 
tests were used as a gateway to employee-protective legislation. As Davies notes, however, 
this relationship has largely been inverted, with the courts recognising that it is now legislation 
that forms the primary focus of employment regulation, with the contract ‘playing a 
supplementary role where the two interact’.8 Nevertheless, there are still numerous examples 
of common law contractual principles being used to interpret employment legislation with the 
effect of impeding the protective aim of that legislation.9 By and large, this has been an entirely 
                                                          
6 Gaabriel Tavits, ‘Freedom of Contract in Labour Relations’ (1999) 4 Juridica International 179, 182.  
7 Hugh Collins, ‘Contractual Autonomy’ in Alan Bogg (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart 2015) 60.  
8 Anne Davies, ‘The Relationship between the Contract of Employment and Statute’ in Mark Freedland and 
others (eds), The Contract of Employment (OUP 2016) 73, 73.   
9 See for eg definition of constructive dismissal under s 95(1)(c) ERA 1996.  
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domestic matter, with little consideration given to the human rights nature or Charter 
underpinnings of employee-protective legislation. 
It would, of course, be possible post-Brexit (as it is now) to exclude the application of the 
common law or at least confine it to a residual gap-filling role. Clear examples of this approach 
can already be found in the non-derogable provisions of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
(ERA), as well as the definition of direct and indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 
2010 (EqA) which are granted autonomous legislative definitions and therefore depend little 
on contract law.   
Barnard and Merrett have described the relationship between the common law and statute as 
lying along a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, statute and common law enjoy a symbiotic 
relationship while on the other end statute has intervened with the express intention of altering 
the common law position—what they described as ‘full pre-emption’.10 In Johnson, Lord 
Nicholls held that the crucial consideration was whether the alleged common law right ‘could 
“satisfactorily co-exist” with the statutory regime. That would not be the case if the alleged 
common law right undermined or contradicted the statutory regime or if the two could not in 
practice co-exist in the same sphere’.11 Beatson further clarifies that in civil law systems the 
code or the statute is the default whereas the common law provides the default in this country. 
Two consequences flow from this. First, the common law, to quote Lord Bingham, ‘has over 
the centuries proved a shameless snapper-up of well considered trifles of foreign law (…) 
Why, if they are relevant, should a common law system not also snap up well considered trifles 
of statute law enacted by its own legislature?’.12 In other words, the common law has been 
malleable to accepting legislative principles, including, as we shall see, social rights. 
Conversely, the second consequence is that statutory intervention may actually allow the 
common law to stick to (or return to) its roots outside of legislative intervention, with judges 
reassured by the fact that ‘particular problems have been addressed by the legislature’.13 As 
explored below, given the common law’s continued commitment to freedom of contract, this 
may have serious implications for the interpretation of employment legislation post-Brexit.  
Finally, as Atiyah notes, when legislation is adopted, it takes the continued application of 
existing case law for granted.14 He further posits three ways in which statute interacts with the 
                                                          
10 Catherine Barnard and Louise Merrett, ‘Winners and Losers: Edwards and the Unfair Law of Dismissal (2013) 
CLJ 313.  
11 ibid 316.  
12 Jack Beatson, ‘The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law Doctrine’ (2001) 117 LQR 247, 250.  
13 ibid 253.  
14 P S Atiyah, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (1985) 48 MLR 1. 
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common law (1) where statutes deliberately adopted open-textured language; (2) where 
statutes openly confer discretion on the courts to resolve conflicts as they think just and 
equitable and (3) where statutes amend a very active part of the common law. Situations (1) 
and (3) are particularly relevant in the employment context. The language employed in labour 
law statutes is often open-textured or leaves terms to be defined in accordance with existing 
common law concepts.  
In certain circumstances, the common law has been malleable to legislative intervention 
leading to an absorption of social rights standards. We have already seen that in the context of 
the transfer of undertakings, the case law goes as far as illustrating that the common law can 
at times provide a higher level of protection to employees than a reading of legislation through 
a fundamental rights lens. The employment context is replete with examples of the common 
law taking its lead from statute.  
This is largely due to the recognition that the employment contract is not an ordinary contract 
and so cannot be subjected to the full force of commercial contractual principles. In Autoclenz, 
for example, it was recognised that in order to determine employment status (in that case, the 
status of worker), the inequality of bargaining power between the employer and the employee 
must be taken into account.15 In that case, the claimants carried out car cleaning services on 
behalf of the respondent company. Their contracts stated that they were sub-contractors (self-
employed) and not employees. They had to provide their own materials and they were not 
obliged to provide services, nor was the company obliged to offer any work. Furthermore, they 
could provide substitutes to carry out the work. Nevertheless, the claimants were granted 
worker status after an examination of all the relevant material (and not just the written contract) 
showed their self-employed status to be no more than a sham. In the UKSC, Lord Clarke 
referred with approval to the distinction drawn in the CoA by Aikens LJ between employment 
cases and ordinary commercial disputes, when he said that: 
the circumstances in which contracts relating to work or services are concluded are often 
very different from those in which commercial contracts between parties of equal 
bargaining power are agreed.16 
Although a decision based on common law principles, the legislative background was 
pervasive given that any other conclusion would have allowed ‘employers to avoid statutory 
employment rights by drafting contracts to deny individuals employee status, when Parliament 
                                                          
15 Autoclenz Limited v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41. 
16 Autoclenz Limited v Belcher [2009] EWCA Civ 1046 [92] (Aitken LJ); Autoclenz Limited v Belcher [2011] 
UKSC 41 [34] (Clarke LJ).  
195 
 
had prohibited contracting out of such rights’.17 What this means, then, is that when we talk 
about the operation of common law contractual rules to legislation, we really mean the 
common law of the employment contract ie contract law as modified to take into account the 
particular requirements of the employment context.  
A particularly good example of the common law using social legislation to develop employee-
protective concepts can be seen in the emergence of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence (MTC) discussed in more depth below. As Davies notes, it was the need to come 
to a satisfactory definition of the constructive dismissal concept found in unfair dismissal 
legislation that led to the courts developing the implied term of MTC in order to modify the 
concept of repudiatory breach found in commercial contracts.18 Here, we see a common law 
concept (repudiatory breach) being modified by another common law concept (implied term 
of MTC) to ensure the effective functioning of unfair dismissal legislation in order to protect 
employees.  
However, the relationship between the common law and statute is not always so benign. In 
Johnson, it was found that the implied term of MTC could not apply to the manner of an 
employee’s dismissal because Parliament had already occupied the field through the enactment 
of unfair dismissal legislation.19 
What the above discussion shows, is that even without considering any underlying human 
rights, the common law may already give way in the face of competing employment 
legislation, even when not strictly required by that legislation, although this is not universal 
and there remain examples of harsh results when the common law applies to the employment 
relationship. Is there any evidence, then, of the courts adopting a more stringent approach to 
the relationship between common law and statute when faced with legislation that is 
underpinned by the Charter? In other words, when interpreting and applying domestic 
employment law, do the courts consider the Charter or rights origins of underlying principles 
in legislation and does this make any difference?  
                                                          
17 Davies (n 8) 86.  
18  ibid. 
19 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13.  
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1.2. Interpreting legislation with a fundamental rights underpinning  
 
If the common law has at times been receptive to social standards, taking its lead from 
legislation, is there any additional effect, from the perspective of the common law courts, of 
that legislation having a fundamental rights underpinning in the Charter?  
Once again, the clearest example of legislation being underpinned by the Charter is the 
Working Time Regulations (WTR) 1998 which implement the Working Time Directive 
(WTD) into domestic law. We have already seen in relation to the TUD, that legislation, when 
backed by the Charter, may have the effect of overturning existing common law approaches—
in that field, the dynamic approach to the incorporation of collective agreements. The question 
to be dealt with here is how the relationship between the common law and legislation develops 
over time through judicial interpretation and application. For example, do the courts allow 
common law concepts to give way in the face of rights-based legislation even if not strictly 
required by the legislation in question?  
We have already determined that in the context of employment legislation with an 
Employment Rights underpinning, the CJEU has tended to adopt a purposive approach to the 
interpretation of that legislation, although this may have more to do with the CJEU’s general 
aim of ensuring that the objectives of the legislation are not undermined. Despite what we have 
also said about the modern relationship between common law and social legislation, with the 
common law giving way, Anderman has identified a tendency for UK judges to continue to 
exaggerate contractual tests when applied to employee-protective legislation. He argues that 
this stems from an unwillingness by certain judges to recognise protective employment 
legislation as an autonomous layer of regulation20.  
It has already been suggested that the domestic courts have not always been clear about the 
precise extent to which common law contractual principles are displaced by statutory 
employment rights. The courts’ approach to dealing with the relationship between contractual 
agreements and protective statutes has been even more confused. Here, the courts have 
‘experienced difficulties of a more systemic nature in deciding what weight to give the contract 
of employment in interpreting statutory provisions’.21 This has led to the courts borrowing or 
adopting ordinary contractual principles and applying them to employment statutes. Thus, the 
                                                          
20 Steven Anderman, ‘The Interpretation of Protective Employment Statutes and Contracts of Employment’ 
(2000) 29 ILJ 223, 223.  
21 ibid 224.  
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courts have at times treated the provisions of the contract as the decisive factor in interpreting 
a statute.  
We have already noted that some legislative provisions such as the definition of indirect 
discrimination are not dependent on the common law for further elucidation. Others refer to 
the common law explicitly but also seek to offset its effects by preventing derogation, for 
example the ERA 1996. Still other provisions are clear in their permissiveness of derogation, 
whether through national legislation or the individual contract of employment. The WTR is an 
example of the latter. As Deakin and Morris note: 
[u]sing the scope for derogations allowed for in the original Directive, the Regulations 
devolve much of the responsibility for arriving at working time norms to agreement at 
lower levels, including not just collective agreements but also individual agreements. 
This form of devolution of law-making authority from statute to collective bargaining 
(and, beyond that, to individual contract) is unusual in the UK.22  
In this respect, the legislation itself recognises the possibility of derogation, for example from 
the 48-hour working week, although we have said that this derogation is conditional and may 
not even be compatible with article 31 of the Charter. Given that the clearest example of rights-
based legislation in the UK already permits extensive derogation through contractual 
arrangements, is there any scope for the common law courts to take account of the underlying 
human rights rationale governing the WTR? It is suggested that the area that is most open to 
being influenced by the Charter is the issue of the personal scope of EU employment 
legislation/domestic implementing legislation. Is there any evidence of the Charter influencing 
the interpretation of the personal scope of legislation at domestic level and what are the 
consequences for the ability of litigants to rely on rights-based legislation?  
1.3. The personal scope of legislation  
 
Before a litigant can rely on a legislative right, including a right that is grounded by the Charter, 
they must first bring themselves within the personal scope of that legislation. Much of EU 
employment legislation leaves it to the Member States to determine the legislation’s precise 
personal scope. As we saw above, the common law has at times had the effect of precluding 
reliance on employee-protective legislation. To what extent, then, might fundamental rights 
impede or indeed facilitate the employer’s ability to avoid entering an employment 
                                                          
22 Deakin and Morris (n 1 ) 336.  
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relationship, of whatever type, and the intendent protective elements that come with such 
status? 
The two questions to be addressed here are essentially whether (1) there is any evidence of the 
courts modifying the tests for worker status where the relevant EU legislation rests on a Charter 
Employment Right, for example, the WTD and (2) whether freedom of contract in article 16 
means that employers are, in fact, free to avoid worker or employment status in order to escape 
obligations imposed by legislation. This enables us to examine the impact of the Employment 
Rights and freedom of contract, discussed in earlier chapters, on the individual employment 
relationship. Answering these questions can also help us to further assess the Charter’s current 
impact at domestic level and whether echoes of its provisions will continue after Brexit.  
The analysis is mostly confined to those employment relationships that are considered 
‘contractual’ rather than the related question of the extension of employment legislation to 
non-contractual employment relationships. Most domestic UK employment legislation defines 
the contract of employment as ‘a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or 
implied, and (if it express) whether oral or in writing’.23 As we shall see below, the broader 
‘worker’ concept also requires the presence of a contract as a necessary prerequisite to 
obtaining that status.  
In national law, the ‘employee’ is defined as ‘an individual who has entered into or works 
under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment’.24 This 
definition of the employee is rather open-ended and it has been left to the courts to develop 
various common law tests to flesh out the meaning of the concept. We have already seen that 
some of these common law tests, such as the requirement for ‘personal service’ or ‘mutuality 
of obligation’ have been used to deny employee status to applicants. In recognition of the 
difficulties that this strictness was posing for the protection of employment standards, the UK 
legislature—largely but not exclusively in its implementation of EU law—began to extend the 
scope of employee-protective legislation to a new category of ‘workers’. It may be that the 
Charter, at least if we consider the issue of personal scope, has very little relevance to the 
contract of ‘employment’ as opposed to the broader ‘worker’ contract dealt with below.  
The EU legislature was already long-cognisant of the fact that employee-protective legislation 
may require a broader personal scope than merely ‘employees’. For this reason, EU 
employment legislation is also usually stated to apply to the seemingly wider category of 
                                                          
23 See for eg s 230 ERA 1996.  
24 ibid.  
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‘workers’. The concept of the worker here should not be confused with that found at national 
level. In EU law, the worker concept must be given an autonomous Union definition, although 
this will influence the domestic definition to the extent that it is used to govern the personal 
scope of implementing legislation. It is, therefore, worth considering the approach of the CJEU 
before turning to that of the domestic courts.  
a. EU level  
 
At an EU level, Bell has recently analysed the CJEU’s treatment of the personal scope of 
employment legislation. He found that although there is no ‘human right’ to be treated as a 
worker or an employee, the CJEU does modify its approach depending on the nature of the 
underlying legislative rights in question (although he does not specifically consider the ‘human 
rights’ nature of the underlying legislation). The real difficulty is that there is no overarching 
status of ‘worker’ that applies across the board of EU employment legislation. Rather, each 
piece of legislation has its own personal scope. But, ‘[t]his variability has to be combined with 
the subsequent interpretative gloss from the Court of Justice’.25 Long before the enactment of 
the Charter, the CJEU in interpreting notions such as ‘worker’ has been cognisant of the 
constitutional significance of concepts such as the free movement of workers.26 When it came 
to determining the personal scope of rights-based legislation, the CJEU already had a 
constitutionalised starting point in the form of the definition of a worker for the purposes of 
free movement law. The most striking example comes from the field of equal pay.  
In Allonby, the applicant sought to rely on the concept of equal pay, a right that was granted 
to ‘workers’, a term that was left undefined by the equal pay provision of the Treaty.27 Allonby 
had been part time lecturer at a college. She (along with a number of other colleagues) was 
dismissed and reengaged via an agency. There was a stipulation that Allonby was to be self-
employed. The number of lecturers to be employed in this way included twice as many women 
as men. The CJEU accepted that the worker concept could not go so far as to include 
independent providers of services who are not in a position of subordination, but the nature of 
the relationship could not entirely be left to the individual Member States to define.28 As the 
CJEU put it, ‘[t]he formal classification of a self-employed person under national law does not 
exclude the possibility that a person must be classified as a worker within the meaning of 
                                                          
25 Mark Bell, ‘Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law’ in Hans W Micklitz (ed), The 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014) 137, 158.  
26 ibid 160.  
27 Art 157 TEU.  
28 Case C-256/01 Allonby.  
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Article [157 TEU] if his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment 
relationship within the meaning of that article’.29 As Bell remarks, ‘[i]n so doing, the Court 
chose to constrain both national autonomy and party autonomy even though the contractual 
arrangements had been designed to reflect the domestic [in that case, the UK] legal approach 
to self-employment, these were supplanted by the Court’s conception of what it means to be a 
worker’.30 The CJEU was particularly persuaded by the fact that the right to equal pay 
contained in the Treaty was merely an expression of the general principle of equality (which 
is now a fundamental right found in the Charter).31  
As mentioned in the Introduction, equality law has always been somewhat of a field apart 
when it comes to the influence of human rights concepts, but what of other rights-based 
legislation? Let us continue with the example of the WTD.  
The WTD applies to ‘workers’. The Directive does not define this concept, but we have already 
seen from Chapter II that the CJEU has applied a broad definition to the worker concept in this 
field, finding that the WTD is to be construed as bringing many contested areas and forms of 
work within its protective scope. Although, as already mentioned, this broad scope may, in 
reality, have less to do with the Charter and more to do with the CJEU’s traditional teleological 
or purposive approach to the interpretation of legislation.  
It can be seen that in the context of employment regulation, the EU has intervened by granting 
legislation a broad personal scope, applying to workers and not just employees. In addition, 
the CJEU has been sensitive to take a purposive approach to the personal scope of such 
legislation, defining the worker concept broadly, even though it is left undefined by the WTD 
itself. It is suggested that this expansive approach to the definition of personal scope is unlikely 
to be affected by article 16 of the Charter. The CJEU when interpreting the scope of 
employment legislation must be cognisant of the fact that directives largely leave it to the 
Member States to define precisely who falls within the protection of the legislation. Therefore, 
the CJEU’s guidance must, of necessity, be drafted in general terms. Specific carve-outs in the 
name of contractual autonomy would lead to difficulties of interpretation and implementation 
for national courts and legislatures. Discussing autonomous concepts in the context of the 
ECHR, Letsas notes that their interpretation is not a mere semantic issue. Rather, ‘legal 
interpretation faces a rich set of choices all of which have a bearing on what legal rights people 
                                                          
29 ibid para 75.  
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have’.32 Thus, the level of discretion granted to Member States to interpret key terms within 
legislation or the Charter must necessarily be curtailed. Itis clear that EU employment 
legislation does not entirely delegate responsibility for defining the scope of the legislation to 
the Member States, but how far into domestic law does this expansive approach actually extend 
and what does this tell us about the Charter’s impact on the domestic hierarchy and thereby 
the individual employment relationship?   
b. UK level  
 
Cabrelli remarks that ‘parties may exercise their freedom of contract to draw up their 
relationship on some contractual basis other than that of a contract of employment’, thereby 
avoiding supposedly mandatory employment legislation, in other words, freedom from the 
employment contract.33 Even without considering any implication of fundamental rights, this 
proposition is not entirely true. In cases such as Autoclenz, the courts have been rather forceful 
in disallowing the negation of employee/worker status through the use of substitution or ‘no 
obligation’ clauses.34  
The question to be addressed here is not that of whether new non-traditional forms of 
employment relationship should be brought within the definition of the employee/worker 
concepts if fundamental Charter rights are at stake. Rather, it is the related question of whether 
human rights-based legislation has the effect of broadening the personal scope of that 
legislation even in the face of competing domestic definitions of personal scope. In other 
words, do the common law tests used to determine worker status adapt in the face of rights-
based legislation or does article 16 actually strengthen the ability of parties to avoid the 
employment contract altogether due to the countervailing freedom of contract? 
It has already been noted, that the ability of the parties to contract out of employment status 
has to some extent already been negated by the broadening of the personal scope of domestic 
legislation to workers rather than merely employees. This has been true of the UK’s 
implementation of EU employment legislation, including legislation that has a fundamental 
rights basis in the Charter. For example, the WTR applies to ‘workers’ which is defined in 
domestic law as:  
an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has 
ceased, worked under)— (a) a contract of employment; or (b) any other contract, 
                                                          
32 George Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’ (2004) 15 EJIL 279. 
33 David Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context (1st edn, OUP 2014) 65.  
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whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby 
the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another 
party to the contract whose status is not (…) that of a client or customer of any 
profession or business (…) carried on by the individual.   
As with the definition of the ‘employee’, or the ‘employment contract’, the concept of the 
worker is left open-ended, in other words, it has been left to the common law, but here we also 
have the autonomous EU definition to contend with. The CJEU has already said that worker 
concept must be defined broadly given the importance of access to certain fundamental social 
rights such as paid annual leave. Here, there was very little lee-way granted to the national 
courts to derogate from the protection set out in the legislation by narrowing its personal scope. 
However, this protection has, to an extent, been undermined by the increased elision of the 
worker and employee concepts in the UK courts. What does this undermining of the 
worker/employee distinction tell us about the UK courts’ attitude to Charter rights-based 
legislation?  
For example, in Tomlinson, Mr Justice Bristow remarked that ‘it is the employee’s situation 
as a party to a contract of employment which is the subject of protection by the legislation 
which it did not enjoy under the common law. Unless he was a party to a contract of 
employment, the statute cannot and does not give him a right’.35 The same is true of a worker. 
If an applicant cannot bring himself within the definition of that term, he will have no right to 
statutory protection, regardless of whether that statute was implementing a Charter right. 
There are three relevant ways in which the legislative definition of the worker is dependent on 
further common law elucidation and thereby three ways in which to undermine worker 
protection and access to Charter rights. These are (1) the requirement for personal service; (2) 
mutuality of obligation and (3) subordination. The first criterion derives from the legislative 
definition itself whereas the second two are entirely creatures of the case law. The 
interpretation of each of these elements may provide an opportunity for the courts to undermine 
the protection found in social legislation applying to workers. An analysis of the definition of 
the worker is interesting in that outside the scope of EU law, the common law courts are 
entitled to develop an entirely autonomous concept of the worker. Is there any evidence of 
divergence of the definition of the worker in the working time context (which is underpinned 
by an EU definition which we now know is supported by a Charter right) and other contexts 
                                                          
35 Tomlinson v Dick Evans ‘U’ Drive Ltd [1978] ICR 639, 642–643. 
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which are not dependent on the EU definition? Assessing this distinction may allow us to gain 
a clearer insight into the Charter’s impact on the domestic hierarchy of norms.  
The first thing to note is that the common law courts, unlike their EU counterpart, have taken 
a decidedly non-purposive, indeed outright formalistic approach to the interpretation of 
protective statutes. For Cabrelli, this preference for literal interpretation ‘functions to 
legitimize the enterprise’s inherent capacity to frustrate the operation of employment laws’.36 
We can see that from cases like Tanton that this literal approach, emphasising autonomy and 
the written contract, can have serious consequences for the effectiveness of employment 
legislation. The second point of note is that the criteria used to determine worker status are 
very similar to those found in the definition of the employee. First, there must be personal 
service and second, both concepts involve economic dependency or subordination as well as 
mutuality of obligation. Despite these similarities, the courts have at times been cognisant of 
the need to adapt common law tests in the worker context. The mutuality of obligations test 
was, for example, found in the James v Redcats  to relate to the first level of mutuality ie the 
wage-work bargain (similar to consideration in ordinary contract law) rather than with the 
continuing nature of the relationship (as required for employee status).37 So it seemed that 
certain tests are easier to meet for workers than they are for employees.  
With regard to the ‘personal service’ element of the test for worker status, the courts have 
struggled to come to a coherent approach, oscillating between a test of ‘integration’ and 
‘dominant purpose’. The dominant purpose test was set out by Elias J in James v Redcats as 
follows:  
the courts are seeking to discover whether the obligation for personal service is the 
dominant feature of the contractual arrangement or not. If it is, then the contract lies in 
the employment field; if it is not—if, for example, the dominant feature of the contract 
is a particular outcome or objective—and the obligation to provide personal service is 
an incidental or secondary consideration, it will lie in the business field.  
The integration test was formulated in Cotswold Developments as asking whether the worker 
(1) actively markets services as an independent person to the world and (2) whether he is 
recruited by the other party to work as an integral part of his operations. Neither of these tests 
places any particular consideration on the fact that the worker concept was specifically 
designed by Parliament to be more expansive than the traditional notion of the employee. 
                                                          
36 Cabrelli (n 33) 71.  
37 James v Redcats Ltd [2007] ICR 1006.   
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Indeed, the very fact that both tests continue to be applied leads to increased uncertainty for 
workers who will have to rely on litigation to determine if they are indeed entitled to the 
protection of statutes. According to Maurice K LJ in Hospital Medical: 
[t]he striking thing about the judgments in Cotswold and Redcats is that neither 
propounds a test of universal application. Langstaff J’s “integration” test was 
considered by him (…) to be demonstrative in “most cases” and Elias J said (…) that 
the “dominant purpose” test “may help” tribunals in “some cases” (…) both were wise 
to eschew a more prescriptive approach.  
Although it is accepted that a certain level of flexibility is to be welcomed from a worker 
protection point of view, it is inappropriate that the ability to rely on rights-based legislation 
should be so dependent on a court’s interpretation of the particular factual scenario. 
Nevertheless, it is generally recognised that the definition of the worker in domestic law is 
broad enough to be compliant with the EU definition.38 It can be seen that although there has 
been some elision between the worker and employee concepts, the courts have been 
sufficiently flexible that the distinction is not entirely undermined. To date, however, no 
specific consideration has been given to the fact that some legislation which applies to workers 
is also protecting a fundamental Charter Employment Right when deciding whether a litigant 
is a worker, an employee or neither.  
It is at this point that a number of recent cases on worker status might prove illustrative of 
whether the courts adopt a different approach to the issue of personal scope in the face of 
Charter based legislation.39 In most of these cases, the applicants were seeking to benefit from 
a number of statutory protections, including the national minimum wage, whistle-blower 
protection (no EU underpinning) limited working hours and non-discrimination (an EU 
Charter rights underpinning). This may enable us to determine whether a grounding in the 
Charter has an impact on how a piece of employment legislation is dealt with by the common 
law courts.  
The starting point should be to note that the definition of the worker found in the ERA 1996 
and the WTR 1998 is also found across the board of domestic employment legislation 
including the National Minimum Wage Act (NMWA) 1998.40 Pimlico Plumbers is a 
particularly interesting case, given its consideration of the definition of the employee, the 
                                                          
38 Deakin and Morris (n 1) 172.   
39 Secretary of State for Justice v Windle & Arada [2016] EWCA Civ 459; Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith [2017] 
EWCA Civ 51; Aslam & Farrar v Uber (2202550/2015) and Dewhurst v Citysprint UK Ltd (2202512/2016). 
40  S 230(3)(b) ERA 1996, s 54(3)(b) National Minimum Wage Act (NMWA) 1998 and reg 2(1) of the WTR. 
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worker and indeed the contract personally to do work under equality law (the latter of which 
is considered further below). In that case, the applicant plumber claimed that he had been 
unfairly and wrongfully dismissed, that he was entitled to pay during medical suspension, 
holiday pay and that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of disability. Both the 
ET and the EAT found that the applicant was not an employee but that he was a worker. He 
could not, therefore, claim for unfair or wrongful dismissal or pay during suspension. The 
question before the CoA became one of whether the applicant has the required personal service 
to be a worker, or whether he was really self-employed. According to that court, ‘the issue 
whether Mr Smith undertook to do or perform personally work or services (…) turns entirely 
on the terms of the contract’.41 The court then goes on to look at a number of cases concerned 
with personal service in the ‘employee’ context, such as Tanton, thus demonstrating the 
similarity of approaches in the worker and employee status fields. Thus, the test for worker 
status remains essentially fact-specific, with no particular weight given to the fact that at least 
some of the heads of claim were supported by an EU fundamental human right, with the court 
simply concluding that ‘Mr Smith undertook to provide his services personally within section 
230(3)(b) of the ERA, regulation 2 of the WTR and the definition of "employment" in section 
83(2) of the EA’.42 This approach is perhaps unsurprising given that the courts have in the past 
tended to treat the employee/worker distinction as one of ‘degree’ and not ‘kind’.43 
In the Uber case, the tribunal was asked to consider whether Uber taxi drivers were workers 
or self-employed. Having found that they were indeed workers, the tribunal helpfully deals 
with the claim for limited working time and the minimum wage under separate headings.44 
Although the preliminary finding that they were workers already meant that they were in 
principle entitled to both claims, it is nonetheless useful to see if any difference of treatment 
is evident when it came to defining the working time of the drivers and their wage rates. 
Starting with working time, the tribunal set out the definition found in regulation 2(1) WTR 
1998 which provides that working time is ‘any period during which he is working, at his 
employer’s disposal and carrying out his activities or duties’. The tribunal adopts a decidedly 
non-purposive approach to the interpretation of this concept in the present case, with the focus 
remaining largely on the technicalities of the contractual relationship between Uber and the 
drivers. The drivers were only to be considered as working while within their territory, with 
the app switched on and when they were available and willing to work. Again, there is no 
                                                          
41 Pimlico Plumbers Ltd & Anor v Smith UKEAT/0495/12/DM [73] (Sir Terence Etherton MR).  
42 Express and Echo Publications v Ernest Tanton [1999] EWCA Civ 949.  
43 Byrne Bros v Baird [2002] ICR 667 [17] (Recorder Underhill).  
44 Aslam & Farrar v Uber (2202550/2015).  
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reference to the purpose of the underlying regulations nor to the fact that they derive from EU 
law which is underpinned by a Charter right.45 Adopting the same close factual (contractual) 
analysis, the tribunal concluded that the drivers undertook ‘unmeasured work’ for the purposes 
of national minimum wage legislation.46  
To some extent, we should not be at all surprised that the Charter plays a very limited role in 
considering the personal scope of employment legislation at domestic level. It has already been 
noted several times that the equality field stands apart as a beacon of human rights 
development in the employment context. Yet, even here, the UK courts have adopted a non-
purposive, literal and formalistic approach to the issue of the personal scope of equality 
legislation. UK equality law applies not only to employees and to workers, but also to a new 
residual category of those employed under a ‘contract personally to do work’.47 This new 
category is distinct from the worker concept in that the former may be engaged in an 
independent business whereas a worker may not. It was thought, therefore, that the broad 
Allonby test for worker status was satisfied by the UK definition. This was called into question 
in Jivraj.48 The latter case may tell us that being rooted in a human right really makes no 
difference to common law courts if they can escape the sanction of incompatibility with EU 
law.  
In Jivraj, the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) held that an arbitrator could not receive protection 
from religious discrimination on the grounds that he did not, following Allonby, have the 
requisite degree of ‘subordination’ to fall within the category of ‘contracts personally to work’. 
Rather, he was an independent provider of a service. For Lord Clarke, equality legislation 
required not simply a contract ‘personally to do work’ but also ‘employment’ under that 
contract which implies a degree of subordination. Despite the UKSC’s putative reliance on 
Allonby, it is quite clear that there is a misunderstanding of the CJEU’s use of the subordination 
concept in that case. As Deakin and Morris put it, ‘[t]he emphasis in Allonby was (…) on 
ensuring that workers who passed the control test came under the protection of EU law, 
whether or not they would otherwise have been protected under national legislation. In Jivraj, 
Allonby was interpreted as deciding that only workers who passed the control test were 
protected by equality law’.49  
                                                          
45 ibid [122]. 
46 ibid [127]. 
47 S 83(2)(a) EqA 2010. 
48 Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40.  
49 Deakin and Morris (n 1) 177.  
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There are two difficulties with Jivraj from a human rights perspective. First, the interpretative 
approach adopted is overly formalistic and runs counter to the EU court’s purposive approach 
in cases such as Allonby. Second, and potentially more problematic is the elision of the contract 
personally to do work with the worker concept which as we have already seen, has itself at 
times been drawn closer to the traditional employment contract.50 In the quartet of worker 
status case identified above, this elision has continued.  
The confusion in Pimlico between the contract personally to do work under the EqA 2010 and 
the worker concept also stands in stark contrast with the decision in van Winkelholf, where the 
court does appear to adopt a more purposive approach to the definition of the contract 
personally to do work. In that case, Lady Hale commented that ‘the question of whether 
[individuals] can also be workers (…) would be a very different question from whether they 
can be employees’.51 Again, in that case, the court was clear that in determining whether an 
applicant fell within the extended categories, the dedicated statutory tests rather than the 
common law must be applied. To that extent, the common law tests for employee status should 
have no role to play here.52 The emphasis here is squarely on the intention of the legislature, 
ie a purposive approach to interpretation. This means, then, that although the common law 
continues to play a role, it needs to be modified in the face of legislative rights.  
The above discussion shows us that common law tests such as those governing employment 
statuses do not necessarily yield in the face of legislation with a Charter rights underpinning. 
This is not to say, however, the common law courts have not been receptive to legislative 
standards (which in turn might be underpinned by the Charter). Clearly though, the Charter 
has had very little impact on the external hierarchy of norms at domestic level, beyond the role 
the Charter has in the implementation of EU employment legislation. Does that also suggest 
that the Charter has had a limited role on the internal hierarchy, ie the relationship between 
contractual terms?  
 
2. The internal hierarchy  
 
The question here is whether the Charter might have an effect on the relationship between the 
various types of terms found within a contract of employment. The employment relationship, 
                                                          
50 ibid.  
51 Clyde & Co LLP and another v Bates van Winkelhof [2014] UKSC 32 [26].   
52 Jeremias Prassl, ‘Pimlico Plumbers, Uber Drivers, Cycle Couriers, and Court Translators: Who is a Worker?’ 
(forthcoming LQR) 8.   
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perhaps more so than any other field governed by contract law, is necessarily incomplete by 
design. It simply is not possible to set out the entirety of the rights and obligations of the parties 
in advance. The ability of the external norms set out above to influence the employment 
relationship may be helped or hindered by the hierarchy of sources of terms within the 
employment contract itself. In other words, just how much of the employment relationship is 
governed by the express contractual agreement between the two parties?  
Incompleteness in the employment context is to some extent resolved by granting the employer 
wide discretionary powers. These powers do not take the form of contractual terms and so are 
not considered here. Rather, we are interested in the relationship between the express terms of 
the agreement and terms implied at common law as ‘necessary incidents’ of the employment 
relationship. The express terms have traditionally taken precedence over the implied terms 
which are only ever dispositive (derogable). To what extent do human rights concepts 
embolden the courts’ use of common law implied terms to preserve social standards, even in 
the face of express agreement to the contrary and do the Employment Rights or article 16 have 
any role to play here?  
Implied terms are only ‘binding in the absence of manifested assent to the contrary’.53 As such, 
they can easily be excluded by express agreement of the parties to the employment contract. 
As Cabrelli notes, ‘whether and if so how, a rule of law ought to emerge whereby implied 
terms are treated by the common law as mandatory and so impervious to disapplication’ is a 
contentious issue.54 He points to public policy as a potential source of such inderogability but 
recognises that there is little judicial or legislative appetite for such an approach. It may be the 
case in the future than only those implied terms that are seen as ‘fundamental’ might become 
inderogable. MTC is arguably a candidate for such fundamental status. Other authors, such as 
Collins, have described this idea as ‘legal heresy’, marking a rupture with the ordinary 
principles of contract law under which implied terms are ousted by the express contractual 
provisions.55  
A final issue is the extent to which the development of implied terms in the common law 
contract of employment is dependent on the existence of a background of legislative concepts. 
We have already seen that the implied term of MTC was conceived in legislation and born of 
the common law, but has it now taken on a life of its own, becoming truly autonomous and 
                                                          
53 Randy E Barnett, ‘The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent (1992) 78 Virginia Law 
Review 821, 825.  
54 Cabrelli (n 33) 232.  
55 Hugh Collins, ‘Legal Responses to the Standard Form Contract of Employment’ (2007) 36 ILJ 2. 
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not dependent on the pre-existence of protective legislation? Would the common law return to 
ordinary contractual principles, thereby abandoning the notion of an employment contract? 
There is no doubt that the existence of a written list of rights whether contained in the Charter 
or ordinary legislation has had the effect of emboldening the courts to develop implied terms. 
In their absence, it is likely to be seen as a matter best left to the legislature.  
This issue leads to a broader question of whether the private agreement between the parties to 
an employment contract should be allowed to oust legislative protection ie the distinction 
between ius cogens (non-derogable) and ius dispositivum (derogable) rights.56 Cabrelli argues 
that in the case of conflicts between the parties, with each raising competing contractual 
claims, ‘the judges will (…) choose between them. If there is a core minimum of employment 
principles which are (…) inderogable, the judges can consider the most relevant underlying 
principle (…) and need not concern themselves as to whether the principle has been ousted by 
(i) the agreement or (ii) some other medium’.57 The problem with the current judicial approach 
is that ‘whether the right operates as a ‘ceiling’ or a ‘floor’ of employee protection really 
depends on the source of the derogation being considered’.58 For example, legislation will 
generally prevail over competing common law concepts. There are, of course, different forms 
of derogation. First, there is derogation within the contract itself, ie an employment right is 
disapplied (for example, an express derogation, an exclusion of liability clause, an 
acknowledgement of non-reliance clause).59 Second, an external document (eg a company 
handbook) which is incompatible with an employment right may be incorporated into the 
contract by reference.60 Third, an express term of the contract may not be compatible with an 
implied term.  
It is clear that the Charter has not had the effect of introducing any notion of inderogability in 
the employment context. The hierarchy of norms may be disrupted, or at least modified in the 
presence of human rights, but this phenomenon was already in evidence when it came to the 
changing relationship between common law and employment legislation. There is no 
particular consequence of invoking the notion of human rights. To date, the courts have 
addressed the preservation of the core content of the employment relationship through ordinary 
contractual principles such as implied terms.  
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Article 16 will not change things either. The maximum extent of the parties’ ability to avoid 
core employee-protective terms while still holding a contract of employment has probably been 
reached. It is by now clear that there cannot be an employment contract without mutual trust 
and confidence, for example. The jurisprudence on sham contracts also demonstrates that the 
ability of the parties to avoid an employment contract altogether is also largely restricted. It is 
perhaps better to view the derogability issue as consisting of a spectrum rather than in 
absolutes. There is no absolute right to avoid the employment contract or to disapply 
employee-protective terms, nor is there an absolute right to insist on the application of a term 
due to its human rights underpinning. For the foreseeable future, this is precisely how the 
relationship between employment norms will continue to be viewed. This is despite the fact 
that as Freedland put it, ‘the distinction is a particular way, not just of classifying legal norms, 
but also of talking about one of the deepest ideological debates about the making and 
interpreting of laws, namely the debate about freedom of contract’.61 Given the weak influence 
of the Charter at the micro level of the employment relationship, there may be no added value 
in raising the Charter in this context.  
 
3. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has demonstrated the influence (or lack thereof) of the Charter on the individual 
employment relationship. It has done so by assessing the role of the Charter in disrupting the 
hierarchy of sources of employment norms at domestic level. The common law and 
employment legislation have a long history of interaction and it can be seen that the common 
law has, at times, been modified in the wake of competing social rights contained in legislation. 
Having said this, the role of the common law (of contract) in the employment context remains 
prevalent given the continued contractual underpinnings of the employment relationship. This 
has meant that access to the Employment Rights is policed by common law concepts such as 
employee and worker status, meaning that legislation, even with a connection to fundamental 
rights, may not act as an autonomous source of regulation. As such, the British courts have not 
given any real consideration to the fact that a piece of legislation was linked to the Charter 
when it came to interpreting and applying that legislation. It is clear that the Charter has not 
resulted in any rapprochement between the common law and the civil law systems, with the 
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latter having a clear notion of an employment law hierarchy and the former continuing to 
prioritise flexibility.  
We should not really be surprised that the Charter has played such a limited role in the 
domestic hierarchy given that the Charter strictly only applies when Member States are acting 
within the scope of EU law. Outside of that context, national interpretive methods apply and 
can be used to blunt the employee-protective aims of legislation. British judges continue to 
(over) emphasise contractual tests in the employment context. Even when a piece of legislation 
is within the scope of EU law, and is indeed underpinned by the Charter, the wide margin of 
discretion left to the national courts can still have the effect of limiting access to those rights. 
It is less surprising, therefore, that the Charter has had an even more limited role within the 
internal hierarchy between the contractual terms themselves. Neither the Charter, nor human 
rights concepts more generally, are likely to lead to the introduction of a stronger notion of 
inderogability into the employment context, although in future, some terms such as MTC may 
be viewed as fundamental to the employment relationship and therefore inderogable. In terms 
of contractual autonomy, there are already significant limitations on the ability of employer’s 
to avoid the employment relationship altogether. Overall, then, the impact of the Charter on 
the individual employment relationship has been minimal. What then might be the 




VI. Brexit and the Consequences of the Charter’s Removal 
 
Having looked in the previous chapters at the Charter’s impact on the employment 
relationship, both in general and on the individual contract, we are now in a better position to 
begin to assess the impact of the Withdrawal Bill and consequences of the Charter’s removal 
for the employment relationship. An understanding of what the UK might lose in the Brexit 
process can also help us to understand the Charter’s current reach. We begin by setting out the 
provisions of the Withdrawal Bill before considering how retained EU employment law will 
fit into the existing hierarchy of norms (Section A). This is followed in Section B by a 
consideration of the future roles of the Employment Rights and freedom of contract in the 
absence of the Charter altogether.  
 
A. The Withdrawal Bill and the Employment Relationship   
 
This section deals with the key provisions of the Withdrawal Bill before assessing whether it 
really makes any difference whether or not the Charter applies.   
 
1. The Withdrawal Bill  
 
The UK Government has made it clear that, in its opinion, there can be no real Brexit without 
removing the UK from the somewhat ambiguously termed ‘direct jurisdiction’ of the CJEU. 
There are currently ongoing attempts in Parliament to ensure that the Charter is codified in UK 
law but as it stands, the Bill makes clear that the Charter will no longer apply. In that case, it 
will fall on the UK courts to take on the full range of tasks associated with the interpretation 
and application of (former) EU employment legislation. 
Clause 2(1) of the Bill provides that EU-derived legislation applicable before Brexit will 
continue to have effect in UK law. Clause 5(1) makes clear, however, that the principle of 
supremacy of EU law will no longer strictly apply, although it will, according to clause 5(2) 
continue to govern the ‘interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment or rule of 
law passed or made before exit day’. 
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This may have continued significance for the ability of litigants to enforce their EU-derived 
employment rights. In Benkharbouche, workers at the embassies of Sudan and Libya were 
found to be entitled to have their EU-derived employment law (discrimination and working 
time) claims heard in a UK Employment Tribunal despite the presence of a conflict with the 
State Immunity Act 1978.1 Preventing reliance on these EU rights would breach article 47 of 
the Charter, which guarantees access to justice. This judgment should also remind us of the 
protection that will continue to be provided by article 6 of the ECHR, the Convention right to 
a fair trial. Lord Sumption held that ‘a conflict between EU law and English domestic law 
must be resolved in favour of the former, and the latter must be disapplied; whereas the remedy 
in the case of inconsistency with article 6 of the Human Rights Convention is a declaration of 
incompatibility’.2  
The effect of clause 5(2) is to create a new category of ‘retained EU law’ that must, somehow, 
fit into the existing hierarchy of norms. For employment law purposes, this may not be an 
immediate issue. As we saw, much of the existing EU employment acquis has already been 
implemented in domestic legislation. However, there still remain serious doubts as to the 
precise status of post-Brexit CJEU case law (clause 6 retains that court’s pre-Brexit case law, 
with more flexibility to amend that case law) and whether this can be applied or departed from 
by the domestic courts. Lady Hale, the newly appointed President of the Supreme Court has 
called for clarification in this area. Most importantly, for our purposes, the Bill is clear that the 
Charter will not apply. 
Clause 5(4) of the Bill provides that ‘the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic 
law on or after exit day’. This presents some major practical difficulties. First, we know that 
it is often impossible to pinpoint precisely the influence of the Charter in CJEU decisions. 
Sometimes, the Charter is front and centre in employment law decisions. In others, it is barely 
mentioned (if at all). In earlier cases, the CJEU may simply have been reticent in its use of the 
Charter, recognising the sensitive nature of social rights and grappling (as it continues to do) 
with the distinction between rights and principles. 
It has also been argued that incorporating the Charter into domestic law post-Brexit would be 
undemocratic. This is because the interpretation of the Charter rights is entirely a matter for 
the CJEU. Eduardo Gill-Pedro argues in a recent blog that the CJEU interprets the Charter in 
                                                          
1 Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62.  
2 ibid para 78.  
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the light of the objectives of the Union.3 Once the UK leaves the Union it will no longer share 
those objectives and so it would be undemocratic to rely on the Charter. 
I would argue that the Charter does not merely serve as an overarching political guide to the 
future direction of the Union. Certainly, in the employment context it has a less ambitious 
remit, steering as it does, the interpretation and review of employment legislation. If the 
Government is committed to preserving the existing employment law acquis it should have 
nothing to fear from retaining the Charter. In any case, stripped of its constitutional status into 
the future, the Charter may prove little threat to the amendment or repeal of domestic 
employment legislation, save to the extent that the supremacy principle continues to apply on 
a limited basis. There would, therefore, be no ‘intrusion’ of external values into the legislative 
process. 
Finally, it could be argued that whether the Charter applies or not really makes very little 
practical difference. First, as was noted elsewhere in this thesis, the effect of the Charter’s 
Employment Rights, largely dismissed as mere ‘principles’, has been somewhat disappointing. 
Second, and more significantly, the Withdrawal Bill itself, at clause 5(5) preserves 
fundamental rights that exist autonomously of the Charter and ‘references to the Charter in any 
case law are, so far as necessary for this purpose, to be read as if they were references to any 
corresponding retained fundamental rights or principles’. 
It is clear, then, the Charter will continue to play a role in the guise of those provisions that are 
already reflected in the general principles of EU law (although Schedule 1 to the Withdrawal 
Bill will limit the legal effect of those general principles). In many areas, but notably the 
equality field, it was the general principles that opened the way to the application of 
fundamental rights in employment law, although I accept that the adoption of the Charter had 
an emboldening effect even prior to its granting of full legal effect. Although, admittedly the 
status of the Employment Rights as general principles remains unclear and the Withdrawal 
Bill provides in any event that the general principles cannot act as a standard of review for 
retained EU law. Separating the role of the Charter and the general principles will in any case 
be difficult, as discussed below regarding the relationship between the EFTA Court and the 
CJEU.  
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Given the impending absence of the Charter, we now turn to consider how the UK courts 
might, in future, interpret legislation that was once underpinned by a Charter Employment 
Right.  
 
2. Interpreting employment legislation with a former rights underpinning  
 
What does the future hold for employment legislation that was once supported by a 
fundamental Charter right? The irony is that Brexit may require the common law courts to 
explicitly consider social rights requirements in their reasoning, including where the Charter 
might have fit into that reasoning. 
Not all existing British employment legislation derives from EU law. The minimum wage, 
collective bargaining and unfair dismissal are largely domestic creatures. The latter is a 
particularly interesting example of an area in which the Charter does not currently apply but 
could potentially apply to EU employment legislation in the future. This is because the Charter 
tells us that unfair dismissal protection is a fundamental right. Article 30 of the Charter 
provides that ‘every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’. Article 153 TFEU provides the 
Union with a legal basis for the adoption of legislation intended to protect ‘workers where 
their employment contract is terminated’. Despite this, there is no specific EU Directive 
dealing with unjust dismissal. With the Charter’s clear indication that protection from 
unjustified dismissal is a fundamental right (albeit in the Solidarity Title), how have the UK 
courts dealt with the concept as it arises in national legislation?  
The ERA 1996 provides for certain types of dismissal which may be ‘potentially’ fair. In order 
for a dismissal to be potentially fair it must first fall under one of these legislative categories 
of potentially fair reasons.4 It should be noted that this category of potentially fair reasons is 
construed very broadly and ‘only a completely unreasoned or arbitrary dismissal (…) is likely 
to fall outside the scope’.5 In addition to the specified potentially fair reasons for dismissal 
there is an additional ‘catch all’ category of some other substantial reason (SOSR). This 
residual category has the effect of increasing the possibilities for the employer to escape 
liability under the legislation, but it also renders the other reasons for dismissal largely 
redundant.  
                                                          
4 S 98 ERA 1996.  
5 Deakin and Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart 2012) 504.  
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In addition to the reason for dismissal being potentially fair, the employer’s behaviour must 
also have been ‘reasonable’. In other words, did the employer act reasonably in the 
circumstances in treating the reasons as sufficient for the dismissal?6 This formulation suggests 
that ‘the standard here is more procedural than substantive, that is to say, concerned less with 
the fairness of the outcome than with the fairness of the procedure by which it was arrived at’.7 
In this respect, the employer is protected as long as he acts within a ‘band of reasonableness’ 
or a ‘band of reasonable responses’ ie ‘whether in the particular circumstances of each case the 
decision to dismiss the employee fell within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable 
employer might have adopted’.8 This test has been heavily criticised. In Haddon, Morrison J 
held that ‘the mantra “the band of reasonable responses” is not helpful because it has led 
tribunals into applying what amounts to a perversity test (…) The moment one talks of a 
“range” or “band” of reasonable responses one is conjuring up the possibility of extreme views 
at either end of the band or range. In reality it is most unlikely’.9 In other words, it is only in 
extreme outlying cases in which the employer’s behaviour will be found unreasonable, thereby 
undermining the protection of employees in this context.  
Despite recognition from the courts of the harshness of this test, they nonetheless feel bound 
by existing jurisprudence. In Foley, the court took the view that authority which had ‘been 
followed almost every day in almost every employment tribunal and on appeals for nearly 20 
years [should] remain binding’ until Parliament decides otherwise. 10 As Deakin and Morris 
remark, ‘[t]he courts may be thought of as having adapted to the employment context an 
approach of the common law of tort and contract to the assessment of the standard of care 
expected of professionals in negligence cases’.11 They further point out the failure of the UK’s 
domestic unfair dismissal regime to protect employees from dismissals which may have 
implications for their ECHR rights.12 It is suggested, for example, that ‘the “band of 
reasonable” responses test should not be applied in its existing form where an employee’s 
Convention rights have been violated, although to date judicial comments to this effect have been 
obiter’.13  
                                                          
6 S 98(4)(a) ERA 1996. 
7 Deakin and Morris (n 5) 504. 
8 Iceland Frozen Foods v. Jones [1982] IRLR 439, 442 (EAT).  
9 Haddon v Van den Bergh Foods [1999] IRLR 672 (Morrison J).  
10 Post Office v Foley; Midland Bank plc v Madden [2000] IRLR 827, 829 (Mummery LJ).  
11 Deakin and Morris (n 5) 529.  
12 A rare example is the abolition of the requirement for continuity of employment before dismissal which was a 
result of the ECtHR decision in Redfearn v The United Kingdom HEJUD [2012] ECHR 1878.  
13 Deakin and Morris (n 5) 546. See Pay v UK [2009] IRLR 139.  
217 
 
We can see here that domestic legislation in the unfair dismissal context has been largely 
unreceptive to fundamental rights concepts despite the obvious implications of dismissal for 
the human rights of workers and the fact that protection from unfair dismissal is itself a 
fundamental right contained in the Charter. This example serves to highlight that often 
employee-protective legislation may lose much of its potency when it comes into contact with 
the common law of contract, with the British courts granting a large margin of discretion to 
employers exercising their managerial prerogative. In any case, this should not be surprising, 
given that we have already seen that legislation such as the WTR with a clear Charter basis is 
still interpreted by domestic courts in a manner which largely ignore its fundamental rights 
implications. This also does not bode well for the future interpretation of employment 
legislation that had a former fundamental rights underpinning prior to Brexit.  
Having addressed the manner in which the Government intends to remove the Charter from 
domestic law and the potential consequences for employment legislation, we now turn to 
consider how the Employment Rights and freedom of contract might continue to have an 
influence in the absence of the Charter and the effect this might have on the employment 
relationship.  
 
B. Mapping the Charter Rights onto Domestic Law  
 
We now know that the Charter is likely to be removed from domestic law post-Brexit. Are 
there any alternatives to the Charter that could continue to preserve the Employment Rights 
and what will be the future role for the principle of contractual autonomy? We start by 
exploring the ability of the common law to protect social rights by first examining the 
relationship between the common law and human rights concepts.  
 
1. Human rights and the common law 
 
The adoption of the Charter, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and, indeed, Brexit, have 
ironically led to a resurgence of interest in the development and protection of human rights at 
common law. As Dickins notes, the common law (rather than legislation) is once again being 
viewed as the primordial source of protection of human rights in this country:  
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Ever since the 17th century the common law has been a hugely important factor in the 
UK constitution. Today, its role is as great as ever, the more so given that previous 
faith in the omniscience and incorruptibility of Parliament is not as strong as it used to 
be. In the UK it is judges who area increasingly viewed as prime protectors of human 
rights.14 
Proponents of common law human rights argue that it has to some extent been hamstrung by 
the enactment of the HRA. As Fordham puts it, ‘the common law is not limited to, but rather 
liberated from, the incidence and scope of those rights which happen to be found in the 
ECHR’.15 This overlooks the fact that the HRA is a mere twenty years old, while the common 
law has had centuries to develop human rights standards. For Fordham, this can be explained 
away by the fact that ‘[t]he inhibitors on the development and power of common law rights 
protection are matters of historical and considered judicial self-restraint. They are always open 
to re-evaluation’.16 If the HRA has led to the courts ignoring or overlooking the development 
of common law rights, this too can be explained by judicial inaction. There is nothing in the 
enactment of the HRA that prevents the simultaneous development of the common law. 
Indeed, this is a development that many human rights lawyers would welcome. I am more 
sceptical. The reason, it is suggested, that the courts have tended to rely on the HRA even 
where the common law may have provided a similar outcome, is for the very fact that the HRA 
is more readily accessible to both the judiciary and the general public. In addition, and unlike 
the common law, there are clear, predetermined remedies available for the breach of a right 
contained in the HRA, for example a declaration of incompatibility. Of course, the 
effectiveness or indeed appropriateness of such as remedy may be challenged. There are also 
a number of obstacles preventing litigants from enforcing common law rights.  
The first major obstacle to relying on the common law as a source of human rights protection 
is that is it developed piece-meal, over time and therefore cannot contain an ‘authoritative 
catalogue’ of rights at any one time, although proponents of common law rights might point 
to this flexibility as a positive element. Nevertheless, and as Elliot comments, although 
common law rights existed, or at least could be inferred from case law, they ‘appeared to 
occupy a terrain substantially narrower than that occupied by the Convention rights. Indeed, it 
was the failure of domestic law to protect the full range of such rights that underpinned the 
                                                          
14 Brian Dickson, ‘The United Kingdom’ in Patricia Popelier, Catherine van de Heyning and Piet van Nuffel 
(eds), Human Rights Protection in the European Legal Order: The Interaction between the European and the 
National Courts (Intersentia 2010) 343.  
15 Michael Fordham QC, ‘Common Law Social Rights’   
<www.blackstonechambers.com/documents/215/Common_Law_Rights> 2 accessed 29 December 2017. 
16 ibid 5.  
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desire of the Blair administration to legislate so as to see “rights brought home”’.17 This is a 
key element undermining the argument that the common law provides adequate human rights 
protection. It was the very failure of the common law to act as a clear standard against which 
human rights violations could be assessed that necessitated the enactment of the HRA in the 
first place.  
Even more fundamentally, because of the relationship between the common law and statute, 
the common law must give way in the face of competing legislation, although as we have seen, 
it may retain a residual role. As Lord Hoffman put it in Simms: 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary 
to fundamental principles of human rights (…) The constraints upon its exercise by 
Parliament are ultimately political, not legal (…) Fundamental rights cannot be 
overridden by general or ambiguous words.18  
It is clear that in English law, there is not much added value in attaching the term 
‘constitutional’ or ‘fundamental’ to a particular right in the absence of a written text.19 
For Elliot, there are two ways of looking at the relationship between the common law and the 
HRA. First, common law ‘dynamism’ might extend beyond the mere negative assertion that 
the HRA has not precluded the common law’s continued development. Second, the HRA has 
in fact been used to inform and inspire the development of the common law and common law 
human rights, bringing out the common law’s latent unfulfilled potential.20 Fikfak further notes 
that if the common law, as informed by international human rights were to become an 
increasingly important source of rights protection in this country, ‘[i]nstead of treating 
international law as politics, courts will have asserted its legal nature’, bypassing controversial 
debates about the appropriateness of adopting ‘foreign’ human rights standards’.21 She 
concludes that ‘English judges have therefore taken the initiative to divorce the understanding 
of human rights protection as exclusively international in character and to strengthen the 
domestic, autonomy basis on which rights protection can be ensured in the UK’.22 With 
respect, it is suggested that far from divorcing international human rights from political debate, 
                                                          
17 Mark Elliot, ‘Beyond the European Convention: Human Rights and the Common Law' (2015) CLP 1, 4.  
18 Simms [2000] AC 115 [131] (Lord Hoffmann). 
19 Richard Clayton, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: Common Law Rights and the Human Rights Act’ (2015) Public 
Law 3, 8.  
20 Elliot (n 17) 10.  
21 Veronika Fikfak, ‘English Courts and the “Internalisation” of the European Convention of Human Rights?- 
Between Theory and Practice’ Legal Studies Research Paper No. 37/2015 2.  
22 ibid 15.  
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this is rather a recognition by the judiciary that the application of international, or at least 
‘European’ human rights domestically, has become a rather toxic issue.  
The repeal of the HRA may now be a distant prospect. The abolition of the Charter, however, 
is an altogether more imminent danger. If there is some hope that public law rights may be 
replicated by the common law, is the same true of the Charter’s Employment Rights? Is the 
common law capable of protecting employment rights or does it remain wedded to the 
‘libertarian paradigm’ often exalted by proponents of common law rights?23 Can the common 
law act as a conduit through which the Charter’s Employment Rights might be reflected?  
 
2. The common law as a conduit for the Employment Rights  
 
In chapter V, we considered the manner in which the common law interacts with employment 
legislation. There is a clear potential there for the courts to take account of the nature of an 
underlying right when interpreting and applying legislation. But, if that legislation is removed 
post-Brexit, to what extent can the common law itself step into the breach to ensure the 
continued (autonomous) protection of the Charter’s Employment Rights? As we saw, a similar 
exercise has already been carried out in relation to the HRA/common law relationship. It has 
been suggested that, at least in some instances, the common law is just as capable of protecting 
human rights standards as the Convention/HRA.24 Is the same true of the common law and the 
Charter’s Employment Rights and what are the consequences for the employment 
relationship? 
2.1. An autonomous source of employment ‘rights’  
 
Perhaps we need to extend to the social context the distinction that according to Elliot ‘can—
and needs to be—drawn between values associated with the common law and rights protected 
by it. It is true that the Convention embodies rights that amount to specific manifestations of 
values that, at some level of abstraction, are reflected in the English common law tradition’.25 
It is perhaps a futile exercise to embark on a search for employment ‘rights’ contained in the 
common law. A more fruitful exercise may to look for its underlying values, as contemplated 
in chapter II.  
                                                          
23 TRS Allan, ‘In Defence of the Common Law Constitution: Unwritten Rights as Fundamental Law’ LSE 
Working Papers 5/2009. 
24 Elliot (n 17) 1. 
25 ibid 5.  
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There is a certain irony in the fact that the CJEU considers (at least some) of the Charter’s 
Employment Rights to be too vague/incomplete to act as autonomous standards while at the 
same time they may be too specific to be incorporated as rights in the common law. It is 
suggested that one such expression of the underlying values of the common law of the 
employment contract will be the continued development of the above-mentioned term of 
mutual trust and confidence (MTC), which will be implied as a ‘necessary incident’ of the 
contract of employment, ie a term implied in law, regardless of the intentions of the parties.26 
The test for the implication of a term at common law is therefore one of ‘necessity’ ie based 
on wider considerations of public policy rather than necessity in terms of efficacy.27 The 
implied term of MTC performs two functions. First, it prevents the disappointment of the 
employee’s legitimate expectations. Second, it subjects the power and discretion of the 
employer to a measure of meaningful control.28 
Since its inception in the unfair dismissal context, the implied term of MTC has expanded to 
other areas. In Malik, the term was formulated as the employer shall not ‘without reasonable 
and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee’.29 To what 
extent, therefore, is this implied term capable of reflecting the content of the Charter’s 
Employment Rights?  
As already mentioned, the common law is incapable of transposing the level of detail contained 
in the Charter’s provisions and accompanying Explanations. It will be recalled that article 31, 
for example, guarantees workers a right to limited working hours, daily and weekly rest as 
well as paid annual leave. The accompanying legislation, the WTD, fleshes out this provision 
with quantitative guarantees for each right (eg four weeks’ annual leave). It is clear that 
common law implied terms will not able to bear the weight of such a specific provision, but 
what about the more general principle that employees should be protected from over-work? 
A potential approach might be found in Johnstone.30 In that case, a junior doctor sought 
damages for ill-health brought on by working excessive hours. His employment contract 
specified that he was to work a basic 40-hour week and to be available for an additional 48 
hours’ overtime. Browne-Wilkinson VC argued that ‘express and implied terms (….) have to 
                                                          
26 Edwin Peel (ed), Treitel, The Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 255.  
27 David Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context (1st edn, OUP 2014) 156.  
28 ibid 185.  
29 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] UKHL 23 (Lord Nicholls).  
30 Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1992] QB 333.  
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be capable of co-existence’.31 He reasoned that the express term of the contract simply gave 
the employer the option of requiring the employee to work overtime. This was an option that 
had to be exercised in accordance with implied terms. In other words, the employer had to act 
reasonably and with regard for the health of the employee. This case demonstrates that at least 
to some extent, implied terms are capable of preserving employment ‘standards’ but there are 
a number of obstacles standing in the way of the development of common law employment 
‘rights’? 
First, although a common law concept, we have already noted that the implied term of MTC 
developed largely as a result of the common law’s interaction with legislation and so it is not 
an autonomous right. In addition, it is perhaps a stretch to require common law concepts to 
perform functions for which they were never intended. More problematic still for the common 
law’s ability to act as a rights source is the issue of derogation already discussed above. Given 
these difficulties associated with replicating the Charter in domestic law, it is perhaps a good 
opportunity to ask whether it is all worth it. What is the added value of relying on the Charter?   
 
2.2. The added value of the Charter 
 
Before we begin lamenting the Charter’s absence, it may be worth taking a step back and 
asking what added value continuing to apply the Charter might actually give. It has already 
been remarked that having a written statement of fundamental rights is beneficial, in terms of 
legal certainty and public accessibility. The focus of this section will rather be on cases in 
which the Charter could have been raised but was not, with the case being decided entirely on 
domestic legal principles to achieve a human rights-compliant approach. The most remarkable 
of these cases has been the recent decision handed down in Unison.32  
This case concerned the validity of the UK Government’s introduction of fees for access to 
Employment Tribunals in 2013. These fees had led to a significant reduction in the number of 
claims being brought to tribunals. In quashing the fees, the UKSC relied heavily on the 
common law right of access to justice noting that ‘the right of access to justice is not an idea 
recently imported from the continent of Europe, but has long been deeply embedded in our 
constitutional law. The case has therefore been argued primarily on the basis of the common 
law right of access to justice’.33 This decision has been heralded as signalling the ability of the 
                                                          
31  ibid [351] (Browne-Wilkinson VC).  
32 UNISON v The Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.  
33 ibid [64].  
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common law adequately to protect rights post-Brexit or indeed that the relevant fundamental 
right—here access to the courts has been ‘Brexit-proofed’. But this is to overlook the 
significant engagement undertaken by the Court with article 47 of the Charter which 
guarantees the right to access justice. The UKSC concluded that ‘the Fees Order imposes 
limitations on the exercise of EU rights which are disproportionate, and that it is therefore 
unlawful under EU law’.34 So, while it is broadly to be welcomed that the courts are engaging 
with multiple human rights sources, particularly in the run up to Brexit, the underlying EU 
rights continued to play a significant role in this case. It should also be borne in mind that the 
right guaranteed in this case, access to justice, is a classic human right protected in most 
Western democratic constitutions. What will not be protected post-Brexit, are the underlying 
Employment Rights that the litigants would want to ‘access’ the courts to defend. The UKSC 
itself was cognisant of this fact, remarking that ‘[t]he Court of Appeal identified 24 of the 
rights enforceable in ETs as having their source in EU law’.35 
In other cases, the Charter has made no appearance at all. Walker concerned access to a pension 
scheme following the death of a same sex partner. The employer in this case refused to 
guarantee that the applicant’s spouse would receive payments following his death as the 
marriage had occurred post-retirement. UK legislation provided an exception to the equal 
treatment principle. This allowed for continued discrimination in relation to benefits that had 
accrued prior to the entry into force of the same sex marriage legislation. The question was 
whether this exception was compatible with the Framework Directive. The main focus of the 
decision is on the non-retroactivity principle in both EU and domestic law.36 Thus, the case 
turned on the compatibility of the derogation found in UK equality law with the Framework 
Directive, with no mention of the Charter or the fundamental rights aspects of the case beyond 
the retroactivity issue. For the court, it was entirely foreseeable that Walker would get married 
at some point (to a woman), even after retirement.37 His spouse, whether male or female, was 
therefore entitled to the benefit of the pension scheme upon his death. To hold otherwise would 
be irreconcilable with the ‘plain effect of the Directive’.38 
In two other cases, there is wide discussion on human rights issues, mostly relating to the 
Convention (and not the Charter), but these arguments were not determinative to the outcome 
of the case. The first of these is the case of Bull v Hall.39 In that case, a gay couple had been 
                                                          
34 ibid [117].  
35 ibid [105].  
36 Walker v Innospec [2017] UKSC 47 [22]–[23].  
37 ibid [58].  
38 ibid [72].  
39 Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73.  
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denied a double room at a B&B on account of the owners’ deeply held religious conviction 
that Christian marriage should be defined as that between a man and a woman. They would 
equally refuse a double room to an unmarried heterosexual couple. According to Lady Hale, 
‘[t]he issues in discrimination law are difficult enough, but there are also competing human 
rights in play [religious belief v the right to a private life]’.40 EU human rights did not come 
into play as the UK regulations ‘are not implanting a right which is (as yet) recognised in EU 
law [access to services based on sexual orientation]’ but ‘as the same concepts and principles 
are applied in the Equality Act 2010 both to rights which are and rights which are not 
recognised in EU law, it is highly desirable that they should receive interpretations which are 
both internally consistent and consistent with EU law’.41 Again, however, the focus of the 
judgment was not so much on the human rights issue, but rather on the application of the 
legislation as ‘[t]o permit someone to discriminate on the ground that he did not believe that 
persons of homosexual orientation should be treated equally with persons of heterosexual 
orientation would be to create a class of people who were exempt from the discrimination 
legislation’.42 This would defeat the purpose of the legislation despite the fact that ‘Parliament 
was very well aware that there were deeply held religious objections to what was being 
proposed and careful consideration had been given as to how best to accommodate these within 
the overall purpose’.43  
In Ashers, the ‘gay cake case’, the judge made similar remarks, noting that ‘“[t]he law in 
Northern Ireland prohibits the defendants from acting as they did and, in relation to the 
requirement to balance competing interests, I find that the extent to which the 2006 
Regulations and/or the 1998 Order limit the manifestation of the defendant’s religious beliefs, 
those limitations are necessary in a democratic society and are a proportionate means of 
achieving the legitimate aim which is the protection of the rights and freedoms of the 
plaintiff’.44 In other words, there was no need to read down the legislation for its compatibility 
with the Convention.  
It seems from the above that the common law is simply not stable enough a foundation upon 
which to rebuild the protection of the Employment Rights post-Brexit. The Employment 
Rights will, of course, continue to be found in the implementing legislation, but even that is 
vulnerable to repeal. We know, however, that a role for at least some of the Charter’s 
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provisions will be preserved in the form of the general principles. In that respect, there may be 
some lessons to draw from the relationship between those countries not in the EU, but which 
might never the less be influenced by the Charter.  
 
3. The view from Norway: back to general principles again?  
 
Should the UK eventually adopt the Norway model of joining EFTA/the EEA, the Charter will 
formally cease to be of application in the UK. That is not to say that the Charter will become 
irrelevant.45 As Wahl remarks, ‘[f]rom the absence of incorporation one cannot just assume 
that the Charter does not have any effects of a secondary and/or indirect nature. Such ancillary 
effects can be significant and should in any event not be underestimated’.46 Such effects can 
in particular, be achieved via the principle of homogeneity which governs the relationship 
between the EEA Agreement and EU law. Article 6 of the EEA Agreement provides that 
‘[w]ithout prejudice to future developments of case-law, the provisions of this Agreement, in 
so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of [the EU Treaties] and to acts 
adopted in application of [those Treaties], shall, in their implementation and application, be 
interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the [CJEU] given prior to the date of 
signature of this Agreement’. Article 3(2) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement further 
provides that ‘[i]n the interpretation and application of the EEA Agreement and this 
Agreement, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court shall pay due account to 
the principles laid down by the relevant rulings by the [CJEU] given after the date of 
signature’. In practice, however, the EFTA Court has not distinguished between EU case law 
arising prior to and after the adoption of the EEA Agreement.47 The Court has, in fact, stated 
that ‘the objective of establishing a dynamic and homogenous European Economic Area can 
only be achieved if EFTA and EU citizens, as well as economic operators enjoy, relying on 
EEA law, the same rights in both the EU and EFTA pillars of the EEA’.48 The homogeneity 
principle extends to fundamental rights, with the Court referring to judgments of the European 
                                                          
45 Iceland has relied on the social provisions of the Charter in infringement proceedings brought against it, but 
the EFTA Court did not engage. See Case E-12/10 ESA v Iceland para 92. However, the Court went on to confirm 
the relevance of the Charter in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA and in Case E-4/11 Arnulf Clauder. 
46 Nils Wahl, ‘Uncharted Waters: Reflection on the Legal Significance of the Charter under EEA law and Judicial 
Cross-Fertilisation in the Field of Fundamental Rights’ in The EFTA Court (ed), The EEA and the EFTA Court: 
Decentred integration : to mark the 20th anniversary of the EFTA Court  (Hart 2014) 281, 282.  
47 Carl Baudenbacher, ‘The Relationship Between the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’ in Carl Baudenbacher (ed), The Handbook on EEA Law (Springer 2016) 179, 184.  
48 Case E-18/11 Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v Kaupping para 122.  
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and CJEU as well as AG opinions in fundamental rights 
cases. 49  
Specifically, in the employment context, the EEA Agreement incorporates all of the EU 
Directives on health and safety, equality law and labour law. Having said that, ‘most of the 
principles have been developed by the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court has faithfully 
applied them’.50 As such, the EFTA Court has closely shadowed the CJEU’s interpretation of 
employment legislation, notably in the context of the transfer of undertakings.51 In Deveci, the 
EFTA Court noted that the Charter was formally of no application. Nevertheless, it went on to 
rely on Alemo-Herron without mentioning article 16 of the Charter.52 According to the Court, 
‘[t]he EEA Agreement has linked the markets of the EEA/EFTA States to the single market of 
the European Union. The actors of a market are, inter alia, undertakings’. The freedom to 
conduct a business lies therefore at the heart of the EEA Agreement and must be recognised 
in accordance with EEA law and national laws and practices. Thus, the freedom to conduct a 
business seems to have become a general principle of EEA law.  
Even without adopting the Norway model, it has already been noted that the Government 
intends to codify the existing general principles of EU law via the Withdrawal Bill. It will be 
recalled that the Charter essentially concretises pre-existing general principles. Even if neither 
the Charter nor the general principles were formally to apply, the UK courts may nevertheless 
rely upon them, even indirectly. The CJEU has long referred to ECtHR decisions even prior 
to the recognition of the Convention as a source of EU rights in the Treaty. Indeed, the EU has 
still not completed its accession to the Convention, yet this has not impeded the Court’s 
reliance on Convention-inspired rights.53 In addition, private litigants are likely to point to 
relevant CJEU judgments relating to the Charter in order to bolster their arguments. The very 
same phenomenon has been witnessed before the EFTA Court.54 
In any event, it will be recalled from earlier chapters that it has often been the general 
principles, rather than the Charter that have led to the most significant developments in the 
employment field, although it is accepted that the adoption of the Charter had an emboldening 
effect on the Court even prior to its granting of full legal effect.55 Separating the precise role 
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of the Charter as opposed to the general principles is therefore a difficult task. As the example 
of article 16 shows, it is altogether possible for the general principles and the Charter to 
diverge, despite the Charter’s purported codification of those general principles. Going 
forward, the question of whether the Charter and the general principles can actually develop 
in tandem remains unanswered. In any event, it cannot be denied that the codification of human 
rights in a written text lends itself to the increased visibility and accessibility of those rights. 
This is important not only from the point of view of litigants, but also of the courts. The 
imprimatur of the legislature should never be underestimated in its emboldening of the courts 
to rely on fundamental rights. To what extent, though, can this approach be maintained in the 
face of the competing principle of contractual autonomy at common law? In what ways does 
this concept differ from article 16 of the Charter and what are the consequences for the 
employment relationship?  
 
4. The continued role of contractual autonomy  
 
This section compares the notions of freedom of contract in article 16 of the Charter and at 
common law before considering some of the potential consequences for the employment 
relationship post-Brexit.  
4.1. Freedom of contract at common law  
 
As we saw in chapter III, freedom of contract is considered one of the cornerstones of the 
common law, with the English conception of contractual autonomy being based largely on the 
facilitation of market transactions, in contrast to the German autonomy model. Despite its 
supposed underpinning of the common law, it is remarkable how briefly the concept of 
freedom of contract is dealt with in the leading contract law text books. This may be a symptom 
of the fact that contractual autonomy is, in fact, pervasive throughout the common law and it 
is easier to demonstrate concrete examples of the concept in action rather than to set out any 
principled vision of the notion. It would, however, be wrong to assume that this is the only 
founding principle of the common law. Rather, the common law has at times shown concern 
for other values such as fairness and protecting the weaker party.56 
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In the nineteenth century, the ideal of freedom of contract was simply that ‘persons of full 
capacity should in general be allowed to make what contracts they liked’.57 The classic 
statement of contractual autonomy was made by Sir George Jessel when he said: 
[i]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public 
policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.58  
Two more precise concepts are embedded within freedom of contract. First, there is the 
freedom of a party to choose to enter a contract and on whatever terms, thereby placing 
contractual obligations firmly within the will of the parties.59 Second, there is a negative aspect 
of freedom of contract. This is the idea that there can be no liability without consent.60 
Although these elements remain the core of freedom of contract at common law, it is now 
widely recognised that they must give way in the face of competing legislative intervention, 
as discussed above. Andrews has suggested four overarching restrictions on contractual 
autonomy at common law. These are (1) public policy; (2) the parties’ ability to exclude 
liability for fraud; (3) personal capacity and the most important for our purposes; (4) statutory 
regulation.61  
In the modern context, therefore, freedom of contract is still recognised but it is ‘generally 
regarded as a reasonable social ideal only to the extent that equality of bargaining power 
between contracting parties can be assumed, and no injury is done to the economic interests of 
the community at large’.62 Employment legislation is now extensive, at times going so far as 
to impose terms on the individual contract of employment. As we have seen, terms are also 
increasingly being implied at common law. Such terms are considered to be legal incidents of 
the employment relationship from which the parties are not free to deviate without 
undermining the existence of that relationship.  
Despite the recognition that legislative intervention has essentially eroded the notion of 
contractual autonomy, at least in the employment context, the problem remains that ‘English 
law and English judges still to a great extent proceed on the assumption that the parties are 
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free to choose whether or not they will enter a contract and on what terms (…) the law does 
still rest on the assumption of freedom of choice, and where a relationship is entered into in 
which there is no choice, a Court may hold that it is not contractual’.63 Thus, it seems that 
contractual autonomy as a common law concept continues to operate as the background rule, 
with regulation building ‘on the foundation laid by the general principles of the law of 
contract’.64  
It is certainly true that the domestic legal systems of the EU Member States have largely 
developed a concept of the employment contract which has a certain degree of autonomy from 
general private law principles, being ‘treated as a special kind of contract that is analysed and 
regulated in a different way from other types of market contracts’.65 At an EU level, it is 
interesting to note that the architects of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) for 
the harmonisation of EU contract law regarded the employment contract as being excluded 
from their remit.66 This has been described as ‘an operation of isolating (…) employment law 
into its own enclave in which it is accepted that “general private law” does not rule, and in 
which a general notion of freedom of contract is specially subordinated’.67 As a result of this 
separation, ‘the law of and about the contract of employment is thus located in a special place, 
as if it were in private law but not of private law’.68  
Indeed, the classification of the employment relationship as contractual at all is not entirely 
uncontested, with many commentators categorising employment as a ‘relationship’ which is 
characterised by a 'mixture of status and contract and which is ‘not subject to the exigencies 
of the freedom of contract doctrine’.69 It is suggested, however, that the special considerations 
surrounding the employer/employee relationship do not undermine the fact that the contract of 
employment remains key to employee protection. As Deakin and Morris have pointed out, 
although ‘protective labour legislation frequently provides for “inderogable rights”, it also 
assumes the prior existence of a contract of employment’.70 Indeed, worker-protective 
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legislation can only be applied if the parties ‘have first voluntarily entered into a contract of 
employment’.71 
It is apparent that the special considerations surrounding the employment contract do not mask 
the fact that the ‘equilibrium’ between general private law principles and employment law is 
‘decidedly fragile and that the ‘employment relationship is still primarily a “private law 
relationship” even if it is regulated in a distinctive way’.72 In other words, although it is true 
that employment contracts are subject to greater limitations than general contract law, freedom 
of contract is still considered a fundamental aspect of such contracts. On the other hand, the 
recognition that freedom of contract does indeed apply in the employment field does not mask 
the fact that the concept is not without its limits. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that freedom of contract is particularly limited in the employment 
context given that parties with equal bargaining power usually ‘best know their preferences 
and are best equipped to determine the ways of protecting their interests’.73 Employment 
contracts on the other hand, are characterised by the inequality of bargaining power due to the 
differing positions of the parties. Of course, it might be argued that in such cases, the 
contractual autonomy of the stronger party is being limited so that the weaker party may also 
fully enjoy their own freedom of contract. The debate is still on-going therefore as to ‘how far 
a general function of upholding freedom of contract and giving effect to the intentions of 
parties to contracts is qualified by, or combined with, elements of social balancing or 
redistribution or controlling the abuse of contractual power’.74 This is largely because of the 
fact, that much like article 16, there are competing visions of contractual autonomy underlying 
the concept at common law. 
4.2. Contrasting visions of autonomy?  
 
Collins uses the example of Schroeder to illustrate the value placed on autonomy by common 
law judges.75 In that case, a music composer was contracted to hand over all works to a 
publisher for five years in return for royalties but with no promise that the music would in fact 
be published. The House of Lords found the contract to be void for restraint of trade. The 
Lords were persuaded that the composer’s weak bargaining position meant that the agreement 
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had been unfair even in the presence of a competitive market. For Collins, the Lords actually 
overlooked what he terms the ‘real objections’ to this type of contract, namely notions of 
power, fairness and cooperation rather than market efficiency.76 Because the composer’s 
career was entirely in the hands of the publisher, there was an unwarranted degree of 
domination and subordination.  
Collins uses this case to illustrate his own conception of the law of contract which is based on 
a new understanding of the market order, oriented around the values of unjustifiable 
domination, equivalence of exchange and cooperation which ‘merely represents a revised 
understanding of the market order and its justificatory principles, not a wholesale rejection of 
markets as the most efficient system for the satisfaction of wants’.77 As such, liberty remains 
the core principle for interpreting the market order, but it is a revised notion of liberty one that 
recognises that not all choices are worthy of protection and ‘deserving of approbation’. What 
Collins shows us is that freedom of contract is capable of being moulded and utilised for 
different ends. This is largely because the notion was not originally a legal concept as such but 
rather ‘an economic and even political ideal, which probably had its roots in the personal, 
religious and intellectual freedoms which had their origins in the Reformation’.78 It was only 
in the nineteenth century that freedom of contract as a legal rather than a political or 
philosophical principle began to emerge.  
We have already seen that continental conceptions of contractual autonomy also recognise its 
value as a tool of political or constitutional rhetoric. At the same time, civilian legal systems, 
unlike their common law counterparts, have long recognised that there are different categories 
of contract underpinned by a more or less pervasive vision of contractual autonomy. This is 
considered anathema to the common law of contract ie there is only one contract law as 
opposed to the law of contracts.79 In practice, however, the distinction has never been that 
strong. First, the common law courts themselves have refused to enforce certain types of 
agreement, whether that be because of the ‘perceived moral or social value of a contracted-for 
activity (…) the alternatives available to the contracting parties (…) the intelligence, 
sophistication, and independence of the contracting parties (…) the fact that circumstances 
have changed since the contract was made (…) and, perhaps most importantly, the basic 
fairness of contractual terms’.80 Second, and most importantly, the legislature has intervened 
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to limit freedom of contract. In the first instance, the contracting process has been modified 
when weak parties (consumers for example) face stronger parties. Another technique has been 
the regulation of the content of certain contracts. The latter technique has been particularly 
prevalent in the employment field, to such an extent that, as we have seen, the question must 
be asked whether the employment contract is really a contract at all. In what way, then, does 
the vision of autonomy at common law compare to that found in article 16 and what does this 
tell us about the potential future effects on the employment relationship?  
4.3. The relationship between article 16 and common law contractual autonomy  
 
One similarity between contractual autonomy at common law and that found in article 16 is 
that both concepts lack a clear definition. As Atiyah puts in in his seminal treatise on freedom 
of contract at common law, ‘[o]ne of its principal characteristics was its abstractness, its lack 
of particularity, and its attempt to treat all contracts as being of the same general character’.81 
We know from Alemo-Herron, though, that freedom of contract in article 16 and that found at 
common law must be different.  
It will be recalled that Lord Hope in the UKSC remarked that ‘had this issue been solely one 
of domestic law, the question would have been open only to one answer’.82 In the EAT, Judge 
Hicks said that ‘there is simply no reason why parties should not, if they choose, agree that 
matters such as remuneration be fixed by processes in which they do not themselves 
participate’.83 In other words, being bound by dynamic clauses was no more than an ordinary 
application of the principle of freedom of contract. Everything turns on the interpretation of 
the words used in the contract itself, ie on the intention of the parties as expressed in the 
contract. In Alemo-Herron, the expressed intention was to be bound by pay determinations 
negotiated externally from time to time.  
Of course, the TUD is a somewhat unusual example in that at common law, the transfer of an 
employment contract actually had the effect of terminating the contract. Here, we see the 
common law concept of freedom of contract in its interaction with employment legislation. As 
Rimer LJ put it in the CoA, decisions such as Whent amount to no more than a conventional 
application of ordinary principles of contract law to the statutory consequences apparently 
created by regulation 5 of TUPE.84 This is a clear articulation of the fact that contractual 
autonomy as a common law principle is subject to legislative intervention, more clearly so 
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when that legislation derives from the EU. What we can see, then, is that at common law, it is 
precisely freedom of contract that allows for the dynamic approach, whereas as a fundamental 
right, it is that very freedom that prevents a dynamic interpretation. Nonetheless, it is important 
to emphasise the role that the legislation plays in steering the common law in an employee-
protective direction. Outside the scope of legislative protection, the common law has continued 
to demonstrate a strong commitment to contractual autonomy, with often harsh and unexpected 
results. 
a. Expansive approach to autonomy outside of legislative protection  
 
The effects of common law contractual autonomy outside the protective influence of 
legislation can be seen in the case of Arnold v Britton.85 This case concerned the interpretation 
of a service charge contribution in the lease of a number of chalets in a caravan park. Clause 
3(2) of the lease contained a covenant to pay an annual service charge. The lessee was required 
to pay a fixed sum of £90 in the first year which increases at a compound rate of 10% in each 
succeeding year. The contention was that this resulted in an absurdly high annual service 
charge in the later years of the lease. According to Lord Neuberger, when it comes to 
interpreting a written contract, the court ‘is concerned to identify the intention of the parties 
(…) by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words’.86 In other words, what the court 
thinks should have been agreed is not a relevant consideration. As Lord Neuberger put it, 
‘[e]xperience shows us that it is by no means unknown for people to enter into arrangements 
which are ill-advised, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight, and it is not the 
function of a court when interpreting an agreement to relieve a party from the consequences 
of his imprudence or poor advice’.87 This was despite the fact that for a lease taken out in 1980, 
the annual service charge would amount to £2500 by 2015 and to £550,000 by 2072. Lord 
Carnwrath dissented, noting that the lessor’s interpretation was ‘so commercially improbable 
that only the clearest words would justify the court in adopting it’.88 This may be an extreme 
example, but it serves to demonstrate the consequences of the full force of the application of 
freedom of contract at common law in the absence of statutory intervention.  
An interesting discussion of the courts’ continued commitment to freedom of contract can also 
be seen in recent cases concerning non-variation clauses. In Rock Advertising, MWB operated 
managed office space in London. Another company, Rock, provided marketing services and 
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occupied premises managed by MWB. 89 Rock decided to expand the office space that it used, 
but was soon unable to meet this financial commitment as business did not develop as hoped. 
MWB exercised its right under the license to lock Rock out of the premises and gave notice to 
terminate the agreement.  
Rock argued that an oral agreement had been made to reschedule the licence fee payments 
under which it would pay less in the beginning and more in subsequent months to cover the 
arrears. Of particular relevance for our purpose was that MWB referred to the original written 
agreement which provided that ‘[t]his licence sets out all of the terms as agreed between MWB 
and the licensee. No other representation or terms shall apply or form part of this licence. All 
variations to this licence must be agreed, set out in writing and signed on behalf of both parties 
before they take effect’. For Kitchin LJ, this was a clear clause which precluded an oral re-
negotiation of a core term of the agreement. The question for the court was essentially whether 
a written agreement containing an anti-oral variation clause could be varied other than in 
accordance with that clause.  
The law in this area was inconsistent. In an earlier case, Globe Motors, the trial judge had 
found that it was indeed possible for the parties to agree to vary or waive a requirement that 
an agreement be amended only in writing, as to decide otherwise would have been inconsistent 
with the principles of freedom of contract.90 Beatson LJ held that ‘as a matter of general 
principles, parties have freedom to agree whatever terms they choose to undertake, and they 
can do so in a document, by word of mouth or by conduct’.91 In MWB, the judge relied on 
Globe to find that ‘the most powerful consideration is that of party autonomy’.92 He referred 
to the judgment of Cardozo J in the New York Court of Appeals in Alfred C Beatty v 
Guggenheim where he commented that ‘[t]hose who make a contract, may unmake it. The 
clause which forbids a change, may be changed like any other. The prohibition of oral waiver, 
may itself be waived’.93  
In a more recent case, however, the courts have shown themselves willing to restrict 
contractual autonomy. In Parking Eye, the UKSC had to determine whether penalty clauses 
should be permitted at common law.94 Traditionally, penalty defaults, ie a charge incurred for 
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non-performance of a contractual obligation, were not enforceable if they consisted of an 
exorbitant amount when compared with damages. Parking Eye concerned a parking fine of 
£85 incurred for overstaying the time limit at a private car park. The car’s owner argued that 
this was a penalty and was unenforceable. The UKSC said the question to be asked was 
whether ‘the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the 
contract breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the 
enforcement of the primary obligation’.95 Here, the fine was not out of proportion to the 
competing interests of preserving traffic management and space. This case nevertheless 
demonstrates that there are limits to the courts’ willingness to allow parties to any contract to 
decide the terms between themselves.  
b. Consequences for the employment relationship  
 
It is becoming apparent that freedom of contract at common law and that found in article 16 
diverge in a much more profound way than might previously have been imagined. At common 
law, rather than being an overarching ideological principle, freedom of contract may be no 
more than a pragmatic starting point which is more or less neutral when it comes to 
determining how the individual conducts their business. Article 16 on the other hand, comes 
not only with the human rights label, but also with the entire baggage of market integration, 
removing barriers to trade and more lately deregulation (although as we have seen, an 
individual right to contractual autonomy is not inherent in the free movement provisions). The 
EU is not neutral and indeed cannot be neutral when it comes to regulating the manner in 
which business is conducted. The very rationale for the EU’s single market is to prevent state 
or business behaviour that might hinder access to the market for other commercial operators 
or indeed consumers. It must be concluded that the confusion surrounding the purpose of 
freedom of contract in EU law stems from its elision with the business freedom concept. 
Although the Charter has not modified the concept of contractual autonomy at common law, 
as such, we have seen that it has displaced it due to the position of EU law in the hierarchy of 
norms. 
Having said all this, it is suggested that outside the commercial context, notably in the 
employment field, scholars have tended to be wary of notions of contractual autonomy, seeing 
the concept as being inherently deregulatory, allowing the employer to avoid employee-
protective obligations found in legislation. Perhaps, then, there are simply many perspectives 
on freedom of contract and it is not possible to pinpoint a core ‘principle’ and its effect on 
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various regulatory fields. The problem with dressing contractual autonomy in the garb of 
fundamental rights is that this diversity of perspectives is somewhat lost, with freedom of 




This chapter has shown that it is still much too early to gain a full grasp of the consequences 
of Brexit and the Charter’s impending absence for the employment relationship. This may 
largely be due to the fact that, as this thesis demonstrates, the current impact of the Charter on 
the employment relationship is far from clear. The Withdrawal Bill itself is still undergoing 
significant changes, with the Lords having voted on its retention. Even at this juncture, the 
Charter’s precise fate remains uncertain.  
It is equally clear that difficult questions lie ahead as to the future status of existing 
employment legislation as interpreted by the CJEU. This issue is further complicated by the 
Bill’s simultaneous removal of the Charter while preserving (at least to some extent) a role for 
the general principles. As the example of unfair dismissal shows, the courts are unlikely to 
have consideration of Charter rights when legislation is no longer underpinned by such a right 
or when it is outside the scope of EU law.  
Finally, it was shown that it will be difficult to replicate the provisions of the Charter via the 
common law. The common law is simply not capable of bearing the weight of the specificity 
of the Charter’s Employment Rights. In any event, it was shown that in many cases in which 
the Charter could have been relied on, it was not and to no detriment for the litigants. In 
addition, Brexit (or indeed the public suspicion of ‘foreign’ rights standards) has led to the 
courts considering domestic sources of such rights instead.  
The message from the analysis of common law contractual autonomy is more mixed. In some 
respects, it can be seen that freedom of contract at common law is simply not as radical as its 
cousin in article 16 of the Charter. Common law autonomy is largely neutral, whereas article 
16 comes with the baggage of human rights and Treaty freedoms. At the same time, labour 
lawyers have been long-suspicious of autonomy principles and with good reason. The common 
law, although at times malleable to legislative intervention can still lead to the watering down 
of employment legislation. Having said that, there are examples from the case law showing 
that even outside the scope of legislative protection, there is room for the courts to deny parties 
the right to decide contractual terms between themselves. The impact of the Charter’s absence 
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on the employment relationship clearly remains to be played out but may not be as significant 






The research question set out by this project was whether the EU Charter has had an impact 
on the employment relationship. The thesis has shown that it is not possible to talk about the 
Charter’s ‘impact’ in any global sense as, in reality, the Charter influences various aspects of 
the employment relationship in difference ways. This thesis opened with a discussion on the 
‘variable geometry’ of the Charter, emphasising the widening gap in the treatment of the 
Employment Rights and article 16. In reality, it might be more appropriate to talk about 
‘variable geometries’. It makes little sense to talk of the ‘impact’ or the ‘implications’ of the 
Charter in the abstract. It is quite clear from the above, that the Charter’s reach is heavily 
dependent on the particular context. The Charter is not an autonomous legal tool to be 
exploited by litigants as they see fit. Rather, it is constrained by rules both internal and external 
to the text of the Charter itself. These varied geometries can be conceived of through the notion 
of divergence. First of all, it has been shown that the Employment Rights and the freedom to 
conduct a business found in article 16 have had diverging impacts on the employment 
relationship. Indeed, even within each of those provisions, the case law has shown that the 
CJEU relies on the Employment Rights and contractual autonomy to varying degrees. Second, 
the Charter has a different effect depending on whether we look at it from a macro or a micro 
level. Finally, post-Brexit, contractual autonomy will continue to have a role via the common 
law (albeit in a different form), while it may not be possible to replicate the Employment 
Rights.  
 
1. The diverging impact of the Employment Rights and freedom of contract  
 
The assessment of the impact of both the Employment Rights and freedom of contract on the 
employment relationship has been funnelled through the Charter’s constitutional functions. 
The Charter can act as a tool of interpretation of employment legislation and a standard of 
review against which the adoption or amendment of employment legislation at EU level or 
Member State level can be assessed. The Employment Rights have yet to be raised as a 
standard of review of EU employment legislation. The discussion of their impact at this stage 
must remain largely speculative. As tools of interpretation, the Employment Rights appear not 
to have had much of an impact. The CJEU has simply continued its purposive approach to the 
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interpretation of EU employment legislation such as the Working Time Directive. The CJEU 
continues to repeat its mantra that legislative rights such as paid leave are ‘particularly 
important principles of EU social law from there can be no derogation’. Here, the Employment 
Rights merely reinforce an interpretation that could be achieved using existing approaches, 
with the Charter simply acting as a new point of reference.  
Clearly, the extent of the Charter’s influence on the employment relationship, if viewed 
through the lens of the Employment Rights alone, has been rather disappointing. And yet, it is 
possible that we simply expected too much from this document that was explicitly intended to 
codify the existing piecemeal and cautious approach to fundamental rights in the employment 
field. This was to be expected given the myriad barriers impeding the effectiveness of the 
Employment Rights. And yet still, it is possible to be too sceptical. The reality is that the case 
law has shown, and continues to show, that the Charter’s Employment Rights do have the 
potential to act as a bulwark against legislation that might undermine the rights of workers. To 
this extent, the CJEU has been emboldened in that its long-held approach to interpreting 
provisions of legislation as important social rights has now been codified in the Charter. In 
addition, the Employment Rights have been most frequently invoked as a tool of interpretation. 
Lessons from the equality field show that the Charter’s true potential lies in its role as a 
standard of review of EU legislation. 
As a contrast to this ‘potentiality’, article 16 has already been used in a much more radical 
way. Freedom of contract has long existed as a concept in EU law yet it has always been 
limited, both because it was infrequently invoked and because it was constrained by competing 
social or economic interests. Even when the concept was included in the Charter, the early 
case law showed a continued reluctance on the part of the CJEU to invoke it. There was nothing 
inevitable, therefore, about the CJEU’s subsequent aggressive reading of business freedom in 
Alemo-Herron. The Charter, just like the general principles, does not contain any 
comprehensive statement of freedom of contract and yet in Alemo-Herron, the CJEU was able 
to interpret that concept in such a way as to disrupt the CJEU’s existing balanced approach to 
the recognition of business freedom and contractual autonomy as both general principles and 
in its early case law as fundamental rights. Although, in the CJEU’s subsequent use of article 
16 it has continued to give mixed signals. Sometimes, article 16 is explicitly relied on while at 
other times, the CJEU overlooks it entirely. It is now clear that the Employment Rights and 
freedom of contract have had differing degrees of impact on the employment relationship. That 
being said, there is evidence of divergence within the Charter provisions themselves.  
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In the context of the Employment Rights, we have seen that article 31 on fair and just working 
conditions has been the most prevalent both as a tool of interpretation and a standard of review. 
This is probably because of its close connection to the Working Time Directive, a piece of 
legislation that has been subject to much litigation. Similarly, the impact of article 16 has 
largely been confined to the context of the transfer of undertakings. The other Employment 
Rights have largely been overlooked. Article 30 is usually dismissed as the case is outside the 
scope of EU law. Article 27 is disregarded as a mere principle and article 28 is usually 
deployed as a rhetorical hook on which to hang the CJEU’s recognition of the importance of 
collective bargaining. The consequences of the rights/principles distinction can be seen here. 
Article 31 is clearly a right and therefore has the strongest impact. Article 28 is a right, but 
collective bargaining is not governed at Union level. Articles 27 and 30 are principles and so 
their potential impact on the employment relationship is heavily constrained.  
 
2. The divergence between the micro and macro perspective  
 
Clearly, it is too early to determine whether, what are only a small number of cases, will lead 
to the EU’s Lochner moment. There is nothing inherent in the Charter that necessarily leads 
to the conclusion that the economic freedoms must be prioritised over the Employment Rights. 
Nevertheless, drawing parallels with Lochner allowed us to consider some of the potentially 
far-reaching consequences for the EU’s ability to regulate the employment relationship into 
the future. From a rather narrow perspective, its impact on the employment relationship can 
be seen in the undermining of the purpose of employee-protective legislation and the false 
presumption of the need to balance employment provisions with freedom of contract. This 
makes the expansive and formalistic notion of autonomy found in Alemo-Herron all the more 
alarming. A more substantive vision of autonomy would recognise that employees, via their 
right to work, also enjoy a degree of autonomy in the guise of this competing fundamental 
right in article 15. Attempts to circumvent article 16 through other avenues, namely the 
development of new forms of regulation such as nudging, may not be as respectful of 
contractual autonomy as they first appear, or worse still, may become yet another tool of the 
deregulatory agenda.  
Beyond the broader consequences for employment regulation, it was shown that the Charter 
has had a much more limited impact on the individual employment relationship. The method 
chosen to examine this question was the influence of the Charter on the hierarchy of norms at 
domestic level. The common law and employment legislation have already had a long history 
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of interaction and it can be seen that the common law has, at times, been modified in the wake 
of competing social rights, but access to the Employment Rights continues to be policed by 
common law concepts such as employee and worker status. As such, the British courts have 
not given any real consideration to the fact that a piece of legislation was linked to the Charter 
or other human rights concepts.  
We should not really be surprised that the Charter has played such a limited role in the 
domestic hierarchy given that it strictly only applies when Member States are acting within 
the scope of EU law. On its face, article 16 is more powerful that the Employment Rights and 
yet it is equally constrained by the notion of the ‘scope of EU law’. Outside that scope, article 
16 has no influence. This has particular consequences for the employment relationship. The 
scope of EU employment legislation (and therefore national implementing legislation) is rather 
narrow. It does not cover the whole raft of employment rights that are granted to workers under 
both legislation and case law. Outside of that protective scope of EU law, the UK legislature 
will be further free to amend or to repeal existing employment legislation regardless of whether 
it was once underpinned by a Charter and even if that Charter right derived from a pre-existing 
general principle. It is less surprising, therefore, that the Charter has had an even more limited 
role within the internal hierarchy between the contractual terms themselves. Neither the 
Charter, nor human rights concepts more generally, are likely to lead to the introduction of a 
stronger notion of inderogability into the employment context. In terms of contractual 
autonomy, there are already significant limitations on the ability of employer’s to avoid the 
employment relationship altogether. Overall, the Charter has had very little impact on the level 
of the individual employment relationship.   
Having said that, the hierarchy of norms in the employment context is now in flux and we do 
not yet know where the pieces may fall. What we do know, is that the Charter is unlikely to be 
included among them. It was demonstrated that the Charter’s absence is likely to effect the 
continued influence of employment rights and business freedom in different ways.  
 




Post-Brexit, the Employment Rights will continue to exist, but only as ordinary legislation or 
in the case of articles 31 and 28, potentially as general principles (albeit with a reduced 
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function). This legislation will be easy to amend, thereby undermining that status of those 
rights even further. Attempts to replicate the Employment Rights via any concept of common 
law constitutionalism are unlikely to be successful. Given the historic hostility of successive 
British governments to the Employment Rights found in the Charter, it is altogether possible 
that they will not survive long after the Brexit process, unless the EU insists on their continued 
application in return for a future trading relationship. By contrast, freedom of contract has a 
long pedigree at common law and will continue to apply in this guise post-Brexit. As we have 
seen, contractual autonomy at common law and the concept found in article 16 may be 
different. What this means for the future regulation of the employment relationship is unclear. 
Certainly, article 16 has presented significant challenges for employment law and is likely to 
continue to do so. Even if common law contractual autonomy does not come with the added 
complications of being a fundamental right attached to the Treaty freedoms, it is still a concept 
of which most employment lawyers will remain rightly suspicious.  
Without doubt, the instincts of both labour lawyers and Charter (euro) sceptics have been 
wrong. Far from representing a Trojan horse, bringing in its wake alien social rights to disrupt 
the common law’s traditional flexibility, the Charter has had the effect of reinforcing or even 
emboldening the development of countervailing business freedom and contractual autonomy. 
One really must question the motivation lying behind Conservative hostility to the Charter. If 
anything, the free-marketeer, libertarian Brexiters should welcome, indeed celebrate, its 
commitment to business freedom. Labour lawyers, by contrast, should lament both the 
Charter’s simultaneous ineffectiveness in protecting Employment Rights and its juxtaposition, 
indeed confrontation of these same rights with business freedoms. For Charter sceptics, it may 
be a case of not knowing what we had until it is gone. There is no doubt that without the 
Charter, the human rights landscape in the employment field will be somewhat impoverished. 
The Charter, if nothing else, provides the clearest articulation of the most fundamental values 
of the European Union and should act as a sign post or a guiding star for the courts, legislatures 
and peoples of Europe. With this protection gone, it is likely that UK employment law will 
travel in a different and altogether more deregulatory direction.  
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